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OPSOMMING 
Die opvatting bestaan dat die Suid-Afrikaanse oorgangsonderhandelinge geinisieer is 
deur gebeurtenisse tydens 1990. Hierdie stuC.:ie betwis so 'n opvatting en argumenteer 
dat 'n noodsaaklike tydperk van informele onderhandeling voor formele kontak bestaan 
het. Gedurende die voorafgaande tydperk, wat bekend staan as vooronderhandeling, het 
lede van die Nasionale Party regering en die African National Congress (ANC) gepoog 
om kommunikasiekanale daar te stel en sodoende die moontlikheid van 'n 
onderhandelde skikking te ondersoek. Deur van 'n fase-benadering tot onderhandeling 
gebruik te maak, analiseer hierdie studie die oorgangstydperk met die doel om die 
struktuur en funksies van Suid-Afrikaanse vooronderhandelinge te bepaal. Die volgende 
drie onderhandelingsfases word onderskei: onderhande/ing oor onderhandeling, 
voorlopige onderhande/ing, en substantiewe onderhandeling. Beide fases een en twee 
word beskou as deel van vooronderhandeling. 
Volgens hierdie studie het die eerste fuse so vroeg as 1985 onder uiters geheime 
omstandighede begin, en het dit so voortgeduur tot met die finalisering daarvan in 1990. 
Drie verskillende kommunikasiewee het ontstaan gedurende hierdie tydperk. Die eerste 
weg was tussen regeringsamptenare en die gevange Nelson Mandela. Gereelde 
ontmoetings is gehou in 'n poging om 'n verstandhouding te kweek oor wat nodig sou 
wees om Suid-Afrikaanse politiek te normaliseer. Die tweede weg het meestal op 
internasionale grondgebied afgespeel deur middel van tussengangers, en het 'n indirekte 
kommunikasiekanaal tussen uitgeweke ANC lede en amptenare van die regering se 
Nasionale Intelligensie Diens bewerkstellig. Die derde weg het bestaan uit ona:thanklike 
pogings deur rolspelers buite die regering om kominunikasie te bewerkstellig met die 
uitgeweke ANC-leierskap. Alhoewel die wee op verskillende vlakke die 
onderhandelingsproses beiinvloed het, word al drie as deel van die eerste fase beskou. 
Die tweede fase is ingelei deur F. W. de Klerk se parlementere openingstoespraak in 
1990. In hierdie fase het nuwe onderhandelaars na vore getree en dit is gekenmerk deur 
'n deurlopende poging van die regering en die ANC om 'n kontraksone vir substantiewe 
onderhandeling te skep. Prominente skikkings het ingesluit die Groote Schuur Minuut, 
die Pretoria Minuut, die D.F. Malan Verdrag, en die Nasionale Vredesverdrag. Die 
totstandkoming van 'n veelparty-onderhandelingsforum, Codesa, het die einde van 
voorlopige onderhandeling aangedu~ alhoewel slegs tydelik. Na 'n dooiepunt bereik is 
in Mei 1992 het dit noodsaaklik geword om terug te keer na voorlopige onderhandeling. 
Die daaropvolgende bilaterale ontmoetings tussen die regering en die ANC is 
gekenmerk deur die ontwikkeling van prominente onderhandelingsverhoudings, veral 
tussen RoelfMeyer en Cyril Ramaphosa, en tussen Nelson Mandela en F.W. de Klerk. 
Met die ondertekening van die Rekord van Verstandhouding en die totstandkoming van 
die Veelparty-onderhandelingsproses in 1993, het vooronderhandeling tot 'n einde 
gekom. 
Deur hoofsaaklik op vooronderhandeling te fokus, probeer hierdie studie om beide 
bestaande vooronderhandelingsteorie te verfyn, asook moontlike riglyne vir ander 
diepverdeelde samelewings te identifiseer. Vir 'n onderhandelingsproses om suksesvol 
te wees is dit noodsaaklik dat blywende goedertrou en 'n werkbare kontraksone tot 
stand gebring word voor die aanvang van enige vorm van substantiewe onderhandeling. 
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ABSTRACT 
The perception exists that the South African transitional negotiations were initiated by 
events during 1990. This study challenges such a perception and argues that prior to 
formal contact there existed a crucial period of informal bargaining. This period, known 
as prenegotiation, saw members of the National Party government and the African 
National Congress (ANC) attempt to communicate in order to gauge the possibility of a 
negotiated settlement. By utilising a phaseological approach to bargaining/negotiation, 
this study analyses the transition in order to ascertain the structure and functions of 
South African prenegotiation. The following three negotiation phases are identified: 
bargaining about bargaining, preliminary bargaining and substantive bargaining. Both 
of the first two phases are regarded as part of prenegotiation. 
This study argues that the first phase started as early as 1985 under conditions of 
immense secrecy and stayed that way until its conclusion in 1990. Three different 
avenues of communication were established during this time. The first avenue existed 
between government officials and the imprisoned Nelson Mandela. Regular meetings 
were held in an attempt to create an understanding of what was needed to normalise 
South African politics. The second avenue operated mostly on international soil, 
through intermediaries, and became an indirect channel of communication between 
exiled ANC officials and officials in the government's National Intelligence Service. 
The third avenue consisted of independent efforts by extra-governmental role-players to 
establish communication with the exiled ANC leadership. All three avenues impacted 
differently on the negotiation process, yet all are regarded as part of the bargaining 
about bargaining phase. 
The second phase was initiated by F.W. de Klerk's opening of parliament speech in 
1990. In this phase new negotiators came to the fore and it signified an ongoing attempt 
by the government and the ANC to establish a contract zone for substantive bargaining. 
Prominent agreements included the Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute, the D.F. 
Malan Accord and the National Peace Accord. The establishment of a multi-party 
negotiating forum, Codesa, ended preliminary bargaining, but only temporarily. After 
deadlock occurred in May 1992 it became necessary to revert back to prenegotiation 
issues before further progress could be made. The bilateral discussions that ensued 
between the government and the ANC saw the most prominent bargaining relationships 
of the transition develop, notably between Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa, and 
between Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. With the signing of the Record of 
Understanding and the establishment of the Multi-P~ Negotiating Process ·m1993, 
~ ,--· .. . ~ ~--
prenegotiation came to an end. 
In focussing primarily on prenegotiation, this study attempts both to refine existing 
prenegotiation theory and to identify possible recommendations for other deeply 
divided societies. For the success of a negotiation process it is an imperative that lasting 
good faith and a workable contract zone are established prior to any form of substantive 
bargaining. 
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CHAPTER! 
OUTLINE 
1.1. Introduction 
The first democratic elections in the history of South Africa, on Apri126- 29 1994, was 
regarded in the eyes of the world as nothing short of a miracle. Due to the perceived 
intractability of the South African conflict, such a relatively peaceful transition was 
widely proclaimed to be a triumph of the human spirit as well as a timely lesson for 
similar conflict-ridden societies. The euphoria has since given room to more sober 
reminders of the problems and issues surrounding governance in a post-apartheid South 
Africa. Concomitantly, the negotiations that led to a transition taking place at all, are 
perceived as part of South Africa's "previous" history. Popular history accounts and 
·• 
academic analyses of the transition are appearing sporadically, but the full range of 
lessons to be learnt from the South African transitional negotiations have not been 
explored. 
1.2. Problem statement 
South Africa continues to be a deeply divided society and any effort to diminish the 
existing lines of conflict is dependent on the parameters set by the 1996 constitution. 
Yet, the successful resolution of current domestic and international conflict can 
similarly depend on the lessons taught by a decade of South African negotiations that 
preceded the 1996 constitution. It is my view that the South African case is specifically 
significant regarding the initial stages of the negotiation process - broadly referred to as 
the prembgotiation phase. The addressing of prenegotiation issues comprised the largest 
part of the South African negotiation process, and I am of the view that the successful 
completion of this stage was imperative to the success of the process as a whole. What 
this study pursues is a detailed description ofthe how's, what's and where's of phased 
negotiations, with a specific focus on prenegotiation. This can not only create a better 
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understanding of the South African transition and its outcomes, but also ensure a 
significant contribution to the discipline of conflict resolution. 
A public perception exists that the South African transitional negotiations were initiated 
by the opening of parliament address ofF.W. de Klerk on 2 February 1990. I argue that 
this view is based on an incorrect analysis of both the events that preceded his speech as 
well as the concept of negotiation. In contrast, I hold the view that an analysis of the 
South African transition is incomplete if it only focuses on post-1990 events, as 
numerous preparatory events occurred in the preceding years. Yet, a context has to be 
found in which to analyse the 'behaviour' of role-players before 1990. A phaseological 
approach to conflict resolution serves as the ideal framework for creating such a 
context. Although numerous approaches to the study of negotiation exist, the 
phaseological approach aims to fulfill a clarifying role regarding the timing and 
development of a bargaining relationship. It does not preclude or disregard the other 
methods of analysis, but can be successfully integrated with them. Despite the absence 
of consensus over the exact number and structure of phases, all phase theorists agree on 
the existence of a broad initial stage, here referred to as prenegotiation. 
Hence, two research problems are identified in this study: 
• The first problem asks the question: "When did the South African transitional 
negotiations commense?" It relates to the perception among many analysts that, 
despite bargaining and bargaining-related events prior to 1990, the South African 
negotiation process only started after February 1990. In view of this, I propose a 
distinct schematic analysis of the negotiation process based on phases; one which I 
feel more accurately reflects the dimensions of the case. 
• The second research problem involves the question: "What lessons from the South 
African case can be applied to similar deeply divided societies?'' To answer this 
question it is necessary to first reflect on the above-mentioned schema and discern 
what functions the phases performed. Following from this, tangible propositions 
will be presented which could ensure success in the resolution of similar conflicts. 
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1.3. Limitations of the study 
Research on the prenegotiation phase in the South African transition is lacking, partly 
due to the absence of a uniform perspective on what constituted prenegotiation, but also 
because of the exclusive and secretive conditions under which South African 
prenegotiation was conducted. Both secrecy and exclusivity were salient characteristics 
throughout the negotiations, to the extent that they became functional to the success of 
the process as a whole. This proves to be an obstacle to research, and will likely stay so. 
It is doubtful whether all the facts surrounding the motivations, decisions and dialogues 
of participants will ever be disclosed. 
Due to the intensity and institutionalised nature of past South African conflict, issues 
such as identity, nationalist aspirations and cultural fears were intertwined with hard 
bargaining. The way in which some of these issues were resolved remain contentious 
even at the time of writing. One example is the simmering debate among the supporters 
of the previous National Party (NP) government over the latter's conduct during the 
negotiations on issues such as group rights and minority protection. 1 For leaders on all 
sides to come forward at this stage and admit errors of judgement might be asking too 
much, compounding efforts to establish the facts surrounding certain bargaining events. 
A significant problem encountered during the research for this study is the habit of role-
players, when asked about the negotiation process, to couch their answers in a 
retrospective analysis of the events. This is also referred to as 'reinventing history.' It is 
doubtful whether current interpretations by participants always reflect the views they 
held at the time of negotiation. To counter the possible misrepresentation of facts 
caused by this phenomenon, two strategies were employed. First, an attempt was made 
to assembl~ as many divergent viewpoints as possible in order to compare the 
similarities and differences between negotiators' perceptions. Secondly, certain fixed 
questions were asked to all interviewed respondents to gauge their positions and 
correlate the answers. 
1 The analysis of negotiation does not stop at the last bargaining event. A crucial element of any 
negotiation process is the outcome. Subsequently, the interplay of power continues after agreement is 
reached, as parties, due to the reaction of their respective audiences to the deals presented to them, 
bicker over who ensured the best bargain. An analysis of the outcome, however, falls outside the scope 
of this study, and where it is discussed it will be viewed in relation to the preceding phases. 
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It should be noted that the first strategy was not as effective as hoped. To ensure a 
balanced analysis a roughly equal number of participants from the previous government 
and the ANC respectively were approached for interviews. Although it was expected 
that not all of the persons approached would agree to be interviewed, it was found that 
the negotiators of the previous government were much more approachable and willing 
to participate. The end product is a set of interviews which seems to be numerically 
biased in favour ofthis group. This was not the intention. 
The reasons for the ANC members' unwillingness to participate are open to speculation. 
A first explanation could be the prominent positions that most ANC negotiators now fill 
in government - which involve busy schedules and huge workloads - vis-a-vis the 
positions of the ex-government negotiators, which made the former unavailable for 
interviews of this nature. A second explanation could be the public perception that the 
previous government received a far worse deal than the ANC in negotiations, leading 
their participants to perceive this as an ideal opportunity to 'set the facts straight.' A last 
explanation, which were offered by some negotiators in their correspondence, could be 
that the South African case has become such a popular area of study for South African 
and international scholars alike, that the continuous granting of interviews becomes 
repetitive and simply takes up too much time. 
I have to stress that the above set of circumstances does not in any way invalidate the 
study's findings. The interviews that were conducted are still relevant as indicators of 
the perceptions of former government negotiators. For ANC points ofview, the Herman 
Giliomee papers:Patti Waldmeir interviews were utilised, which were just as effective 
as personal interviews. Furthermore, the main focus of this study is the negotiation 
process as it presented itself through events, an area over which the perceptions of 
negotiators ~ve a limited impact. 
1.3.1. Theoretical shortcomings 
South Africa proved to be a demanding case for an analysis based on prenegotiation 
theory, as the manner in which events transpired between 1985 and 1993 did not always 
match with existing theoretical assumptions. Despite the fact that anomalies are to be 
expected in a unique case such as South Africa, I am of the opinion that many of the 
visible discrepancies rather serve to identify theoretical shortcomings of the 
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phaseological approach. Some of these shortcomings are due to the levels of analysis on 
which research about prenegotiation is usually conducted. Thus, in analysing the South 
African transition, this study pursues a dual purpose. Whereas the phaseological 
approach is used on the one hand to assess the prenegotiation phase in the South African 
transitional negotiations, the specific dimensions of the case are in turn used to refine 
the phaseological approach. To this end proposals regarding the successful resolution of 
intergroup conflicts, based on the South African experience, will be put forward. 
1.4. Summary of the argument 
In short, I argue in this study that the South African transition to democracy was a 
process based on a sequence of bargaining events, starting in 1985 and ending in 1993, 
which can be analysed in terms of their timing, functions, participants and outcomes -
factors that indicate the phase of which each event was part. I further argue that each 
phase in a negotiation process fulfils certain functions, hence the success of each phase 
rests on the adequacy of agreements in every prior phase. The South African transition 
was not initiated by an impulsive leap into an unsure future, based on the metaphysical 
experiences of an individual. Although the possible consequences were never truly 
understood, it was a structured and calculated exercise to manage the inherent conflict 
in the system of apartheid, and solve the impasse that became a striking feature of the 
system during the 1980's. All bargaining events were not co-ordinated from a central 
point, yet, as a whole they comprise the range and scope of South African 
prenegotiation. 
1.5. Research questions 
The following research questions are addressed in this study: 
• When did prenegotiation commense? 
• What caused prenegotiation to commen5e? 
• Which phases can be identified in the South African transitional negotiations? 
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• What differentiates these phases from each other? 
• What role did audiences play during the negotiations? 
• What role did secrecy play in the negotiations? 
• What role did individual negotiators play in the process? 
• What are the crucial determinants for success in prenegotiation? 
• Is the success of prenegotiation a determinant to the success of the process as a 
whole? 
1.6. Methodology 
1.6.1. The literature study 
The data-gathering process in this study comprised of two parts, a literature study and a 
set of personal interviews. In the literature study sources were divided into two broad 
categories, namely books and articles which deal with the dimensions of 
negotiation/bargaining and conflict resolution, and books and articles which deal with 
the South African negotiations. Category one was studied first so as to create an 
analytical context in which to view further reading. Specific attention was given to 
those sources that analysed the process of bargaining/negotiation as a process based on 
stages or phases. Personal correspondence with academics in the field also functioned as 
a way of coming to terms with the theory. 
In category two a wider variety of sources were used. Apart from books and articles 
which offered some sort of interpretation of the process, sources such as newspaper 
articles and Internet documents on the transition were important to offer specific 
accounts of significant events. This part of the literature study was also crucial in 
helping me to identify the primary role-players in the transition process. The 
information gathered here was used in the preparation of interviews. 
1.6.2. Personal interviews 
The second part of the data-gathering . process consisted of personal interviews 
conducted with role-players in the negotiation process and opinion holders (e.g. 
academics) with knowledge of the South African case or an interest in bargaining 
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issues. Respondents were sorted in a way that reflected their participation in the process 
chronologically. They were contacted in that order and asked for permission to be 
interviewed. 
The documentation that accompanied each interview request included a cover letter, 
stating the request, the reasons therefore and the nature of the study, and an abstract of 
the research proposal for the study. Respondents were assured complete anonymity 
should they prefer it. If respondents granted the request for an interview, a follow-up 
communication was sent to them, reaffirming the date and time of the particular meeting 
and stating whether it would be anonymous. Respondents were also asked for their 
permission that a tape recording could be made of the interviews. 
Between May 1996 and October 1997 a total of eleven interviews were conducted with 
eight different respondents. Where a respondent was only willing to grant a single 
interview, permission was obtained to send clarifying questions as the need arose, to 
which the person could reply in writing. The recorded interviews were all transcribed by 
me. The interviews were not only used for information-gathering purposes, but also 
served as ideal opportunities to build up contacts. Hence, respondents were probed for 
the names of other role-players that might not have surfaced in the literature study. 
1.6.3. Interviews by other researchers 
Because some role-players declined to be interviewed, interview transcripts of another 
researcher were used to supplement the existing data In the research for a recent book, 
Patti Waldmeir conducted a vast number of interviews with negotiators and other 
participants in the South African transition.2 The transcripts of her interviews were 
handed to the Archive and Manuscript library at the University of Cape Town, who 
made copies available to researchers, subject to the agreement that the copies are to be 
used only for research purposes and/or study and not to be published. In the event of the 
transcripts being referred to or quoted from, the full reference for the item must be 
listed. 
2 Waldmeir, P. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa, 
London: Viking, 1997. 
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1. 7. Type of interview 
The decision to make use of personal interviews as a method of data-gathering was 
taken due to the lack of information available on certain aspects of the South African 
negotiations. The specific type of personal interview that was used is the focused 
interview. Nachmias & Nachmias identify four characteristics of this form of interview: 
• It takes place with respondents known to have been involved m a particular 
expenence. 
• It refers to situations that have been analysed prior to the interview. 
• It proceeds on the basis of an interview guide specifying topics related to the 
research hypotheses. 
• It is focused on the subjects' experiences regarding the situation under study. 3 
Although the encounter between the interviewer and the respondents is structured 
respondents can be given considerable liberty in expressing their definition of a 
situation that is presented to them. This interview technique was preferred because it 
offers the interviewer enough room to probe if sensitive issues are addressed. 
1.8. Final validation 
I am aware of a common perception that theorists of negotiation and negotiators 
themselves hold different views as to what constitutes a negotiation process. This is due 
to the fact that negotiation can involve impulsive decisions as well as the strategic use 
of tactics such as bluffs and threats, all of which are difficult to convert into theory. In 
order to bridge possible conceptual disparities in interviews, I usually presented 
respondents with a schematic representation of the phases in the South African 
transitional negotiations as seen by me, and asked them to comment. Some remained 
skeptic, but even their criticism proved very useful in developing a model which 
accurately reflects the phases as they transpired. 
3 Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. Research Methods in the Social Sciences, (4th ed.), London: Edward 
Arnold, 1992, p. 224. 
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As a final validation for the methodology used, I submit the following statement: 
"Although many skilled negotiators view there work more as an art or craft than as a 
systematic body of propositions, knowledge, and teachable skills, nevertheless, if 
skillfully drawn out, they can provide certain lessons. ,,4 
1.9. Structure 
In Chapter 2, a theoretical framework is developed. First .of all, the dimensions of the 
conflict is discussed, as South _Africa exhibited a distinct form of conflict. The 
discussion then proceeds to the . process known as bar_gaining/negotiation, which is a 
method of conflict resolution. Bargaining/negotiation also constitutes the theoretical 
backbone of any analysis which deals with the interaction of two or more entities in the 
pursuit of some sort of deal. Different approaches to the study of bargaining/negotiation 
are discussed, in order to differentiate effectively between the phaseological and other 
approaches. The latter part of the chapter is assigned to a discussion of the 
phaseological approach. The assumptions of the approach, the main advocates thereof, 
the differing views on the number and structure of phases, and the possible 
shortcomings of the approach are discussed. This serves the purpose of defining the 
prenegotiation phase. A choice is made as to what constitutes the most effective 
framework when analysing the South African case. The three phases identified are 
bargaining about bargaining, preliminary bargaining and substantive bargaining. Both 
the first two phases are regarded as part of prenegotiation. Lastly, the characteristics and 
functions ofprenegotiation are discussed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the bargaining about bargaining phase of the South African 
transitional negotiations. In it, I argue that the mutual movement towards a 
consideration of negotiation as a conflict resolving mechanism started in May 1985. The 
bargaining about bargaining phase was not repeated and lasted until February 1990. As 
the first phase had a crucial impact on the rest of the process, specific attention is given 
to its functions. The three different forums in which discussions took place during this 
4 Eurich, A.C., foreword to The Practical Negotiator, by Zartman, I.W. and Berman, M.R New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1982, p. ix. 
~ \. 
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phase are discussed in detail. This is done to ascertain how and why the decision was 
made to transform the South African political dispensation through negotiation. 
In Chapter 4 an analysis is made of the preliminary bargaining phase. Despite a move to 
substantive bargaining in December 1991, it became necessary to revert back to 
preliminary bargaining in 1992 in order to break a deadlock in discussions. This 
movement is of crucial importance when attempting to understand the negotiation 
process, hence it is analysed in detail. Although references are made to instances of 
substantive bargaining, the main focus falls on events associated with preliminary 
bargaining. 
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the argument and proposes some recommendations 
for other deeply divided societies, based on lessons learnt in the South African case. 
The recommendations deal with, among others, the roles of leaders, individual 
negotiators and supporters in establishing a successful negotiation process. 
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CHAPTER2 
A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY 
OF PRENEGOTIATION 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to define a theoretical construct such as prenegotiation, its context has first to 
be described. It is of no use to any scholar studying South Africa if the crucial role of 
prenegotiation in the transition is underlined without first stating its role. Why is 
prenegotiation important? In response to what was prenegotiation pursued? What origin 
does prenegotiation theory have as an approach to conflict resolution? Answers to these 
questions should first be sought before any meaningful discussion on the objectives of 
prenegotiation can continue. To just state that prenegotiation theory is but one approach 
to the study of negotiation, and negotiation in its turn is but one possible response to a 
situation of conflict, is insufficient. Concepts such as conflict and negotiation formed an 
integral part of South African political dynamics between 1985 and 1994, and 
prenegotiation as a methodological approach is embedded in their parameters. 
2.2. Conflict 
2.2.1 Defining conflict 
The conceptual delineation of conflict is a difficult task. Bercovitch states that "[f]ew 
concepts seem more central to the social sciences than the concept of conflict, yet few 
have created more confusion and been studied in a less systematic way than the concept 
of conflict".1 Schelling corresponds the diverse theories of conflict with the diverse 
meanings of the word conflict. He identifies two broad groupings in this diversity. 
According to him, where the study of conflict is concerned, one group regards conflict 
as a pathological state and seeks to find. its causes and treatment. The other group 
1 Bercovitch, J. ''Problems and Approaches in the Study of Bargaining and Negotiation," Political 
Science, vol. 36, no. 2, December, 1984, p. 125. 
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accepts conflict as a given and studies the behaviour associated with it. 2 This is a handy 
distinction, but seems to be a slightly oversimplified view of the study of conflict. A 
study aimed at finding possible causes and solutions to conflict does not necessarily 
have such a strong normative view of the conflict itself. This is evident from Zartman's 
statement that the cause of conflict is an incompatibility of goals or actions. 3 
By keeping the above-mentioned in mind, an attempt can be made to define the 
parameters of conflict. Bercovitch defines conflict as " ... a perception of incompatibility 
between two or more actors and the range of behaviour associated with such 
perceptions.'"' Mitchell asserts that "[i]t is a truism that conflict between unequals are 
conducted differently from conflicts between equals. " 5 This states not only the presence 
of a power relationship in a situation of conflict, but also implies that perceptions about 
power come into play. Levinger and Rubin identify six properties that, according to 
ll them, all social conflict have, irrespective of the level of analysis: 
• It derives from perceived diYergence of interest. 
• It can be addressed in a relatively small number of ways. 
• It contains a mixture of motives. 
• It can be ended through either behaviour or attitude change. 
• It leads to outcomes that range from purely destructive to purely constructive. 
• It stems from a broad variety of causal antecedents.6 
Levinger and Rubin further state that in social conflict one or both parties perceive their 
interests as divergent -whether or not they are divergent. Again a notion of perceptions 
come into play. Indeed, they continue to state that "[c]onflicts may derive from 
competition for scarce resources, differences in values or beliefs, or the parties' 
2 Schelling, T.C. The Strategy ofCoriflict, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 
3. 
3 Zartman, LW. "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution," in Deng, F.M. and 
Zartman, I.W. (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991, 
p.299. 
Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," p. 125. 
5 Mitche11. C.R "Asymmetry and Strategies of Regional Conflict Reduction," in Zartman, LW. and 
Kremenyuk, V.A (eds.), Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1995, p. 27. 
6 Levinger, G. and Rubin, J.Z. "Bridges and Barriers to a More General Theory of Conflict," Negotiation 
Journal, vol. 10, no. 3, July 1994, p. 202. 
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differing definitions of their relationship."7 The implication of this is that, although 
conflict has a structural and physical dimension, the nature of a conflict is equally an 
intellectual construct based on parties' experiences and perceptions. These experiences 
can also create a muddled perception of conflict, as conflict over one set of issues can 
be obscured by conflict over issues at a different level. 
According to Horowitz an acceptable definition for conflict is one of the most elusive 
aspects in ethnic conflict theory. He states that most definitions embody an element of 
struggle, strife, or collision which serves the purpose to distinguish conflict from 
competition. Furthermore, according to various definitions conflict involves a struggle 
for mutually exclusive rewards or ~he use of incompatible means to realise a goal. For 
Horowitz, mutually exclusive ends or means need not be intrinsic to all conflict. His 
proposed definition regards conflict as a struggle aimed at gaining objectives and 
simultaneously neutralising, injuring or eliminating rivals; thereby leaving the nature 
and incompatibility of objectives and methods open to further scrutiny. 8 
All scholars do not hold to the view that there should be a distinction between conflict 
and competition. As seen above, Levinger and Rubin define conflict as deriving from 
competition, and in South Africa, competition over scarce resources was an important 
factor in the conflict. In my view neither of the above definitions are adequate in their 
,-
own to describe conflict as it transpired in South Africa. It is necessary to construct a 
composite definition from those listed above. The following definition will be used in 
this study: 
Conflict exists where two or more parties hold incompatible positions towards each 
other due to differences in values or beliefs, or competition for certain scarce 
resources; which can be influenced by tangible events or mutual perceptions. In such a 
situation, parties aim to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals. 
7 Ibid., p. 202. 
8 Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 95. 
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2.2.2 Types of conflict 
Smyth identifies two important distinctions when analysing conflict. The first he 
identifies is a distinction between conflicts that involve a change in the power 
relationship of parties and conflicts that do not. The second distinction is between 
conflicts where a mutually acceptable, agreed-upon institution to deal with changes in 
the power relationship between parties exist, and conflicts where such an institution is 
not evident.9 He illustrates these distinctions by identifying the types of conflict 
associated with different configurations of the distinctions. This is illustrated in Figure 
2.1. 
Figure 2.110 
Conflicts, Power Relationships, and Institutions 
Agreed-Upon 
Institutions 
No Agreed-
Upon 
Institutions 
Power 
Relationship 
Altered 
II 
Democratic 
elections 
Mergers 
IV 
Revolutions 
Secessions 
Devising new 
international 
agreements 
Power 
Relationship 
Does Not 
Chan2e 
I 
Market 
transactions 
Civil suits 
m 
Football riots 
Spontaneous 
civil 
disturbances 
9 Smyth, L.F. "Intractable Conflicts and the Role ofldentity," Negotiation Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, October 
1994, p. 311. 
10 !bid 
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Smyth regards Quadrant IV as the definitional area where most severely intractable 
conflicts can be found. Conflicts are regarded as intractable when no possible solution 
seems to be present. I argue that before 1990, South Africa found itself in a conflict 
situatio:..1 akin to those in Quadrant IV. According to Smyth, conflicts in this category 
focus on the altering of a power relationship, but there is no agreed-upon institution 
which can contain the tension, as the institution is usually the focus of tension. As 
examples he identifies ethnic calls for self-determination; accusations of institutional 
discrimination; accusations of imperialism; and appeals for the extension of universal 
suffrage as a basic human right. 11 
I further argue that between 1990 and 1994, as negotiations for a new dispensation took 
form, conflict in South Africa moved towards Quadrant II. In this category, if parties 
agree in principle that a coalition government should be formed, negotiation centres 
around its mechanisms of control. Based on assessments of their support, party leaders 
propose mechanisms that would offer them the most control in a coalition government. 
Smyth argues that in such negotiations a tolerance for ambiguity is needed from parties, 
as leaders are aware that their assessments might not be accurate and therefore attempt 
to include alternative measures as we~. 12 Although numerous issues are negotiable, 
such as cabinet positions and policies, Quadrant II implies that all parties accept the 
mechanism, such as a cons.!_itution, which sets the parameters of control. This was 
signified by the negotiated interim constitution in South Africa. What is of interest for 
this study, is how South Africa managed to move from Quadrant IV to Quadrant II in 
the space of8 years (1985- 1993). 
A majority of the studies that deal with conflict and conflict theory have an international 
or regional focus. According to Horowitz attempts to develop conflict theory in political 
science have been made in connection with international relations. He cautions against 
this and argues that despite certain similarities between interethnic relations and 
international relations, the application of international conflict theories on ethnic 
conflict can prove to be forcing unknown parameters on a distinct field. 13 Levinger and 
11 !bid, p. 314. 
12 !bid, p. 313. Two significant examples that illustrate such ambiguity in the South African case are the 
abstract procedure which was known as "sufficient consensus"; and the stipulation written into the 
interim constitution that cabinet should make decisions in a "consensus seeking spirit." 
13 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, p. 95. 
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Rubin identify four levels of analysis in the study of conflict, namely international, 
interorganisational, intergroup and interpersonal. 14 This study analyses conflict on an 
intergroup level of analysis. Yet, most of the work that has been done on prenegotiation 
operate on an interpersonal or internationallevel. 15 Part of the aim of this study is to test 
the applicability of prenegotiation theory on intergroup conflict, and determine what 
generalisations can be ~e to similar conflicts. The situation therefore necessitates the 
exploration of international conflicts and their nature. 
As South African conflict before 1994 operated on the intergroup level under a system 
of forced racial classification, the obvious conclusion was that it was an ethnic conflict. 
Disregarding the common sense factor, models such as that of Rabushka and Shepsle, 
which ,focus on ethnic entrepreneurs who deliberately increase the salience of ethnic 
criteria in public issues, have been applied successfully to the South African case. 16 Yet, 
different perceptions occur on this issue. Giliomee argues that South African conflict is 
communal rather than ethnic and motivates it as follows: 
"Ethnic is too narrow a category for it refers to a group with a common 
belief in a shared ancestry and history. This would fit the Afrikaners, but not 
the larger white community, or for that matter, the African or larger black 
community. Communalism ... operates within less rigid boundaries and is 
more geared to the politics of group entitlement which makes special claims 
upon the state for rewards and services on the basis of past performance (or 
exploitation)."17 
Horowitz provides a sober analysis of the definitional problem when he says: "There is 
a conflict in South Africa that has something to do with race. This is about as far as 
agreement runs among many of the participants and interpreters of the conflict." He 
14 Levinger and Rubin, "Bridges and Barriers," p. 202. 
15 See Douglas, A. Industrial Peacemaking, New York and London: Colwnbia University Press, 1962.; 
Morley, I. and Stephenson, G. The Social Psychology of Bargaining, London: George Alien & Unwin 
Ltd., 1977.; Stein, J.G. (ed.), Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, 
Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
16 See Du Toit, P. ''Bargaining about Bargaining: Inducing the Self-Negating Prediction in Deeply 
Divided Societies- The Case of South Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, no. 2, June 1989, 
f· 211. 
7 Giliomee, H "The Communal Nature of the South African Conflict," in Giliomee, Hand Schlemmer, 
L. ( eds. ), Negotiating South Africa's Future, Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1989, p. 114(*). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
continues to identify two types of conflict in South Africa: the conflict itself, and the 
metaconflict- the conflict over the nature of the conflict. 18 One of the three problems he 
identifies that is exacerbated by the conflict about conflict is the fact that it contracts the 
range of acc.eptable innovations and future arrangements. 
Horowitz's assessment points to a dilemma which was experienced by the parties in 
South African prenegotiation. Parties were confronted with a definite existence of 
differing opinions on what the conflict was all about, let alone differing opinions on 
how to resolve the conflict.19 What was needed for any progress to take place was first 
of all a meeting of minds on the nature of the conflict. In game theory jargon, it was 
necessary for the parties to redefine the conflict from a zero-sum conflict, in which one 
party gains all and the other looses everything, to a non-zero sum conflict, in which 
mutual gains and mutual losses are to be expected. 20 This is were this study enters into 
the debate, by arguing that only by taking part in a process structured by the 
characteristics of prenegotiation could such a common perspective emerge. 
(Pre)negotiation, however, was not the obvious choice. The resolution of conflict via a 
mutually accepted set of rules and agreements was but one method of addressing the 
political stalemate that existed in South Africa. Alternative options were never fully 
discarded until in the later stages of the process. 
2.2.3 Responses to conflict 
Levinger and Rubin identify six alternative approaches of responding to conflict. They 
are: 
• Domination 
One side attempts to impose its will through physical or psychological means. 
• Capitulation 
One side unilaterally cedes to the other whatever the latter demands or expects. 
18 Horowitz, D.L. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991, pp. 1-2,27. 
19 See Du Toit, P. Power Plays: Bargaining tactics for transforming South Africa, Halfway House: 
Southern Book Publishers, 1991, pp. 10-33, for a discussion of three contending regime models for a 
'better' South Africa. These models are each embedded in a different view of conflict in South Africa. 
2° For a more elaborate discussion of zero sum versus non-zero sum encounters, see Zartman and Berman, 
The Practical Negotiator, pp. 12- 13. 
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• Withdrawal 
One side walks away from the conflict, refusing to be a party to it any longer. 
• Inaction 
18 
One side deliberately does nothing in the hope that the passage of time will change 
things more to one's liking. 
• Negotiation 
Two or more interdependent parties use the give-and-take of offers and counteroffers in 
an effort to build a mutually acceptable settlement. 
• Third Party Intervention 
An individual or group that stands apart from a particular dispute helps the parties to the 
conflict to identify issues and move towards settlement?1 
In South Africa, negotiation was chosen from the above range as the most viable 
alternative for managing a peaceful transition. As mentioned above, such a situation 
where the South African conflict would be addressed by way of negotiation, was not a 
foregone conclusion during the late 1980's and early 1990's, when the ANC and the 
NP-government seemingly searched for a possible mutual solution. It was possible for 
any of the six options to emerge as the preferred choice for at least one of the parties. 
~ndeed, it was part of the risk taken by them in the establishment of a bargaining 
relationship. For the purposes of this study only negotiation will be discussed in detail, 
as it was the strategy of choice for both the ANC and the government. 
A final conceptual clarification should be made regarding possible responses to conflict. 
Various scholars stress the importance of distinguishing between different end-goals 
when responding to conflict. Here they differentiate between the resolution, 
management and settlement of conflict. 
Zartman regards the resolution of conflict as " ... the elimination of the causes 
underlying conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties." He emphasises that it 
is a tall order, and usually only occurs over long periods of time, not by direct action. 
According to him the management of conflict " ... refers to the elimination, 
21 Levinger and Rubin, ''Bridges and Barriers," pp. 203 - 204. 
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neutralization, or control of the means of pursuing either the conflict or the crises."22 
This may involve measures such as denying both sides the means of combat, 
neutralizing one party's means by slightly increasing the other's, separating the 
combatants in space and time and substituting conferences to talk for fighting. 23 
Levinger and Rubin distinguishes between two kinds of solutions: settlement and 
resolution. For them, settlement " ... refers to behavioral change, as when two sides find / - -
a way to reach agreement, but their basic attitudinal opposition remains largely 
unchanged." According to them this usually occurs when one party resentfully 
acquiesces to the other's demands, thus feeling coerced. Resolution, for Levinger and 
Rubin, " ... not only implies a c~_o_f_~havior but also convergence in underlying 
attitudes." This is usually accompanied by the internalisation of new patterns of action 
by the parties, reflecting the shift in attitudes. 24 
According to Hill conflict is settled and not resolved when parties are coerced into 
accepting a1 solution. She proceeds to quote Burton on this topic, who states: "A conflict 
is resolved, as distinct from settled, when the outcome is self-supporting, and for this to 
happen the new relationship must be negotiated freely by the parties themselves. "25 
In view of the above perspectives I approach the South African negotiations as an 
attempt in conflict resolution. This assessment is based on the argument that the 
perceptions of conflict between the two major parties shifted from widely disparate to 
similarly focused, which signified a new approach of both to their bargaining 
relationship. They did this on own admission and was not forced into accepting an 
imposed view. Hence, both parties moved from positions aimed at eliminating the 
'enemy', towards an acceptance of a political resolution based on mutually agreed-upon 
parameters and rules. 
22 Zartman, I.W. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985, p. 8. For reasons of clarification, Zartman regards conflict as " ... the underlying issue in 
dispute between parties", and crisis as " ... the active outbreak of armed hostilities." 
23 !bid, p. 8. 
24 Levinger and Rubin, ''Bridges and Barriers," pp. 204-205. 
25 Hill, B.J. "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem-Solving Workshops to 
Theory'', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 26, no. 1, March 1982, pp. 114- 115. 
I 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
2.3 Negotiation 
2.3.1. Introduction 
The uses and interpretations of the word negotiation are diverse. Not only is it utilised 
when referring to everyday acts such as "negotiating roads/obstacles/life" etc., but as a 
concept it has come to mean more than might be expected. For example, in South Africa 
a common perception has emerged that a revolution was negotiated, stretching the 
meaning of both revolution and negotiation past their previously conceived conceptual 
limits. This leads to the dilemma identified by Ikle when he states that certain concepts 
" ... appear to be well understood until we wish to define them."26 To this can be added 
Zartman's words: "After all these years, we still have trouble living with concepts. 
Unlike tangible realities, such as a dog, concepts have no clear beginnings and ends, no 
unambiguous middles, and not even a usefulness that is beyond debate."27 Not only is 
the defining of the concept problematic, but the broader understanding of the process 
called negotiation is as important and as difficult to comprehend. Bercovitch succinctly 
addresses the problems relating to the conceptualisation of negotiation when he states: 
"Of all the strategies that have been used to contain the destructive potential 
of conflict and encourage cooperation, negotiation is undoubtedly the most 
important. Yet notwithstanding its timelessness, universality, and centrality 
to international conflict management, the process of negotiation is little 
understood. Most scholarly attention devoted to the subject focuses on the 
give-and-take and exchange of concessions that constitutes on aspect of 
negotiation. But if we are to comprehend, let alone improve the process of 
negotiation, we must take into account other forms and aspects of the 
process. We must strive to understand negotiation's complexity, and the 
context in which it is embedded; perhaps more important, we must ensure 
that its dynamic nature - the way states and other actors move from stage to 
stage, from conflict to compromise, is adequately grasped." 28 
26 lkle, quoted in Morley and Stephenson, Social Psychology, p. 20. 
27 Zartman, LW. "Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions," in Stein (ed.), Getting to the Table, p. 1. 
28 Bercovitch, J. "International Negotiations and Conflict Management: The Importance of 
Prenegotiation," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 13, no. 1, 1991, p. 7. 
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As Bercovitch mentions, and as Levinger and Rubin29 also argue, negotiation is but one 
strategy to address conflict. Despite its ubiquitous nature, it needs to be delineated 
accurately in a study such as this. 
Before a discussion is held on negotiation it is necessary to refer to the status of the 
concepts negotiation and bargaining. Unfortunately no universal consensus exists 
whether these two concepts can be regarded as synonymous. Some scholars use them 
interchangeably and others differentiate between them on the basis of their scope and 
functions. In the theoretical delineation of both concepts, any distinction will be noted, 
yet in the analysis negotiation and bargaining will be used interchangeably. This is 
necessary to prevent confusion, as the variety of sources dealing with the South African 
case differ. It is not done haphazardly, as I have studied these sources and it is my 
opinion that all the references to bargaining and negotiation fall within the defmition of 
negotiation accepted by this study. 
2.3.2 Defining negotiation/bargaining 
According to Smyth, negotiation " .. .is not the application of analytical logic to a 
problem but an exercise in talking (preferably accompanied by listening)."30 This may 
seem like a vague definition, but it alludes to one of the most important characteristics 
of negotiation, namely interaction. 
Zartman mentions that negotiation is regarded by some scholars as one of the basic 
processes of decisionmaking, along with legislation and adjudication. He stresses that it 
is not a static event, and involves the selection of a single value out of many for 
implementation and action. He identifies four components in a negotiation process: 
• It involves the participation of parties as actors, and the interaction among them. 
• It involves values, interests or demands that parties present to the other parties for 
the purpose of collective choice. 
29 See section 2.2.3. 
30 Smyth, "Intractable Conflicts," p. 319. 
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• An important component is the outcome ofnegotiations.31 Zartman stresses that all 
negotiations have an outcome, even if they are regarded as unsuccessful. 32 
• Negotiation signifies mutual movement, and only if movement from initial positions 
occurs, has negotiation taken place. 33 
Five further assumptions of negotiation are identified by Zartman in order to distinguish 
it more fully from legislation and adjudication: 
• The negotiation process is seen as having a mixed-motive nature. This involves the 
presence of common and conflicting goals among parties. 
• The negotiation process is assumed to have a non-zero sum character. This is due to 
different values assigned to different issues, or the presence of side payments, which 
accompanies the agreement to negotiate. 
• Imperfect information exists between parties regarding the other's resources and 
their willingness to distribute them. According to Zartman, the verbal encounter of a 
negotiation process is designed to shape a new reality, not reveal a given reality. 
• Variable values, which stem from controlled communication come into play. 
• Controlled communication in its turn indicates the inherent element of power. 
Zartman defmes power as " ... the volitionally controlled ability of one party to 
produce ... movement or re-evaluation on the part of the other party, often more 
generally as the ability of one party to cause another to change behavior in an 
intended direction. "34 
Bercovitch regards bargaining and negotiation as interchangeable concepts and he 
identifies six characteristics of bargaining and negotiation that support Zartman' s 
assessment. They are: 
31 Outcomes can be defined as" ... the results of negotiations or the ways in which settlements occur." See 
Putnam, L.L. "Challenging the Assumptions of Traditional Approaches to Negotiation," Negotiation 
Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, October 1994, p. 338. 
32 For a discussion of the role that perceived outcomes can have on parties' approach to negotiations, see 
Atkinson, G.G.M The Effective Negotiator: A practical guide to the strategies and tactics of conflict and 
bargaining (2nd ed.), London: Quest Research Publications. 1977, pp. IV- VI. 
33 Zartman, LW. (ed.), "Introduction" The 50% Solution: How to Bargain Successfully with Hijackers. 
Strikers, Bosses, Oil Magnates, Arabs, Russians, and Other Worthy Opponents in This Modern World, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 7-8. 
34 Ibid., pp. 9- 18. 
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• Bargaining and negotiation is a conflict management mechanism rooted in all social 
systems and involving at least two analytically distinct actors in conflict over 
resources or positions. 
• These actors join voluntarily m a process designed to manage their conflict, 
implying that the actors can choose whether to enter the process, as well as accept or 
reject its outcome. 
• Actors are part of a social relationship in which they have both common and 
conflicting interests. 
• Bargaining and negotiation as a conflict management mechanism is rooted in the 
perception of the actors, who knowingly try to alter the perceptions of each other. 
• Bargaining and negotiation operates within two parameters: expanding cooperation 
in the interests of the system or environment; and maximising each actor's 
objectives and interests. 
• The relationship is conducted m a sequential manner, consisting of repeated 
exchanges of information, evaluation and decisions in order to reach an acceptable 
outcome.35 
Rubin and Brown refer to the divergent meanings of bargaining and negotiation in 
everyday use. They note that references to bargaining usually involve an interaction of 
individuals over some sale or purchase, whereas negotiation is used in connection with 
interaction involving complex social units. Despite some differences, they regard the 
two concepts as mostly similar and explicitly state that they use them interchangeably. 
Consequently they defme bargaining as " ... the process whereby two or more parties 
attempt to settle what each shall give and take, or perform and receive, in a transaction 
between them. "36 Rubin and Brown admit that this is a restrictive definition, and 
continue to identify five structural and psychological characteristics of bargaining 
relationships. These are: 
• At least two parties are involved 
• The parties have a conflict of interest with respect to one or more different issues. 
35 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," p. 127. 
36 Rubin, J.Z. and Brown, B.R The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, New York: 
Academic Press, 1975, p. 2. 
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• Regardless of the existence of prior experience or acquaintance with one another, 
the parties are at least temporarily joined together in a special kind of voluntary 
relationship. 
• Activity in the relationship concerns (a) the division or exchange of one or more 
specific resources and/or (b) the resolution of one or more intangible issues among 
the parties or among those whom they represent. 
• The activity usually involves the presentation of demands or proposals by one party, 
evaluation of these by the other, followed by concessions and counterproposals. The 
activity is thus sequential rather than simultaneous. 37 
According to Bercovitch "[m]ost scholars view negotiation as a process designed to 
help the parties agree on the distribution of values and resources between antagonists." 
He refers to a number of definitions. 38 Fisher and Ury define negotiation as " ... back and 
forth communications designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have 
some interests that are shared and others that are opposed." Cohen sees negotiation as 
" ... a structured dialogue of claim and counter-claim in which an attempt is made by the 
accredited representatives of states to reconcile opposing views and reach agreement on 
subjects of mutual concern." Ikle regards negotiation as" ... a process in which explicit 
proposals are put forward for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchange or 
the realization of a common interest."39 
According to Bercovitch, the above definitions do not address all the aspects of 
negotiation. He argues that negotiation is not merely a quantitative move along some 
metric dimension, but occur in the context of a relationship extending over time. It is 
also subject to many constraints and influences that stem from that relationship, and 
have among others psychological, economic and legal aspects. Bercovitch argues that 
Gulliver's definition accurately describes negotiation as a process of interaction and 
strategic decisionmaking, when Gulliver defines negotiation as " ... the whole range of 
interactions between the two parties in dispute. It embraces everything that occurs, from 
the initiation and recognition of the dispute, to the final outcome.'"'0 
37 Ibid., pp. 6- 15. . 
38 The definition of Rubin and Brown as noted above is also mentioned by Bercovitch. As this has already 
been outlined, it will not be discussed again. 
39 Bercovitch, "International Negotiations," pp. 9-10. 
40 !bid 
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According to Bercovitch, the activities identified in association with negotiation should 
also be kept in mind, namely information exchange and the revision of expectations; the 
use of social influence strategy and tactics; and a joint decision. A very important 
observation is made by Bercovitch, which relates to the focus of this study. He states 
that " ... the overall process of negotiations begins before the actual trading of offers and 
concessions, and ends well after an agreement on these has, or has not been, 
achieved.'"'1 [my emphasis] 
Bercovitch argues that it is necessary to differentiate between different types of 
negotiation. He identifies the following elements as factors which influence the type of 
bargaining: 
• Level of analysis 
He identifies two broad levels of analysis. In the first, the behaviour of individuals who 
are in a conflict relationship are involved, and in the second the behaviour of 
representatives of groups, nations and other collectivities are involved. This can be 
subdivided into international and intergroup negotiation. Bercovitch stresses that it 
should not be assumed that the process is similar on all levels. 42 
• The character of interactions 
Two types of interactions are distinguished. Distributive interactions, according to 
Bercovitch, are characterised by competitive behaviour, commitments, misperceptions, 
and other processes that may intensify conflict. Integrative actions exhibit a call for 
openness and a willingness to examine new possibilities and behaviour that is 
exploratory and aimed at solving problems.43 
• The context ofbargaining and negotiation 
The social context in which bargaining and negotiation takes place may affect the nature 
of the process.44 
41 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
42 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," pp. 128- 129. 
43 Ibid., p. 129. 
44 Ibid. 
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According to Bercovitch certain variables may also affect the course and character of a 
bargaining process. They are divided into the following three categories: 
• Personal factors 
These include individual characteristics, needs and attitudes expectations that actors 
bring with them to the bargaining process. 45 
• Ftole factors 
These influences are attached to expectations ofthe actors' reference groups. They can 
strengthen the bond between actors, as they are aware of similar expectations on the 
other side(s).46 
• Situational factors 
Such factors refer to social and psychological conditions under which negotiation 
transpires. They are grouped in the following way: 
CJ Physical components: e.g. location of bargaining, neutrality of the site, 
arrangements for conflict management. 
CJ Social components: e.g. the number of parties involved, presence of third parties. 
CJ Issue components: e.g. tangible or intangible conflict issues and their dimensions. 
CJ Components relating to interpersonal orientation: e.g. the presence of 
communication channels, openness or secrecy of the process. 
• Interactional factors 
These factors focus on the prior relationship between parties and the nature of the 
interdependence. They include: 
CJ The parties' attitudes towards each other. 
CJ The distribution of power between parties. 
CJ The way communication is conducted. 
CJ To what extent parties utilise social influence strategies.47 
45 Ibid., p. 130. 
46 Ibid., pp. 130- 131. 
47 Ibid., pp. 131 - 132. 
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It can be seen that many of the definitions on bargaining and negotiation significantly 
overlap. This shows that negotiation exhibits certain salient characteristics irrespective 
of the discipline it is embedded in. It is, however, necessary to delineate the specific 
parameters of negotiation as it is understood in this study. The definition of negotiation 
on which I base my argument, is that of Zartman and Berman. They defme negotiation 
as: 
" ... a process m which divergent values are combined into an agreed 
decision, and it is based on the idea that there are appropriate stages, 
sequences, behaviors and tactics that can be identified and used to improve 
the conduct of negotiations and better the chances of success. "48 
The crucial assumptions for this study that are evident from the above definition are the 
voluntary, interactive nature of negotiation; and its sequential structure which can (and 
should) be manipulated in order to improve the chances of a mutually beneficial 
agreement. By accepting that these assumptions are of primary importance in the 
analysis of South African prenegotiation, it does not mean that other assumptions are 
disregarded. They assist in enhancing the concept of negotiation, but to a lesser extent. 
It is necessary to provide a relevant, compact definition of negotiation when proceeding 
with this study, and it is my opinion that the definition of Zartman and Berman is the 
most appropriate to fulfill that goal. 
2.3.2.1. The norm of good faith 
Implicit in Rubin and Brown's assessment of a bargaining relationship as a "special 
kind of voluntary relationship" is the recognition of good faith as a crucial factor in 
successful negotiations.49 In the South African negotiations, the establishment of good 
faith proved to be decisive in many instances to move the process forward. As a concept 
it can be broken down into a number of constituent parts, which need to be addressed in 
order to create a successful bargaining relationship. These are: 
48 Zartman and Berman, The Practical Negotiator, pp. 1 - 2. It should be noted that this definition is 
aimed at international negotiation. As it shall be seen, however, it is aptly suited for the dimensions of the 
South African case which exhibited various characteristics of international negotiation, but also continues 
to be an exceptional case in many instances. 
49 See Section 2.3.2. 
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• a rejection of unilateral strategies 
According to Du To it, good faith is evident when all parties discard the notion of using 
negotiation procedures, venues and processes to pursue victory on their own terms, in 
other words 'talking the opponent into submission. ' 50 
• an undertaking to keep promises 
According to Bacharach and Lawler, good faith entails that once a bargainer makes an 
offer, it cannot be retracted and once agreement is reached, it must be enforced. 51 
Both of the above elements of good faith can only be forthcoming if parties possess 
over the following: 
• a belief in reciprocity 
A party can only establish whether its opponents will act in accordance with the 
commitments mentioned above through previous experience. Prenegotiation serves as 
the ideal forum for parties to gauge the willingness of their opponents to reciprocate. 
• mutual trust 
To believe opponents when they undertake to keep to their promises and refrain from 
unilateral acts, an amount of trust is necessary. Atkinson identifies three areas of trust: 
Cl trust in intent - parties are convinced their opponents want an agreement 
Cl trust in process - parties undertake to keep with the conventions of negotiation 
Cl trust in implementation- parties agree to implement any agreement52 
2.3.3 The contract zone 
As seen above, negotiation can be regarded as an opportunity to transform an essentially 
zero-sum conflict into a non zero-sum configuration. This ensures that all the parties 
involved will have gained something at the end of negotiations. It does not exclude 
compromise, however. To accede to demands and arguments from the other side(s), 
50 Du Toit, P. "Bargaining Power: Dependence Capabilities and Tactical Options in South African 
Politics," Politikon, vol. 18, no. 2, June 1991, p. 87. 
51 Bacharach, S.B. and Lawler, E.J. Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes, San Fransisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1981. 
52 Atkinson, G. Negotiating the Best Deal: Techniques that really work, Cambridge: Director Books, 
1990, p. 19. 
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without capitulating entirely to them, demands from negotiators a firm grasp of their 
party's policies and goals for negotiation. Therefore every party approaches talks with a 
clear idea of what they really want, what they are ultimately prepared to concede and 
what would not be worth negmiating for. 53 I argue in this study that successful 
negotiation depends on the ability of the parties to find some form of common ground 
or mutually appeasing propositions. This area of convergence is called the contract 
zone. 
The contract zone is, however, only the small area of convergence found in usually 
widely disparate viewpoints. As was noted, parties approach negotiations with an 
elaborate model of their needs and wants and how far they are prepared to bend over 
backwards. This positioning of parties can be depicted on a continuum ranging between 
each party's idea of the perfect settlement. The continuum-model used in this study will 
be based on the representation given by Atkinson. For each party, Atkinson states, there 
is firstly an ideal settlement (IS), which he defines as the "most favourable settlement 
which could with realism be achieved in negotiation ... and is established on the basis of 
bargaining power rather than idle hope". This is usually the point of reference from 
which parties enter negotiations, and make their opening demand. Secondly, he 
identifies the realistic settlement (RS): " ... that point of settlement fully justified by 
bargaining power which could be reached with reasonable skill in negotiation and no 
unforeseen adverse circumstances". Thirdly there is the fall back position (FBP), 
defined as " ... the point beoynd [sic] which confrontation will be preferred".54 The 
contract zone, which he terms the "parameters of bargaining" represents the area of 
overlap between the two sides. 55 Figure 2.2. represents the negotiation continuum. 
53 Of course the perception each party has of the power relationship among contenders influences all these 
decisions as well, but for this section focus will be placed on the positions themselves. 
54 Zartman and Berman argue that this is a puzzliiig concept, as the very nature of negotiation through 
persuasion is to make the other party re-evaluate its position. See Zartman and Berman, The Practical 
Negotiator, p. 122. 
55 Atkinson, The Effective Negotiator, pp. 42 - 43. 
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Figure 2.2.56 
2.3.4. Different approaches to the study of negotiation 
As negotiation is a multi-faceted process, it comes as no surpnse that different 
approaches exist in the study of any given bargaining relationship. Although certain 
approaches are better applied to specific types of conflict and negotiation, such as game 
theory to evenly matched bilateral negotiations e.g. the Cold War, most tend to be fluid 
enough so as not to preclude interaction with other approaches. Zartman states that 
although different approaches aim to explain negotiation outcomes in terms of different 
variables, the line of distinction is often blurred between some of them. 57 According to 
Bercovitch all the approaches concern themselves with the question of bargaining 
effectiveness, and the elements which are regarded as most important in bargaining 
behaviour. The latter includes two-party interaction, conflict, responsive behaviour, 
cooperation and joint determination. Bercovitch, however, is of the opinion that the 
approaches do vary considerably in terms of their reliance on independent variables, 
internal consistency and logical completeness. He describes the scope of these 
approaches as ranging from descriptive to analytic to predictive. 58 
By synthesising the work of Zartman and Bercovitch, at least seven distinct approaches 
to negotiation can be identified. They are: 
56 !bid 
51 Zartman, The 50% Solution, p. 20. 
58 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," p. 132. 
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• The Historical approach 
According to Zartman this approach explains a given outcome through a particular set 
of ingredients or through one unique element. 59 Bercovitch states that this approach 
suggests that conflict outcomes are determined by specific historic inputs. He argues 
that although it provides a detailed description of personalities, settings and events 
present in a specific bargaining episode, it cannot be easily replicated. To extrapolate or 
generalise from a historical study is very difficult. 
• The Structural/Resources Approach 
According to Zartman the structural approach explains outcomes in patterns of 
relationships between parties or their goals, and reflect parties' relative strength.60 
Bercovitch describes the explanations of bargaining offered by this approach as focused 
on the distribution of power, skills, knowledge, and other resources, and refers to it as 
the resource approach.61 He argues that its main shortcoming is an inability to cope with 
the intrinsic difficulties of explaining outcomes. 62 Both authors argue that the 
structura1Jresource approach remains attractive because of its capacity to make 
theoretical predictions regarding outcomes in a bargaining situation.63 · 
• The Strategic/Game-theoretic approach 
Zartman's description of the strategic approach focuses on the element of choice, as 
determined by the way values are structured and parties select alternatives. Skill and 
power do not play a role, as all choices are based on the assumption of rationality. He 
argues that they are of a normative nature, hence they propose methods of maximising 
gain in a situation where all sides have access to information. 64 
59 Zartman, The 50% Solution, p. 20. 
60 Ibid., p. 23. 
61 It should be noted here that power is the most important resource, as the status and availability of 
knowledge and skills are indicators of a parties relative position of power. What is also significant is the 
distinction between actual power and perceived power. For an analysis of the South African bargaining 
situation before 1991 based on this approach, see Du Toit (1991). 
62 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," p. 133 - 134. 
63 Ibid., p. 134.; Zartman, The 50% Solution, p. 25. 
64 !bid, p. 26. 
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Bercovitch differentiates between approaches which strive to relate outcomes to a 
number of independent variables, and game-theoretic approaches which aim at plotting 
a bargaining relationship as an abstract, mathematical model in which outcomes and 
moves can be predicted and ordered preferentially. The latter attempt to prescribe what 
the best strategy for each party is, and to what outcome that would lead. They focus on 
possible solutions to mixed-motive relationships. He differentiates between a number of 
game categories, which are based on seven basic assumptions which permit parties to 
search for a solution to problems of conflict. 65 
• The Personality types/Psychological approach 
According to Zartman this approach runs the risk of reducing parties in negotiation to 
caricatures, as it regards the personality types of negotiators to be the main variable 
influencing outcomes. Propositions are made in this approach as to which personality 
types will be able to negotiate successfully with each other (usually persons with similar 
backgrounds). Zartman argues that personality types can have an influence, but that 
there are very few pure personality types, which negates such a reductionist view.66 
Bercovitch states that the psychological approach embraces the micro level of analysis,. 
by assuming that conflict outcomes are determined by a restricted set of personal 
variables. For him, the merit of the approach lies in the importance of identifying 
different personal characteristics and how they affect conflict reducing strategies. 
However, because it cannot embrace the macro level of analysis as well, it has a limited 
use when determining what factors influence bargaining outcomes. 67 
• The Behavioural skills/Social-psychological approach 
Despite different levels of enthusiasm by the authors, the approach based on 
behavioural skills as identified by Zartman, and the social-psychological approach of 
Bercovitch describe the same approximations. Zartman identifies its historic roots by 
referring to codes of conduct for negotiators and appropriate qualities that they should 
develop as proposed by historic documents. He states that the entrance of social 
65 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," pp. 137 - 138. See this source for a discussion of the 
assumptions and game categories. As this study does not rely on a game-theoretical analysis it will not be 
discussed in further detail. 
66 Zartman, The 50% Solution, pp. 27- 29. 
67 Bercovitch, ''Problems and Approaches," pp. 134- 135. 
• 
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psychologists into the study of negotiation signified the first attempts to analyse the 
impact of behavioural traits, such as toughness, trust and threats, on bargaining 
situations. The main aim is to gauge the effectiveness of such traits in the search for an 
agreement, as well as their conduciveness in a situation where all parties utilise them to 
some extent. Zartman's main criticism against this approach is the lack of insight it 
offers into the process of negotiation. 68 
Bercovitch regards the social-psychological approach as the only one which treats 
bargaining outcomes as products of personal, role, situational and interactional factors.69 
He argues that as an approach it takes a systematic look at all aspects of bargaining, and 
tries to bridge the gap between theory and reality. By viewing conflict management as 
operational in three time dimensions, namely antecedent, concurrent and consequent, it 
~tudies the interaction of input variables as mediated through the bargaining structure on 
the basis that they determine outcomes. 70 
• The Process variables/Cognitive and learning approaches 
The process variables approach, for Zartman, differs from approaches who deal with 
outcomes derived from various types of initial factors. Here, negotiation is seen as a 
challenge-and-response encounter where the moves that parties make are the inputs, and 
negotiation is a learning process. Offers and counteroffers are regarded as exercises in 
power, and each offer determines the following counteroffer. The result is variable 
values assigned to resources rather than prefixed perceptions on the worth of a 
concession or demand. 71 
Bercovitch makes a further distinction and identifies both cognitive and learning 
approaches, which are related. The former assume that parties' perception of future 
expectations influences outcomes, and the latter sees outcomes as a function of their 
experience of past interactions. According to Bercovitch cognitive approaches are 
useful when explaining why parties did or did not use certain strategies. LearninK 
approaches assume that the. rate at which parties learn (to cooperate with or trust each 
68 Zartman, The 50% Solution, pp. 29 - 30. 
69 See section 2.3 .2. 
70 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," pp. 139- 142. 
71 Zartman, The 50% Solution, pp. 30- 32. 
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other) determines the likelihood of successful outcomes. The corollary would be that 
more interaction equals an increase in trust and cooperation. 72 
Despite its usefulness, Bercovitch identifies some limitations of these approaches. He 
stresses that they only emphasise the interactional factor, assuming that a situation of 
symmetry exists between parties and that bargaining takes place in a cultural vacuum. 
Therefore, they are not suited for the study of natural negotiations, but can only be used 
under laboratory conditions. 73 
• The Procedural approach 
Zartman identifies an approach which has risen to prominence in the postwar period. He 
states that where observation and cogitation where historically the only means by which 
negotiation was analysed, experimentation and simulation has since become widely 
accepted. Experimentation creates its own reality, while simulation attempts to 
approximate reality. The aim is to separate variables and focus on their particular 
influence in situations of negotiation. Behavioural, structural and procedural variables 
can be tested in such a way. 74 
• The Contextuai/Phaseological approach 
According to Zartman, the contextual approach is similar to the historical approach, as it 
focuses on the chronology of a negotiation event. From this point of view, outcomes are 
determined by a distinct phaseological interpretation of history. This interpretation can 
be based on the history of negotiation itself, or the larger history of conflict into which 
the negotiation fits. 75 
Bercovitch identifies similar characteristics of this approach and terms it the 
phaseological approach. According to him, its aim is to identify a negotiation cycle in 
the interaction between parties. The phaseological approach holds a normative view of 
negotiation, proposing that the viability of a successful outcome in a negotiation process 
depends on whether the parties progress through phases and display appropriate 
72 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," pp. 136- 137. 
73 /bid 
74 Zartrnan, The 50% Solution, p. 32. 
75 /bid, pp. 22-23. 
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behaviour in each phase. 76 Both authors argue that an underlying assumption is present 
that any attempt to restructure, skip or reverse the order of phases can lead to a situation 
where success is difficult to attain. 77 
Zartman stresses that this approach does not say which one of a few possible outcomes 
will be chosen, but rather explains how the choosing takes place. 78 According to 
Bercovitch, the main problem of the phaseological approach is that it does not offer 
much insight into role, situational and personal factors affecting bargaining, as it 
emphasises interaction phases. He is of opinion that it neglects the context in which the 
process occurs.79 This differs from Zartman's analysis, who regards the approach as 
indeed contextual. My point of view is that this constitutes in part a conceptual 
difference, and that the assumptions of both authors are valid. However, to prevent 
confusion, this approach will further be referred to only as the phaseological approach. 
Another problem of the approach that both authors mention is the tautological nature of 
its generalisations, e.g. 'successful outcomes of negotiations are the result of successful 
problem solving activities.' 80 A method to counter this is by pinpointing what functions 
certain events fulfill, and what their impact on a successful negotiated settlement is. 
The phaseological approach is used in this study to analyse the South African 
transitional negotiations. As shown above, it exhibits certain shortcomings. I am of 
opinion that this is an intrinsic problem of all the approaches discussed. Each approach 
focuses on the impact of specific variables and influences on negotiation, and not one 
pretends to be all-encompassing in its analysis. Each rather relates to the variables and 
conditions it sees as most important. To counter the known shortcomings of the 
phaseological approach, concepts and tools of other approaches will be utilised in this 
study to enlarge the canvass of the South African bargaining situation, while still 
primarily focusing on the structure and functions of phases in general, and 
prenegotiation in particular. However, numerous approaches also exist within the 
phaseological approach, making it necessary to compare the different models before a 
choice is made. 
76 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," pp. 135- 137. 
77 Ibid., p. 136.; Zartman, The 50% Solution, p. 23. · 
78 Ibid., pp. 22- 23. 
79 Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches," p. 136. 
80 /bid; Zartman, The 50% Solution, p. 23. 
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2.4 Prenegotiation and the phaseological approach to negotiation. 
The delineation of phases in the phaseological analysis of negotiation has proven to be a 
troublesome exercise. 81 Stein writes that most negotiation analyses begin at the table 
and states: "We do not know enough about when, why, and how parties get to the 
negotiating table.'.s2[my emphasis] From this, a preliminary assumption can be made 
that the phase approach, while also involved in the analysis of proceedings at the table, 
places a crucial emphasis on the movement towards the table. This movement can be 
broadly referred to as prenegotiation, which in itself has been viewed and circumscribed 
in various ways. Zartman views a phase as a particularly troublesome form of concept, 
because of the time dimension it exhibits in relation to its other qualities. Is it single- or 
bi-directional? Is its linkage with other phases fixed under all circumstances? He 
identifies prenegotiation as one such phase concept which defy an explicit conceptual 
delineation. According to Zartman: 
"[t]here is no doubt that there is something before negotiation, but it is less 
clear whether it is a prelude to or a part of negotiation, whether there is a 
difference in nature between these two, how sharp the boundaries are and 
how reversible the flows, or what the relation is to other contextual events 
such as crises and regimes. "83 
To understand the dimensions of phases and specifically prenegotiation it is necessary 
to study the views of the main proponents of a phase approach. This will be done 
chronologically. 
2.4.1 Ann Douglas 
The first detailed theoretical framework of phased negotiations was developed by Ann 
Douglas. Her approach stems from perceptions gathered while involved in various 
bargaining situations as observer, rather than an analyst afterwards. She argues that 
when analysing the long-term trends in negotiation it is useful to refer to a steady 
81 For the sake of brevity 'phaseological' will in future be substituted with 'phase' when referring to the 
approach. 
8 Stein (ed.), Getting to the Table, p. IX. 
83 Zartman, ''Prenegotiation." p. 1. 
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process build-up to a settlement, but when observing bargaining in motion a striking 
featuf~ of negotiations are the step-like movem~nts it undertakes to combine a central 
\ 
tendency. She warns against viewing phases as units measured in clock hours, and 
expresses the view that it is difficult to specify when one phase reaches a conclusion 
and the next starts. For Douglas phases are not parameters enforced from above by 
analysts, but are identified by parties in a negotiation process when searching for a 
analytical breakdown of sequential events. Hence, phases are identified along functional 
rather than chronological lines. 84 
She states the following very important observations regarding phases: 
"[ t ]he notion of 'phases' in negotiation derives from the general deduction 
that the individuals at the conference table will receive increasing degrees of 
surcease from institutional control over their operations ... The fact that these 
negotiator-party relationships are not haphazard and unpredictable in their 
order of emergence in successful negotiating makes plausible the notion of a 
sequence of phases - in other words, the notion of a negotiating process. 
Unlike a developmental sequence which culminates in a foregone 
conclusion ... negotiation involves a process which cannot be telescoped 
without sacrificing harmony that is evident when the phases keep to their 
appointed times. "85 
• Phase One: Establishing the Negotiation Range 
The first phase that Douglas identifies is aimed at creating a contract zone, or 
negotiation range. She states that it usually runs for a long time against the background 
of perceived irreconcilable differences between parties. It also comprises emotional and 
dogmatic statements in which unusually high demands are put with constant allusions to 
parties' supposed bargaining power. Because of parties' propensity to relish in 
emotional defenses and the launching of stinging attacks, Douglas states that it is the 
phase which is the most universally standardised in its trappings, not only for 
negotiators, but for analysts. 86 
84 Douglas, Industrial Peacemaking, pp. 13 - 14. 
85 Ibid., p. 14. 
86 !bid, pp. 13- 18. 
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She argues that it is important for the latter not to approach first phase meetings with the 
idea that it is merely another example of a small and autonomous problem-solving 
group. The actor units in this phase are parties and not individual negotiators, therefore 
the latter on both sides usually pushes the party line at all costs. 87 This serves the 
function of setting the negotiation range within which parties can negotiate. 88 According 
to Douglas parties do not start from a central point when bargaining, but first define the 
outer limits from where they can slowly move inwards. She argues that it is necessary in 
phase one to start off by striving towards a preliminary emphasis of the factors of 
disagreement.89 
• Phase Two: Reconnoitering the Range 
If the outside parameters of the negotiation range have been set in phase one, the 
process moves to the second phase. Douglas argues that this involves bargaining over 
the area in which a possible agreement can be sought, in other words bargaining over . 
the range of the contract zone. She states that this phase tends to be even longer than the 
first due to the intensification of inter-person interactions. Parties usually continue to 
show overt hostility, but the competition centres around the pursuit of the best location 
in the contract zone, thus attempting to maximise gains with the tacit approval of the 
other party, recognising that they pursue a similar aim. According to Douglas the parties 
" ... press the opposite side to confess its basic weakness and capitulate; they themselves 
yield ground only after many protestations of reluctance or self-proclaimed 
magnanimity." By utilising their previous roles of behaviour, they ensure that the 
organisational bodies they represent continue to play a role.90 
According to Douglas the second phase is brought on by the realisation of each party 
that they have to tone down their threats and boasts in order to gain two ends. These are: 
CJ the need to form an estimate ofthe real bargaining strength of the other, and 
87 Douglas also notes that concurrent with inter-party jostling, it has been observed that individual 
negotiators form close ties with opponents. She emphasises the need to discern between the individual 
and party levels of interaction in this phase. See Ibid., p. 18. 
88 See Section 2.3.3. 
89 Ibid., pp. 13-21. 
90 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Cl an approximation of how long and far it can continue pressing its own demands 
without being drawn into a showdown with the opponent. 
Thus, each party recognises the need for mutual movement in order to increase the 
chances of a settlement. If no room for movement is available and the terms of 
settlement has been laid down at the start of phase two, a negotiated outcome is not 
possible. 91 
Another effect associated with phase two is the increase in autonomy that individual 
negotiators receive. Because their role is split between individual and institutional 
:funbtions it means that there is less direction from above and they can make or reject 
proposals based on their own evaluation. This also offers institutional groups a form of 
protection against potentially damaging decisions by their negotiators, as they 
per~onally can claim ignorance or bad judgement on the side of the individual, thereby 
siJking commitment. Douglas warns that this can lead to marauding behaviour among 
negotiators if they and their opponents know that any deal must first be ratified by their 
institutions. Yet, if a negotiator has moved to a certain point at one stage, only to 
backtrack at the demand of his superiors, the opponents perceived view of his fallback 
po~ition is altered, which can cause a determined effort to define the previously held 
position as the only one they will accept (and indeed, hoping for more in the process). 
For. Douglas it is pivotal that parties attempt to reach all possible configurations of 
settlement. Even in failing to ensure a preferred outcome, parties can at least claim to 
havf exhausted all possible options during phase two, legitimising the final settlement 
as the best which could be achieved. 92 
• Phase Three: Precipitating the Decision-reaching Crisis 
According to Douglas, as soon as parties have reached an informal agreement, or have 
exJmsted all possibilities and announces an impasse, they enter phase three. It is now 
up to the institutions involved to accept or reject the settlement that the negotiators 
produced. A settlement does not have to include a fmal word on all issues. If certain 
91 Ibid., p. 34. 
92 lb¥d., pp. 34 - 50. 
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small issues remain after the deal is accepted, parties can alter their positions equally to 
include outstanding differences. 93 
Douglas argues that the main aim of phase three, however, is for each party to ascertain 
whether the opponent will hold out due to final uncertainties or formally submit an 
irreducible offer. All issues raised and agreed upon in phase two must now be 
reaffirmed and synthesized, expecting from the parties to be especially vigilant in order 
to ensure a correct formulation of the agreement. Special attention has to be given to the 
status of agreements previously regarded as 'official' or 'unofficial', depending on the 
situation in which they were reached. From the point of view of Douglas's approach, 
once the officials have given their approval to an agreement and the negotiators have 
thrashed out its formulation, the negotiation process ends. 94 
2.4.2. Daniel Druckman 
In order to gauge the effect of group identification and prenegotiation exercises on the 
outcomes of bargaining, Druckman conducted a series of simulations reflecting a 
bargaining forum. 95 In this sense his aim differed from Douglas in that he did not 
attempt to identify phases in a bargaining situation, but rather the effects of a 
preparatory phase to negotiation. 
Druckman found that parties who prepared their strategy unilaterally beforehand were 
rigid in their bargaining positions and tended to yield less. Where parties studied the 
issues bilaterally beforehand, therefore focusing on both positions, settlement was 
reached faster and the amount of yielding was greater from both sides. This can be seen 
as an exercise similar to what I refer to as establishing the negotiation range/contract 
zone. As Druckman formulates it, the latter results were a function of prenegotiation 
experience, keeping in mind the effects of group commitment where it was tested. He 
93 Ibid., pp. 72-99. 
94 /bid. 
95 The research designs and data-analysis techniques will not be discussed here, as this study focuses on 
the findings with regards to prenegotiation. For an in-depth discussion of these simulations see 
Druckman, D. ''Dogmatism, Prenegotiation Experience, and Simulated Group Representation as 
Determinants of Dyadic Behavior in a Bargaining Situation," Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 6, no. 3, 1967, pp. 279 - 290.; and Druckman, D. ''Prenegotiation Experience and 
Dyadic Conflict Resolution in a Bargaining Situation," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, no. 4, 
1968, pp. 367- 383. 
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notes however, that whether bargainers represented themselves or groups did not have 
an effect on compromise behaviour.96 According to him an implication of the results is 
that informal discussion between parties, where they concentrate on issues before debate 
takes place, is a technique for inducing cooperation. Druckman formulates this finding 
as such: "A prebargaining atmosphere which leads to a consideration of the debate as a 
collaborative, problem solving venture in which neither side is committed to unilateral 
positions appears to facilitate conflict resolution."97 
2.4.3. Ian Morley and Geoffrey Stephenson 
Morley and Stephenson make use of data gathered during experiments and observations 
of real-life bargaining to propose certain characteristics of negotiators' bargaining 
behaviour. They focus on Douglas's assumptions regarding the structure of phases in 
bargaining and the movement of negotiators between their roles as individuals and 
representatives of an organisational view; and test its applicability to their data. Morley 
and Stephenson stress that the interpersonal relationship between participants played a 
critical role throughout the bargaining processes and simulations they observed.98 
According to Morley and Stephenson the balance of power between parties are 
established in the first phase of negotiation, and this has a bearing on the direction of the 
fmal outcome. They argue that demands and the ability to enforce them form the 
essence of first phase discussions. From their experimental work, they propose that the 
accessibility of the other in the first phase is a crucial variable in the outcome of 
negotiations. This entails the amount to which each negotiator acquires a knowledge of, 
and liking for the opponent. They propose that a better knowledge and a high liking 
might have a positive influence on the outcome. 99 
From their observational work, Morley and Stephenson propose that the identifiability 
of the other is a salient marker of progress in negotiation. A decrease in identifiability is 
equated with an increase in interchangeability between negotiators. In other words, 
negotiators in a sense become disentangled from the trappings of inter-party rivalry and 
96 Druckman, "Dogmatism," p. 288. 
97 Druckman, "Prenegotiation Experience," pp. 379-382. 
98 Morley and Stephenson, Social Psychology, pp. 284-285. 
99 Ibid., pp. 285 - 287. 
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proceed to find a joint solution to the conflict. An important aspect to keep in mind, 
according to Morley and Stephenson, is the utilitarian value of party conflict. They 
support the assessment by Douglas that the posturing inherent in the first phase is 
necessary to bring individual negotiators closer together, as they take on more personal 
roles. Despite the effectiveness of increased identifiability in determining the relative 
power of an opponent, it involves some dangers as well. As negotiators sometimes need 
to retreat out of view of critical audiences in order to settle a sensitive deal, the 
possibility exists that they can become too predilected with nurturing a personal 
bargaining relationship, at the cost of party support.100 
A third proposal that Morley and Stephenson offer from experimental analysis, assumes 
that the more formal first phase negotiation is, the less the chances are for increased 
accessibility. This need not be regarded as negative, as formality directs attention to the 
issues involved, decreases sensitivity to the others' feelings, and inhibits the 
development of personal reciprocity; thus leading to the expectation that formality and 
identifiability are positively correlated. They argue that under the assumption that 
negotiators are more identifiable with their parties in formal settings, a " ... principal 
function of the first phase of negotiation (in which identifiability is high) is to establish 
the strength of case of the parties concemed."101 
Based on the phases of Douglas, Morley and Stephenson identify three phases of 
negotiation and their characteristics. 102 They are: 
• Phase One: Distributive Bargaining 
Cl Parties asses the feasibility of demands. 
Cl Implicit decisions are made as to who will have to concede most in the movement 
towards a settlement. 
Cl Strength of case and the power relationship between parties are important.103 
100 Ibid., pp. 287- 289. 
101 Ibid., pp. 289- 290. 
102 For a schematic swnmary of the characteristics of negotiation groups and individuals throughout the 
stages of negotiation identified by Morley and Stephenson, see Ibid., Figure 13.2., p. 291. 
103 Ibid., p. 292. 
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• Phase Two: Problem Solving 
o It is constituted by a movement towards agreement. 
o Proposals are made and exchanged in the light of the opening exchanges. 
o For proposals to match the criteria established in p~.e one, the interpersonal 
bargaining relationship comes to the fore. 104 
• Phase Three: Decision Making and Action 
o The implications of possible settlement points are thoroughly explored. 
o Consistency with the previous pattern of relationships is crucial. 105 
2.4.4. William Zartman and Maureen Berman 
By using a model based on stages of negotiation, Zartman and Berman attempt to 
clarify the nature of the process of negotiation. Each stage in their model is associated 
with different problems and behaviours. They underline the fact that such a model is 
primarily an analytical too~ hence the delineation and recognition of conceptual stages 
are much easier than it is in reality. They regard the haziness of changeovers between 
phases in real-life negotiations as a boundary problem which is ubiquitous to concepts 
and should not invalidate a study of negotiation. According to Zartman and Berman the 
model is also not a rigid construct, but reflect a general sequence recognisable in most 
negotiation processes, and one that if followed, will produce the best results. 106 They 
identify three phases: the diagnostic phase, the formula phase, and the detail phase. 
• The Diagnostic Phase 
Zartman and Berman state that as soon as each party in a conflict makes the decision to 
explore the possibility of negotiating, the negotiation process begins, even if it happens 
long before any formal contact sessions take place. Concomitantly, this implies a crucial 
change in perception from all parties regarding the situation. Yet, a willingness to 
negotiate may not be sufficient for actual talks to start if parties view the issues as non-
negotiable. Neither can negotiations start if one party refuses to talk. For this reason, 
Zartman and Berman regard the negotiability of any issue or sets of issues as a 
104 Ibid., p. 292. 
105 Ibid., p. 292. 
106 Zartman and Berman, The Practical Negotiator, pp. 1 - 11. 
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subjective matter reliant on the perception and will of the parties involved. Without a 
mutual view that a solution might be possible, negotiation cannot begin. 107 
For negotiation to take place, Zartman and Berman identify a number of appropriate 
situations and conditions. 108 They are: 
• Negotiation is appropriate when there is neither authority nor majority but when 
unanimity is the decision rule. 
• Negotiation is appropriate when new solutions have to be invented to replace 
unacceptable old ones or new ones have to be created when new problems arise. 
• Negotiation is appropriate when there is a change in the structure of affairs and a 
new order must be created or problems have to be managed in the absence of such a 
new order. 
• Negotiation is appropriate when propitious changes have taken place. 
• The moment is propitious for negotiation when both sides perceive that they may be 
better off with an agreement than without one. 
• The moment is propitious for negotiation when power relations shift towards 
equality: when the former upper hand slips, or the former underdog improves his 
position. 
• Negotiation is appropriate when all parties to a dispute have a veto over its solution. 
• Negotiations are appropriate when they deal with a new outcome that can be created 
only jointly. 
• Negotiations are also appropriate when they deal with an exchange of outcomes that 
can only be decided upon jointly. 109 
Zartman and Berman provide a summary of the above situations and state that 
" ... negotiation is appropriate when the parties see that a problem can only be resolved 
jointly and when they have the will to end an existing situation that they consider 
unacceptable, while admitting the other party's or parties' claim to participate in the 
107 Ibid., pp. 42-45. 
108 What should be kept in mind is that negotiation is one method of addressing conflict. The 
characteristics offered by Zartman and Berman are seen to be conducive, even imperative, factors to 
negotiation, but it does not mean that if they are present, negotiation will follow - that remains an issue of 
choice for the parties. 
109 Ibid., pp. 46 - 66. 
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solution." The three most important aspects here for them are will, perception and 
equality. 110 
It can sometimes be difficult to convince a party to join a negotiation process, especially 
when its traditional opponents are already part of the process. Perceived power is very 
important in the preliminary stages, and parties can be afraid that joining last might 
create a perception that they joined out of weakness. Zartman and Berman identify some 
ways of creating opportunities for parties to join a negotiation process, which include 
positive and negative options. 111 The positive options are: 
• Discussing the possibilities of creative solutions, such as new alternatives, with an 
outside party, without promising anything. The idea is to convince such a party that 
the stalemate is not permanent. 
• Offering possible side payments, compensation or other benefits in order to induce a 
party to agreement. 
• Focussing on a new good or a dual gain that might be created by joint action. 112 
Negative tactics focus on showing a party that a situation will only degenerate if a joint 
solution is not found, and pointing to worst-case alternatives. This can be done by 
utilising either threats or warnings. Zartman and Berman identify two types of 
threatening action. When a stalemate exists, parties can draw attention to it, and 
communicate the fact to each other that they have necessary but insufficient resources to 
address the problem, thereby attempting to orchestrate an agreement. A party can also 
utilise a veto, preventing another party from creating a solution. The idea for the former 
is to prove itself indispensable in the search for a solution by enforcing non-
movement.113 Two other strategies are identified for inducing cooperation between 
conflicting parties: 
• - Parties can be pressured into a negotiation process by third party actors. According 
to Zartman and Berman this will be more effective if the latter is perceived as 
l!O Ibid., p. 66. 
m Ibid., pp. 69 - 70. 
112 Ibid., pp. 70- 74. 
113 Ibid., pp. 74- 78. 
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neutral as well as inescapable. Third parties can utilise the same positive and 
negative tactics as discussed above. 
• By focusing on the existing amount of agreement between parties, the areas of 
disagreement can reduce in prominence (or alternatively increase in prominence, 
which could have a negative effect).114 
Zartman and Berman summarise prenegotiation tactics as deliberate attempts to point 
out that a given situation is increasingly painful to all parties involved, and that the best 
solution for a mutually beneficial outcome will be to enter into a negotiation process. As 
part of these tactics parties can be pressured into negotiation through the use of internal 
or external forces. They warn, however, that the means of pressure in the diagnostic 
phase can usurp the situational factors as the dominant issue of conflict. Furthermore, 
by heightening another party's awareness of possible beneficial outcomes, it can happen 
that the party raises its expectations accordingly. Zartman and Berman stress that the 
diagnostic phase is not the ideal forum to make concrete proposals, which if made 
prematurely, can negatively influence the later stages of the process.115 
• The Formula Phase 
Zartman and Berman state that the second phase cannot begin if an opponent is 
perceived to be unwilling to concede and receive. If parties are convinced that a 
mutually acceptable solution for their conflict is possible they can proceed in two 
different ways in search of an agreement - inductive or deductive. The authors describe 
an inductive approach as when parties build an agreement together as they proceed 
through compromises and concessions on issues. Agreement on detailed points are 
reached discretely, without much reference to the holistic structure of relations between 
points. They regard the deductive approach as an exercise in frrst establishing the 
general principles, or formula governing the issues, before working out details of 
implementation. Here the detailed point of agreement are put forward by the holistic 
framework. Zartman and Berman argue that the approach most commonly used when 
parties did not commit to an explicit declaration, is intuitive. However, they state that in 
114 Ibid., pp. 78 - 81. 
liS Ibid., p. 82. 
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successful negotiations the deductive approach is usually both present and desirable, as 
it offers structure and coherence to agreements on details. 116 
A formula is defined by Zartman and Berman as " ... a shared perception or definition of 
the conflict that establishes terms of trade , the cognitive structure or referents for a 
solution, or an applicable criterion of justice."ll7 This characterisation can be broken 
down into its three constituent parts: 
Cl A Shared Perception 
Perceptions differ between parties, as they are based on the needs, goals and 
experiences of a party. When parties try to communicate their perceptions, they often 
assume what are important and need to be expressed. In phase one, a party attempts 
such communication, and also tries to understand what the other party's perceptions are. 
Concurrently, each party tries to embed its perceptions as the set of assumptions that 
should govern the process. The rationale behind the search for a formula in phase two is 
the need for a common or shared perception. The proposed formula should "encompass 
the essence of both parties' demands and prove useful in guiding negotiators to work 
out detailed ways of meetings them." 
For example, two parties compete for control over a territory which lies between them. 
Neither party supports the partition of the territory, yet neither wants the opponent to 
control the territory. Thus, they have a common perception of the unity of the territory 
and its denial to the other. A 'neutralisation formula' taking cognisance of this could 
propose that the territory as a whole would be denied to both.118 
CJ Joint Referents 
Zartman and Berman define referents as " ... the secondary or underlying values that 
give meaning to the items under discussion." They argue that it is necessary for the 
values of referents to be known to all parties in order to ensure a deal.ll 9 
116 Ibid., pp. 89, 93. 
117 Ibid., p. 95. 
118 Ibid., pp. 95 - 98. 
119 Ibid., pp. 98 - 102. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
48 
For example, party A occupies a piece of land bordering its territory which it 
acknowledges is not its own, but does not want to relinquish to party B, who is staking 
claim to it. In order to find a solution, it has first to be determined what party A gains by 
its occupation of the area, in other words, what is the underlying value of the area for 
party A. If the referent turns out to be the area's function as a buffer zone against 
security threats, a formula can be devised based on the notion of 'security for territory'. 
Hence, party A relinquishes the territory in exchange for its establishment as a 
demilitarised zone. 
a An Idea of Justice 
Although referents concern types of values, they also refer to an idea of justice, in other 
words, parties' perceptions of what they will deem to be fair to their side, which relates 
to the mechanisms whereby resources will be allocated. Zartman and Berman identify 
five types of justice. In a simplified way they signify the following: 
substantive justice - each side chooses the particular criterion that supports its own 
side 
- procedural justice- all values must be split equally, share and share alike 
equitable justice- the apportionment of shares rests on the basis of each party's 
unique characteristics 
compensatory justice - the weaker parties should receive the most 
sub tractive justice - all possession of shares should be removed on both sides 120 
According to Zartman and Berman the two basic characteristics of a formula are 
relevance and comprehensiveness. This entails that the formula should address as many 
points of the conflict as possible, which in turn entails that parties should confront and 
disseminate the basic elements of the conflict. If there is still conflict about the conflict 
(which is not a farfetched scenario as parties are still opponents with opposing views) a 
solution might be to devise a neutral formula, which allows both parties to agree, 
without them having to forsake what they deem to be important issues. Another crucial 
objective is for parties to stay flexible over the formula, especially when it is 
contentious in some aspects. The authors argue that a formula should be susceptible to 
120 Ibid., pp. 102- 105. 
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improvement, without losing its coherence, relevance or comprehensiveness. However, 
until a final formula has been agreed upon, it is useful for a party to have alternative 
formulas prepared, in order to counter unacceptable proposals of the opponent.121 
Zartman and Berman differ with the position of Douglas in that they regard phase two 
to be shorter than phase one. They argue that the longer the formula phase continues, 
the more changes will be made to the formula, or the more alternative formulas will be 
proposed. Changes in the formula can have either a positive or a negative influence on 
agreement. As negotiations usually take place against the backdrop of ongoing conflict, 
a prolonged formula phase can result in a deteriorating of the conflict situation. What 
they propose for parties is to remember that the problem at hand is the 'enemy', not the 
opponent, from which they can not be severed while negotiation is an option. According 
to Zartman and Berman it is crucial not to get bogged down in broad formulaic 
discussions, but to also pay attention to details and where they can be addressed without 
irrevocably harming the relationship. This also serves the function of preparing 
negotiators for the final phase. 122 
• The Detail Phase 
In the detail phase, parties focus on the solution of more detailed problems and the 
creation of particular agreements. Although Zartman and Berman identify the detail 
phase as analytically distinct from the formula phase, they emphasise that the difference 
between the two does not necessarily manifest itself clearly during real-life negotiations. 
Once the formula phase is perceived to be completed, it does not mean that it is 
impossible to revert back and adjust the formula. Because the boundary between the 
latter two phases is blurred, movement back and forth is a constant possibility. Indeed, 
the authors stress the fact that trial and error are imperative to the success of phases two 
and three, as well as the negotiation process as a whole. They warn that this will 
probably be necessary in most cases, as dealing with details are often the most complex 
part of negotiation. 123 
121 Ibid., pp. 109-117. 
122 Ibid., pp. 143- 146. 
123 Ibid., pp. 147- 149. 
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Even after the supposed cordiality with which phase two is completed, parties can 
become very suspicious of each other in phase three. This is due to the perception 
among parties that the opponent's acceptance of the formula could be a trick, which in 
its turn is influenced by the realisation that an agreement on detail might be final. In 
other words, parties guard against unexpected implications which could be detrimental 
in the long run, especially as they have to face audiences with a final deal. For this 
reason parties start off the detail phase with moves and non-moves. This is aimed at 
sending signals to the opponent that movement is either not possible, or is expected on 
certain issues. 124 
During phase three parties continue to communicate information selectively about their 
own positions, in order to gain as much as possible and concede as little as possible. 
Zartman and Berman add the important reminder that this is a bi-directional exercise. 
Selective communication of information can also be referred to as bluffmg. This can 
take on various forms. Parties bluff over the reality of information, the hierarchy of 
values, and the degree of commitment. Bluffmg also serves as a deterrent because for 
the opponent the chances are just as good that they may be real. Bluffing can prove to 
be ineffective if a party learns how its opponent acts and reacts. Thus, if one or more 
bluffs by a party have been exposed, it may taint the authority of any further statements 
by them. The end product is that, by meting out punishments or rewards, parties teach 
each other as well as learn from each other how to react to bluffs. 
To extend the above analogy, if the bluffmg party was punished after being found out, 
they will think twice before trying it again. As this process continues, parties are at all 
times reminded of the external factors that guide their behaviour, such as audiences, 
outside conditions or referents. This also has an influence on bargaining behaviour such 
as bluffmg and the selective communication of information. As Zartman and Berman 
states: "The detail fmally chosen is the consequence ofthe criterion that justifies it ... the 
prime object in fixing details is to fix the rationale behind them."125 
124 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
125 !bid, pp. 152- 161. 
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Zartman and Berman state that much of phase three deals with the subtle balancing of 
important and unimportant details. Importance and unimportance are fluid descriptors as 
their values can change, depending on the moment in which they are introduced. They 
identify a point in negotiations which they term the "crest". This signifies a turning 
point after which details surrounding the remaining items are rapidly resolved. Yet, it is 
also a point after which the chance of rupture becomes even more threatening, as parties 
may try to sneak in some preferred position they could not gain earlier. 126 
If the above danger is avoided, and agreement has been reached on all outstanding 
issues, negotiations end. According to Zartman and Berman it might be necessary to 
introduce some external constraint to the continuance of negotiation, as parties can 
attempt to better their position indefinitely. A deadline is such a constraint, and it can be 
introduced internally or externally, as well as at any time during negotiations. The two 
dimensions of deadlines are reasonableness and seriousness, which both influence the 
"success" of negotiations in terms of substantiality and the detail level of an agreement. 
One disadvantage of deadlines is that they may distort or interrupt the natural flow of 
interparty communication in the negotiation process. A deadline can, however, not 
influence the fact that the negotiation process ends as soon as all parties conftrm that 
agreement has been reached on all issues. 127 
2.4.5. Harold Saunders 
Saunders identifies ftve stages in negotiation. He argues that to persuade conflicting 
parties to commit to a negotiated settlement can be more time-consuming, complicated 
and difficult than it is to reach an agreement once formal negotiations have begun. He 
acknowledges the usefulness of Zartman and Berman's model, but states that it is 
necessary to reach back even further into the sequence of events that lead to a decision 
to negotiate, in order to help parties reach that point. One reason for a five-point model 
is to ensure that once in a negotiation process, parties can determine more effectively 
where they are and adapt their strategies in accordance. Saunders also emphasis the 
126 Ibid., pp. 187 - 189. 
127 Ibid., pp. 191-202. 
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need for parties to sometimes revert back to a previous stage, in order to rethink and 
readapt. 128 The five phases he identifies are: 
• Defining the Problem 
Saunders argues that in negotiation theory the recognition that two parties share an 
interest in resolving a common problem is a crucial prerequisite for negotiation. In 
trying to ascertain why parties negotiate or fail to negotiate, it is necessary to first 
determine how they view the problem and how these views relate to each other. 
According to him a common definition of the problem is an imperative for success in 
negotiation, although it doesn't preclude an attempt to negotiate. Saunders assigns what 
he terms the "highly political task" of redefining the problem, to leaders and 
policymakers ofthe groups.129 
• Producing a Commitment to a Negotiated Settlement 
According to Saunders the decision to negotiate rely on the leaders' assessment of the 
advantages of negotiation, whether it could lead to a fair settlement, what the other 
side's reaction would be, and whether the balance of power is conducive to a settlement. 
He describes it as a very complex phase because these judgments are knowingly based 
on perceptions. The following is an elaboration of the judgements: 
o The judgement that the present situation has a detrimental effect on a party's 
interests. Parties have to decide whether negotiation will lead to a better, or indeed, 
best possible situation. 
o The judgement that a fair settlement is possible. Again parties have to assess the 
advantages of negotiation vis-a-vis possible alternatives, and whether an acceptable 
solution will be possible (in view of what is perceived as the other parties' 
demands from a settlement). Saunders emphasises that "fairness" entails that all 
parties should accept that their ideal solution will not be attainable. 
128 Satmders, H. "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-negotiating Phases," 
Negotiation Journal I, July 1985, pp. 249-254. 
129 Ibid., pp. 255 - 256. 
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o The judgement whether the other parties will be willing to compromise and accept 
a settlement. 130 Psychological elements such as mistrust, suspicion and dislike 
come into play here, as parties have to gauge whether all would be able to conform 
to the demands set by a mutual search for agreement. 
o The judgement that a balance of power will permit a fair settlement. This includes 
the extent to which an opposing party could mobilise external factors to unfairly 
influence negotiation, and whether it would. 131 
• Arranging a Negotiation 
When parties have made the decision to negotiate, the parameters of negotiation have to 
be determined. Saunders identifies two aspects of this phase. Firstly, the objective of 
negotiation has to be defined. This involves agreement on principles guiding 
negotiation, for example, will the settlement be all-encompassing or deal with 
individual issues over a period of time. Secondly, unanimity over physical arrangements 
has to be reached. Here included are decisions regarding location, the role of supporters, 
and participants. 132 
• The Actual Negotiation 
Saunders argues that though this phase is the most visible, it may take up much less 
time than the preceding phases. 133 
• Implementation 
Successful implementation is necessary for the overall success of the negotiation 
process. Therefore it should be ensured in the previous phases that both parties have a 
stake in implementing the agreement. 134 
130 The aspects identified by Saunders in his first two phases which deal with a common definition of the 
problem, a judgement that a fair settlement is possible and an evaluation of the other party's willingness 
to compromise, all refer to the process of establishing good faith in a bargaining relationship. 
131 Ibid., pp. 257- 260. . 
132 Ibid., pp. 260- 261. 
133 Ibid., p. 261. 
134 Ibid., p. 261. 
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2.4.6. Pierre du Toit 
According to Du Toit a_general acceptance exists that if conflicting parties are eager to 
resolve their opposing interests, because of the potential mutual benefit of such a move, 
they commit themselves to bargaining over the issue. In the bargaining process these 
parties will then attempt to maximise their gains and minimise their losses; One method 
of doing this is through what Du Toit calls manipulative bargaining, " ... in which a 
bargainer attempts to influence the opponent by changing the opponent's perception of 
the decision-making environment in which they confront one another. This involves 
primarily a process of persuasion by selectively supplying and/or withholding 
information from the opponent." In his analysis of bargaining, Du Toit identifies three 
phases, of which he regards the first as a specific category of manipulative 
bargaining.135 The phases are: 
• Bargaining about Bargaining 
The reason why this is regarded as a form of manipulative bargaining is that the issue 
under discussion involves whether a party should try to attain victory on it own terms or 
aim to resolve the conflict of interest that stems from a situation of conflict. This 
pursues the objective of establishing agreement between parties that the search for a 
bargained resolution is more profitable than resorting to sectoral outbidding, such as 
ethnic outbidding in deeply divided societies. 136 
Hence, the first phase involves making a choice between possible divergent outcomes. 
As mentioned, these outcomes usually arrange themselves on a continuum with zero-
sum victory/domination through violence on one side, and a non-zero sum mutually 
agreed settlement on the other. The main function of the first phase is to push the parties 
more into the direction of the latter, to persuade them that outright victory is not 
possible, and outright defeat not necessary. 137 Even if bargaining about bargaining is 
initiated, the nature of bargaining can range between purely cooperative and purely 
competitive. Du Toit also notes that phase one may range from cases of symmetrical 
135 Du Toit, "Bargaining about Bargaining," pp. 213-215. 
136 Ibid., pp. 213, 215. . 
137 Du Toit, P. "The Tragic Theory of Bargaining," in Du Toit, P. and Esterhuyse, W. (eds.), The Myth 
Makers: The elusive bargain for South Africa's future, Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers, 1990, 
pp. 6-7. 
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bargaining to cases of highly asymmetrical bargaining. 138 It is argued that the primary 
drive of the bargaining about bargaining phase as it is described here, centers around an 
attempt by parties to establish the norm of good faith in their bargaining relationship. 
• Preliminary Bargaining 
In this stage, conflicts that concern the bargaining relationship are addressed. Du T oit 
identifies: 
CJ agendas (what is negotiable and what is not) 
CJ arenas (where the bargaining is to take place) 
CJ tactics (whether violence should be renounced, suspended, or openly allowed) 
CJ rules of conduct (what the relative status of the participants should be) 
CJ preconditions (what prior actions are required before actual bargaining starts)139 
According to Du Toit the perceived mutual benefits entailed in settling on these issues 
can be justified in terms of the prior success of bargaining about bargaining. 140 
• Substantive Bargaining 
As soon as the above issues have been resolved, the parties move into the last stage of 
negotiation. This deals with the resolving of the initial differences that caused conflict 
to arise. According to Du Toit parties search for a specific settlement from the range of 
settlements found inside the contract zone. He argues that the basis of success in 
previous stages have a direct impact on the mutual benefit and desirability of such a 
settlement.141 
The approach of Du Toit is used by me to analyse the South African transitional 
negotiation process. The decision to use this framework was taken after a preliminary 
study of the characteristics of the South African case. From this it is argued that it will 
be difficult to ascribe more than three distinct phases to this example, as the process was 
predominated by a few overarching issues. The move between phases was mostly a 
redefining of these issues, and as such the approach used has to be tightly structured, 
138 Du Toit, "Bargaining about Bargaining," pp. 215 - 216. 
139 Du Toit, "The Tragic Theory of Bargaining," pp. 6-7. 
140 Du Toit, "Bargaining about Bargaining," p. 216. 
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both conceptually and practically. Furthermore, this approach has to some extent been 
tested on the South African case in the work of Du Toit, which enhances its credibility. 
I am of the view that some of the other approaches might be associated too much with 
certain types of conflict on certain levels of analysis, making extrapolation to an unique 
case difficult. Both the bargaining about bargaining and preliminary bargaining phases 
will be regarded as prenegotiation. 
2.5 Prenegotiation: Functions and Parameters 
The work of Stein et al. focuses specifically on international prenegotiation, and the 
contributors analyse such cases as the Arab-Israeli conflict, North American Free Trade, 
GATT, and Cold War arms. However, it constitutes one of the most comprehensive 
syntheses of the assumptions and parameters of prenegotiation. It is my view that these 
assumptions, while recognising the different levels of analysis, are just as applicable to 
South Africa. 142 
As was mentioned, Zartman regards prenegotiation as a "troublesome phase concept", 
not disputing its existence but rather referring to the uncertainty relating to its nature.143 
He reiterates a definition put forward by Stein that: 
"[p ]renegotiation begins when one or more parties considers negotiation as 
a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties. It ends 
when the parties agree to formal negotiations (an exchange of proposals 
designed to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation of 
interdependent interests) or when one party abandons the consideration of 
negotiation as an option."144 
141 Ibid., p. 216. 
142 Stein (ed.), Getting to the Table. A preliminary acceptance of this study has been that previous 
research and theory on prenegotiation have to a large extent centred only on the interpersonal or 
international levels of ar~alyses. Partly because of this, and partly despite of it, South Africa was chosen as 
a case study. Central to the aim of the study is an attempt to broaden the scope of prenegotiation theory to 
intrastate, intergroup conflicts. 
143 See Section 2.4. 
144 Zartman, "Prenegotiation," p. 4. 
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Zartman also proposes a second definition: 
"In essential terms, prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which 
the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual problem 
to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or join solutions. From both 
definitions, it is clear that the nature of the activity lies not in conducting the 
combined search for a/the solution but in arriving at and in convincing the 
other party to arrive at the conclusion that some joint solution is possible." 
[original emphasis] 145 
The above definitions include the following three assumptions: 
57 
• Parties arrive at the decision to negotiate separately, differently and not 
concomitantly. 
• Whereas parties previously pursued unilateral strategies, they now either shift fully 
to a multilateral strategy, or incorporate it as one option among others. 
• Each party makes an identifiable decision for which, although conflicting with 
previous positions, a cause may be sought, explained, and eventually produced. 146 
Zartman further argues that the decision to negotiate is usually associated with a 
mutually hurting stalemate, and/or a recent or impending catastrophe. Due to these 
factors a multilateral strategy is usually seen as more promising or comparatively 
cheaper vis-a-vis a blocked and costly unilateral strategy. According to Zartman the 
case studies described in Stein et al. yield similar answers about the use and functions of 
prenegotiation. He states that all the studies had shown that prenegotiation is necessary 
as a preparatory phase without which no negotiation could have taken place. 
Prenegotiation is seen as " ... a purposive period of transition that enables parties to 
move from conflicting perceptions and behaviours to co-operative perceptions and 
behaviours. " 147 Hence, the goal of prenegotiation can be described as convincing parties 
in a conflict not of accepting any forwarded solution, but of accepting the possibility of 
a joint solution. 
145 !bid 
146 Ibid., p. 5. 
147 Ibid., p. 7. 
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According to Zartman each party has to VIew those who were seen as once 
untrustworthy enemies bent on destroying it, as adversaries, worthy of trust and capable 
of co-operation. Thus, for each party a winning mentality has to be transformed into a 
conciliatory mentality which accepts a mutually found solution and settles for an 
attainable second best position rather than an unattainable victory. These shifts are 
regarded as crucial by Zartman, and he identifies seven functions of prenegotiation 
which have to be fulfilled, in no special order, to bring it about. 148 To phrase it 
differently: During prenegotiation a symbiosis evolves between parties, where 
commitment is the substance of prenegotiation on the one hand, and the functions of 
prenegotiation ensure continued commitment on the other. The seven functions are: 
• Risks 
As has been argued, the power relationship between parties comprises a central aspect 
of the negotiation process, and it is based on the perceptions that the parties create of 
themselves as well as each other. Hence the process is very risky, especially when co-
operating, as the other parties might interpret it as a sign of a weak bargaining position. 
Prenegotiation reduces the risk by functioning as a dress-rehearsal for substantive 
negotiations. No binding decisions are made, making it easier for parties to exit without 
compromising their position of power. Furthermore, it is easier for parties to state 
maximum terms without being bound to them. 149 
• Costs 
Negotiated settlements as well as unilateral options entail costs. When parties 
prenegotiate they are able to establish the costs of concessions and agreement, making 
their final decision to talk or not to talk much more calculated. In Zartman's terms, the 
outcome must be of more value to all parties than the security point - the value of what 
is obtained by each party without an agreement. Parties thus establish a perception of 
their opponents' motives for negotiation, as well as sort out their own. 150 
148 Ibid., pp. 7- 8. 
149 Ibid., p. 8. 
ISO Ibid., pp. 8- 9. 
, 
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• Requitement 
According to Zartman a number of studies have pointed out that beyond hurting 
stalemate, a sense of reciprocity is almost equally important for parties' decision to 
negotiate. 151 In other words, co-operation only takes place if parties have a sense of 
requitement. Reciprocity has been shown to be a crucial element in good-faith 
negotiations. Conversely, Zartman notes that " ... fear of reciprocity is its own undoing: 
one does not make concessions because one is sure the other side will not repay and the 
other does not repay concessions because it is sure that the other will not either." 
Prenegotiation is crucial in this sense, as it creates the ideal setting for parties to 
convince their opponents of their good intentions in reciprocating concessions, in an 
environment where assurances are indicative more of future behaviour than of 
commitments. Hence, parties can go through different motions to gauge their outcomes 
without having to be too explicitly bound by them. 152 
• Support 
When a party prenegotiates, covertly or openly, some sort of response is expected from 
either the pru::tY core or the general followers. By analysing the reaction of the party's 
constituency the leaders create an effective mechanism to test support for its decision to 
consider negotiation. On the other hand it serves as a warning to party members what 
they can expect, giving them the opportunity to evaluate their perspective, and 
attempting to influence their perception of the opponent. As soon as one party receives 
an amount of support for its decision to consider negotiation, it places the other role-
players in a moral dilemma, thereby increasing the chance that they will also submit to 
co-operation and informal coalition building. Zartman also points out that: 
" ... the construction of domestic support should not merely be the affair of 
each side. Each party has a role to play in the other's politics, and that party 
which has first concluded that negotiation is a conceivable outcome has an 
especial challenge to reach into the domestic political processes of the other 
and help build a supportive coalition for accommodation."153 
151 See Axelrod, R The Evolution of Co-operation, New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1984., for a 
game-theoretic discussion of co-operation and the long term interest that parties have in it when faced 
with blind-eyed negotiations. 
152 Zartman, ''Prenegotiation," p. 9. 
153 Ibid., pp. 10 - 11. 
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• Alternatives 
If parties jump headlong into the process of substantive negotiation, especially in 
multilateral negotiations, the chances of reaching an immediate deadlock are quite 
significant. The,reason why is that no contract zone exists. Also, the problem is not 
necessarily that parties' ideal solutions are too far from each other on a continuum, but 
that they could be on different continuums. Zartman regards the core function of 
prenegotiation as an attempt to transform the problem into a manageable, negotiable 
issue. As a process it involves the invention of, and choice between alternative ways of 
dealing with the problem, in order to at least create initial consensus among parties. 
Alternatives also involve the setting of themes and limits, and defining the conflict in a 
non-zero sum configuration, thus eliminating unrealistic, complex and unworkable 
solutions. Thus, in prenegotiation the agenda is set and shaped. If parties fail to define 
the problem, choose between alternatives, and set an agenda, prenegotiation is not 
complete. 154 
• Participants 
Prenegotiation also functions as an elimination round for possible parties involved. 
Likewise to the selecting of alternatives, choices have to be made between parties 
involved in the process. As Zartman puts it: "Just as all aspects of the conflict are not 
likely to be solved, so it may not be possible to include all parties in an agreement." The 
two decisions are connected in the sense that the decision regarding alternatives will 
influence the choice of parties. However, it is very important that an inclusive as 
possible settlement is reached in order to create stability. If either the major contender 
or the major issue is left out there can be an agreement but not necessarily a solution. 
This is referred to as the dilemma of comprehensiveness versus compatibility, as 
coalition builders attempt to make it broad enough to ensure a stable agreement, but no 
broader than necessary to cover the bases and expand membership at a later stage.155 
• Bridges 
Substantive bargaining is placed under immense pressure when parties are still engaged 
in conflict outside the negotiation forum. Prenegotiation functions as an opportunity for 
154 Ibid., pp. 10- 12. 
155 Ibid., pp. 12- 13. 
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parties to formally declare a temporary cessation of hostilities in order to build an 
informal coalition. Zartman states that the changes in perception, mentality, tactics, 
definitions, acceptability levels, and partners all play a part in building bridges from 
conflict to conciliation. To complement these, prenegotiation also sets up mechanisms 
on a temporary and provisional basis to provide for the changes to take place. One 
mechanism is a temporary suspension of conflict activities, such as cease-fires, the 
suspension of conflicting practices, and moratoriums on arms production. These 
measures usually conclude prenegotiation. Another mechanism is the building of trust, 
such as when parties construct small tests for each other to see if the others adhere to 
good faith principles or not. The symbolic meaning of bridge building steps taken is to 
remove any misinterpretation ofintentions.156 
The characteristics and functions of prenegotiation as part of the phaseological 
approach, outlined in this chapter, will serve as a framework for the analysis of the 
South African transitional negotiation process. 
156 Ibid., pp. 13- 14. 
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CHAPTER3 
PHASE ONE: BARGAINING ABOUT BARGAINING 
3.1. Introduction 
A striking characteristic of the South African negotiations is the small number of people 
that were involved in strategic decision-making and the steering of the process. It can be 
argued that collectively approximately fifteen individuals steered the transition from 
beginning to end, an important point to keep in mind when reflecting on the South 
African case. The first phase as delineated in this study was especially secretive and 
exclusive, as the political situation in South Africa did not allow for a spontaneous 
public acceptance of negotiation as a strategy on either side. 1 The bargaining about 
bargaining phase was crucial in creating a common understanding (at least between the 
individuals involved) of the necessity and possibility of a mutually agreed settlement. 
Much of the success of the process depended on this phase, to the extent that it partially 
determined the route and outcome of the following phases. Yet, what is important to 
keep in mind when analysing the bargaining about bargaining phase, is the 
serendipitous nature of prenegotiation behaviour. What might seem to have been 
calculated movements towards establishing a forum for hard bargaining, could have 
been strategies to further undermine or alienate opponents. Any analysis of a mov~ment 
towards negotiation should be sensitive to this issue, so as not to be too deterministic in 
its conclusion. 
1 It should be noted that an approach which regards the South African conflict as bipolar is reductionist to 
a certain extent. There was at no stage a situation where two hegemonic powers of equal strength were 
locked in an all-encompassing battle for ascendance (an assumption which implicitly negates the use of 
game theory as an effective framework for analysing the South African situation). The NP-government 
and the ANC-alliance are viewed as the two main role-players during the transition. as they had the 
greatest influence, but they did not assert sole control over the process. Other actors were involved, 
directly or indirectly, and reference will be made to their roles where relevant. Furthermore, even the two 
main parties were internally divided on various issues, an aspect which will be discussed in detail. The 
singular focus on them in this chapter is necessary due to the crucial roles they played in terms of the first 
phase and the movement towards subsequent phases. 
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3.2. mstorical context 
After the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1960 the conflictual 
relationship between them and the South African government can be seen as formally 
defined by a zero-sum configuration. Both adopted strategies which did not involve any 
measure of compromise, but were rather aimed at achieving victory on each party's own 
terms. Whereas the ANC's strategy involved overthrowing the government and setting 
up ahernative structures to establish majority rule, the government's strategy was aimed 
at deepening apartheid structures by eradicating all opposition against it. Hence, the 
crux ofthe conflict remained the institutionalised system ofapartheid.2 
With the start of the armed struggle in 1961 by the ANC, the zero-sum nature of the 
conflict was deepened, as both parties formally perceived the use of violence as the only 
plausible method to attain their goals, thereby effectively discarding negotiation as a 
policy option. This introduction of violence into the parties' respective strategies proved 
to be a decisive stumbling block to relations between the ANC and the government and 
would remain so until as late as 1993. A related factor which would prove to be a major 
contributory to the absence of a contract zone was the jailing of prominent ANC 
leaders, such as Nelson Mandela in 1963, due to their support for a revolutionary take-
over of the state. 
Despite gradual reforms to apartheid in the early 1980's by P.W. Botha, the then leader 
of South Africa, the ANC still based its policy on four strategic pillars identified at the 
Morogoro conference in Tanzania, 1969. They were mass mobilisation, the setting up of 
alternative structures, the international isolation of South Africa, and the armed 
struggle.3 The latter, coupled to the ANC's links with the South African Communist 
Party and the Soviet Union proved to be the most problematic for the government in 
addressing the issue of the ANC. For the ANC, the government's insistence on 
upholding apartheid and the non-inclusion of blacks into the tricameral parliament, 
caused them to reaffirm their policies. 
2 It is not the aim of this study to deal with the history of apartheid, and it is recognised that apartheid 
evolved through various forms and stages. What is important for this study is the nature of the 
relationship between the ANC and SAG, which remained essentially a non-zero swn configuration. 
3 Breytenbach, W.J. The ANC: Future Prognosis, University of Stellenbosch: Institute for Futures 
Research, 1989, p. 7. 
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3.3. Official Positions 
Unbeknown to all but a handful of South Africans, a move towards negotiation as an 
outcome to the political crisis began to take form in the 1985. It stayed a secret until 
1990 though, as most people, including high-ranking officials on both sides, were only 
informed of this movement at the end of the first phase. By that time the 
accomplishments of a few years of informal talks had already begun to steer the process 
in the direction of a settlement. 
The negotiators on both sides realised the possibility of settlement much earlier, and 
while they continued with covert talks they had to start adapting policy in order to 
create an environment conducive to public negotiations. It had also become necessary 
on both sides through the years to sensitize followers to the need and possibility of 
negotiation as a lasting policy option However, against the background of heightened 
unrest and states of emergency, such policy shifts were not seen to be signs of imminent 
talks by the general public. It is only with the advantage of hindsight that the movement 
towards common ground can be identified when analysing official policy statements. 
These official policy changes of the ANC and South African government will be 
discussed here. 
3.3.1. The South African Government 
According to Kobie Coetsee, who was appointed as minister of justice in 1980, 
individuals in the South African government began to realise after the Soweto uprising 
in 1976 that solutions to apartheid-related problems had to be found. He argues that a 
number of commissions, as far back as the Schlebusch Commission in 1972, also played 
an important role in changing the political thoughts of National Party members 
regarding South Africa's future.4 
Despite some exposure to other ideas and people, official government policy towards 
the ANC still could not pass the obstacles of violence and communist backing. All 
possible concessions on policy were always linked to either the ending of the armed 
struggle, or a rejection of violence, or bOth. Waldmeir states that Nelson Mandela 
4 Kobie Coetsee, interview by author, 8 October 1996. 
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received seven release offers from the government between 1976 and 1985 on the 
condition that he would give up the liberation struggle, all of which he refused.5 
According to Kobie Coetsee, a visit by P.W. Botha to Franz JosefStrauss ofBavaria in 
January 1985 changed the former's perception of the issue, as it was proposed to Botha 
that he should agree to possible negotiations, but under the precondition that the ANC 
(or Mandela) renounce violence completely and publicly. This proposal was also 
cleared with Margaret Thatcher.6 Botha, upon his return made the proposal public in a 
speech to parliament on 31 January 1985 on the condition that Mandela 
"unconditionally rejected violence as a political weapon."7 The proposal was rejected by 
Mandela and the rejection was made public at a rally in a letter read by Zinzi Mandela. 8 
According to Coetsee, Botha still regarded this as the ideal way in which to solve the 
problem ofMandela, linked to the original terms, as he" ... was working on the release 
along the lines of Mr. Mandela going back to the Transke~ Matanzima taking Mr. 
Mandela, for Mr. Mandela to be invited there, for Mr. Mandela to be placed there ... "9 
In effect, the government policy of only negotiating with moderate African leaders 
stayed unchanged. AsP. W. Botha stated: "[t]he world was asking me to let Mandela go, 
I told them I was busy with an own positive programme of development, civil 
administration .. .look, there were black people who spoke to me in those days, they are 
quiet today ... " 10 
Despite the ANC and Mandela's reaction to the proposal, it became the official policy 
of the South African government, and was repeated often, as in the following speech by 
Botha on 15 May 1986: 
"As far as the Government is concerned, it remains adamant that it is 
prepared to negotiate with citizens of South Africa, provided they do not 
resort· to violence as a means of attaining their political and other goals, or 
call in foreign agencies to support them. Negotiation of necessity implies 
5 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 93. One was by the minister of defence, Jimmy Kruger, in 1976, 
and the other six were by P.W. Botha. 
6 Kobie Coetsee, interview by author, 4 April1997. 
7http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandela/64~90/jabulani.html 
8 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 93- 94. 
9 Kobie Coetsee, interview by Patti Waldmeir, March 2 1995. 
10 P.W. Botha, interviewbyPatti Waldmeir, 1 March 1995. 
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that participants should accept that not all their requirements are likely to be 
met; it implies a willingness to listen, to discuss and seek solutions. But 
these solutions will result from deliberations by South Africans in the 
interest of South Africans. It is in this spirit that the Government approaches 
the process of negotiation and I want to appeal to all who have made the 
choice for peaceful and constitutional change, to display a similar 
disposition."11 
66 
Some analysts have argued that this position was merely put forward by the government 
in order to gain some moral high ground. 12 Whatever the rationale might have been, it 
remained official policy of the government until the unbanning of the ANC and other 
organisations on 2 February 1990 by F.W. de Klerk. De Klerk reiterated Botha's 
position in July 1989, when he said that he would not negotiate with the ANC if it 
continued to support violence as a means to an end. 13 For such a long-standing position 
to be changed so abruptly, a major cause had to be evident, yet there were no tell-tale 
signs of a build up to this significant shift in government policy, nor of the imminent 
changes in the power relationship between the ANC and South African government. For 
example, Breytenbach wrote in July 1989: 
''It is unlikely that the ANC will gain (any form of) power by either 1992 or 
2000. However, by 2010 and 2020 the ANC might share some power as a 
coalition partner. Monopoly power is still not foreseeable. This implies 
certain compromises and coalition outcomes. It is therefore pointless to 
discuss ANC 'ruling' policies, as the chances are slim that the ANC could 
govern South Africa on their own."14 
The above serves as a prime example of the ruling perception that existed among most 
analysts at the time of the unbanning, which negated any official change in government 
policy towards negotiations with the ANC. 
11 Talking with the ANC. .. , Pretoria: Bureau for Information, 1986, p. 33. 
12 Tom Lodge, interview by Gerrit Olivier. In Praatmet die ANC, Emmarentia: Taurus, 1985, p. 72. 
13 Sisk, T.D. Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 79. 
14 Breytenbach, The ANC, p. vi. 
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3.1.2. The African National Congress 
As was the case with the government, the ANC's official decision to give negotiation 
priority did not overtly stem from incremental policy shifts, but came to the fore in an 
almost abrupt fashion. Also similar to the government, the ANC had been arguing for 
negotiation for quite some time, but on conditions that were unacceptable to the other 
side. 
With the launch of the armed struggle in 1961, the ANC regarded sabotage and military 
action as the primary methods to realise their goals. This position was reiterated at 
various conferences, and also internally by people such as Nelson Mandela. At the first 
Morogoro conference, Tanzania in 1969 the ANC and SACP mutually committed 
themselves to a revolution in two phases, as a reaction to what they referred to as 
"internal colonialism."15 At the second Morogoro conference in 1975 the ANC made 
the following plea to the Organisation for African Unity: 
"Re-affrrm the recognition of the legitimacy of the armed struggle and call 
on all Member States to spare no effort to help increase the striking power 
of our Liberation Movement in pursuit of the struggle for the seizure of 
power in South Africa."16 
Similrul resolutions were made by the ANC at the Kabwe Conference in 1985.17 As the 
ANC's conditions for negotiations included the dismantling of apartheid and a transfer 
of power, no contract zone was forthcoming. A government publication used the 
following quotes to summarise the ANC's position on negotiations: 
" ... the ANC will talk to somebody at the proper moment in the proper 
conditions, but will do so because our struggles has reached a point where 
we believe that talking, apart from anything else we'll be doing, is the way 
forward. "18 
15 Esterhuyse, W. ''Die ANC en onderhandelinge" in Esterhuyse, W. and Nel, P. (eds.), Die ANC, Cape 
Town: Tafelberg, 1990, p. 114. 
1~ttp://www.anc.org.wancdocslhistory/morogoro.html 
17 gopher:// gopher .anc.org.za:70/00/anclhistorylkabrep. txt 
18 Oliver Tambo, broadcast by Radio Freedom, October 1985, in Talking to the ANC ... , 1986, p. 30. 
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"In any case ifthere were any talks and if we thought the time had come for 
talks with the Pretoria regime, we would not abandon the armed struggle, 
we would simply carry on."19 
"I, Oliver Tambo, would not meet him [State President P.W. Botha], but if 
the time came for the ANC and the people of South Africa - the leadership 
as a whole of South Africa- when the time came in South Africa for a 
meeting to take place, then of course, a meeting will take place. It will come 
when the struggle is so far that Botha sees it to be in his own interest to 
transfer power to a democratic majority, not Black majority."20 
68 
In a statement on 9 October, 1987, the ANC announced its preconditions for 
negotiations. These were: 
• the ANC will not unilaterally abandon or suspend the armed struggle 
• the ANC will not be dictated to as far as its allies are concerned 
• the ANC rejects the proposed the National Statutory Council as a forum for 
negotiation 
• the ANC demands the unconditional release of all political prisoners, detainees, all 
captured freedom fighters and prisoners of war, as well as the cessation of all 
political trials 
• the state of emergency must be lifted 
• the army and police must be withdrawn from the townships 
• all repressive legislation must be repealed21 
The demands were rejected by the South African government, as it did not include any 
compromise from the ANC's side on the issues of violence and the SACP. Then, on 
August 21, 1989, the most definite change in ANC policy occurred with the release of 
the Declaration of the OA U Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of 
South Africa, better known as the Harare Declaration. It was based on a draft document 
fashioned by ANC leaders eleven days earlier, and in it the ANC committed itself to 
19 Oliver Tambo, interview in Zimbabwe Herald, 4 February 1985, Ibid., p. 32. 
20 Oliver Tambo, broadcast by Radio Freedom, 18 May 1986, Ibid. 
21 Breytenbach, The ANC, p. 16. 
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negotiations as the most viable way to bring about a new dispensation. Sisk argues that 
the Harare Declaration " ... was crucial in that it signalled within the ANC the apparent 
ascendancy of the idea of supporting negotiation over a revolutionary people's war."22 
The Declaration stated as one of its principles: 
"We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a 
demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in 
negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end 
apartheid through negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression 
of the long-standing preference of the people of South Africa to arrive at a 
political settlement. ,,z3 
In the Harare Declaration the ANC's conditions for negotiation were reduced to the 
following five demands: 
• Release all political pnsoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from 
imposing any restrictions on them. 
• Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and 
people. 
• Remove all troops from the townships. 
• End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including, the 
Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity. 
• Cease all political executions. 24 
In view of both sides' conditions for negotiations, violence still remained the main 
obstacle to a preliminary contract zone. What remained was the need for a concession 
from either side to start the process of talks. This concession came in the form of F. W. 
de Klerk's address at the opening of parliament on February 2 1990, when he unbanned 
the ANC and other organisations. His speech provided the crucially needed overlap in 
the views of the opposing parties, in that both formally ascribed primary importance to 
22 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 80. 
23 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistorylharare.html 
24 !bid See Addendum A for the complete declaration. 
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the issue of negotiations. Although the policies of both parties changed in a staccato 
fashion over the years, they were not decisions taken on a whim, but rooted in the 
context of a deteriorating political and economic situation in South Africa, and the 
secret communication that existed between the two main opponents. It is necessary to 
study these issues in order to put the policy shifts of both sides in full perspective. 
3.4. A mutually hurting stalemate 
It has been noted that the decision to negotiate is usually associated with a mutually 
hurting stalemate and/or an impending catastrophe in any given conflict situation~25 I 
argue that both a mutually hurting stalemate and_the danger_ of an impending catastrophe 
were evident in South Africa, and that they were caused by a variety of factors. The 
~influence of these factors became manifest especially during the 1980's, as the South 
African domestic situation deteriorated rapidly in the politica~ economic, and social 
spheres. This put pressure on both parties to entertain the notion of alternative courses 
of action. The military conflict between the government and ANC, as well as various 
international factors were also important causes of the stalemate. The contnbuting 
factors will briefly be discussed.26 
3.4.1. The Politics of Apartheid 
According to O'Donnell and Schmitter the " ... typical sign that a transition has begun 
comes when these authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their 
own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for individuals and 
groups.'.27 In South Africa the National Party government increasingly began to tamper 
with apartheid legislation in the 1980's, due to the negative practical implications it had 
for governance. The government also acknowledged that it was reforming the political 
system, but under P.W. Botha's leadership there was yet no signs of opting for a non-
separation of people. 
25 See Section 2.5. 
26 It should be noted that a mutually hurting stalemate was but one (albeit complex) reason for the parties 
to consider negotiation. Other factors, such as those relating to the influence of individuals and the Cold 
War, will be discussed at a later stage. Section 3.4 is only concerned with structural factors that caused 
stalemate. 
27 Quoted in Sisk, Democratisation in South Africa, p. 57. 
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A range of appointed commissions under P.W. Botha's reign influenced the 
government's analysis of apartheid's problems, and initiated some reforms. Yet, despite 
these reforms and the 1983 constitution which made provision for a tricameral 
parliament, governance became increasingly difficult. This was because of boycotts by 
community organisations, strikes by workers, the non-functioning of black local 
authorities, greater influx from the homelands, civil disobedience and dissent among the 
ruling party's followers. 28 Swilling summarised the political dilemma of the government 
in 1988 as follows: 
" ... significant structural changes have occurred, but state responses have 
not assumed the form of a new or coherent ideological package that could 
serve as an alternative to apartheid. Instead the state is caught between the 
exigencies of structural needs that transcend traditional apartheid boundaries 
and the vicissitudes of the political terrain where it defends the need for 
'orderly reform'- a euphemism for white and capitalist interests- against 
the right-wing pressuring for the retention of grand apartheid and the 
demands emanating from the large majority of South Africans for the 
transfer of power to those parties that represent this constituency. South 
Africa is currently in the grips of an interregnum which consists of a social 
stalemate where 'the old is dying and the new cannot be born' ."29 
In view of the above situation, the South African government began to dismantle some 
apartheid measures such as pass laws and influx contro~ yet without clear vision as to 
what the process should lead to.30 According to Kobie Coetsee, P.W. Botha and all his 
predecessors battled with the numerical majority of blacks vis-a-vis whites in the 
formulation of policy, which limited their political options. He states: "[P.W. Botha] 
had not a clear game plan, he had an ultimate view, things must be normalised, we must 
- . 
deal with the blacks, we must be fair, but how are we going to overcome the question of 
~umbers, what is available?''31 
28 Swilling, M. ''Introduction: The Politics of Stalemate" in Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M (eds.), 
State, Resistance and Change in South Africa, London: Croom Helm, 1988, pp. 1 - 18. 
~ . . Ibzd, pp. 14- 15. 
3° For a summarised version of the major reforms during P.W. Botha's presidency, see Sisk, 
Democratization in South Africa, p. 70, table 2.3. 
31 Coetsee, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
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Mike Louw, then deputy director-general of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), 
argues that as apartheid crumbled in the 1980's government leaders started to recognise 
that it failed. He states: 
"[I]t was clear the thing was in shreds. So what was left then, we were left 
without anything to really guide the country except for the pragmatic 
manoeuvrings that were then going on, constitutionally by P.W. and other 
people ... and at the same time sanctions were biting, the entire world had 
turned their backs on us ... "32 
The following description by Louw of the government's attitude towards the future of 
apartheid at the time serves as an excellent example of the recognition that a catastrophe 
was imminent: 
"The entire nation was being stigmatised by this [rejection by the world] 
and economically we were beginning to suffer and we could not see, if you 
projected what was happening on the ground, if you projected that into the 
future you could see no light at the end of the tunnel. It was a question of 
sooner or later, there is going to be a huge conflagration and it's going to 
destroy the entire country and the longer you wait the more difficult it is 
going to be to climb out of this hole and the sooner you move the better."33 
3.4.2. Economic decline 
After an economic boom in the late 1960's and early 1970's, South Africa's. economy 
entered a slow downward spiral as political problems began to impact on the economic 
sphere. V an der Berg argues that the downward trend in the South African economy_ 
after 1975 was caused by a combination of factors: 
32 Mike Louw, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 29 May 1995. 
33 !bid 
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• the inability to switch to an export-oriented economic policy because of domestic 
economic inefficiencies and the partial closure of international markets to South 
African exports 
• domestic conflict which resulted in a low level of confidence from South Afi:ican 
investors 
• the international perception of South Africa's conflict which resulted in capital 
outflow instead of capital income34 
According to V an den Berg, these factors, coupled with rising wages and lowering job 
opportunities, created a situation where the average income of black workers did not 
rise. This in turn led to growing inequality coupled with an inability to accede to 
demands of the black population. A legitimacy crisis ensued which pointed at the need 
for social and political reforms in order to create economic stability.35 Another factor 
which pushed up public expenditure was the regular increases in the defence budget. 
Whereas R44 million was spent on defence in 1960-1, the 1986-7 budget allocated it 
R5.2 billion. Coupled to this were also Special Accounts that funded the South West 
African Defence Force and Armscor, which brought up the estimated total to 
approximately R7 billion.36 Hence the government's Total Strategy became too 
expensive and exacerbated the mutually hurting stalemate. 
The argument that the economic costs of apartheid contributed to stalemate is supported 
by Joel Netshitenzhe, then member of the ANC' s National Executive Council (NE C), 
who argues that the popular uprisings during the 1980's brought the South African 
government to its senses and demonstrated to them that containment of resistance was 
not possible any more. It also prompted a worried business sector to apply more 
pressure on the government to change its policy. According to him, for the ANC the 
economic decline brought home the message that continued struggle would destroy the 
productive capacity of the economy and undermine the eventual efforts of the ANC to 
deliver once a new dispensation was introduced. 37 
34 Van der Berg, S. ''Die ekonomiese argument vir onderhandeling en die ANC se ekonomiese sienings", 
Esterhuyse, W. en Nel, P. (reds.), Die ANC, Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1990, pp. 103- 104. 
~ . . /bid, pp. 104- 105. 
36 Evans, M. and Phillips, M "Intensifying Civil War: The Role of the South African Defence Force", 
Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M. (eds.), 1988, pp. 122- 123. 
37 Joel Netshitenzhe, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 19 May 1995. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
3.4.3. Military stalemate 
Against the backdrop of military clashes between the ANC and South African 
government which at times escalated to the level of a full-scale war, the continuance of 
resper.tively the armed struggle and emergency security measures took their toll on both 
sides. Despite the economic effects, both sides realised in the end that an all-out military 
victory would not be possible. The ANC would not have been able to take over power, 
nor would the government have been able to eradicate all military resistance. The 
military conflict was further not limited to South African soil, but were conducted in 
most frontline states, exacerbating the already present logistic, political and economic 
problems. 
According to Willie Esterhuyse, the government and ANC " ... realised that they were 
too weak to defeat each other." He argues that the emergency regulations between 1985 
and 1987 were important in strengthening the stalemate: 
"That was P. W. 's main contribution; destroying the hope of the radicals that 
they would be able to kick Pretoria out of its seat of power .. .It proved to the 
Boers that we can't go on but it also proved to the ANC that there was no 
way that they would be able to defeat it. It was a stalemate, let's call it a 
military stalemate, they had to fight it out. "38 
A similar point of view is given by Niel Barnard, then director-general of the NIS, when 
he states as one of the reasons for the start of negotiations " ... the fact that all South 
Africans realised that at the end no one was going to win any sort of struggle. There was 
balance of forces so to speak ... "39 
3.4.4. International Factors 
The South African case increasingly became an international problem. Partly because of 
the efforts by the exiled ANC leadership, many world governments became aware of the 
issues and attempted to create a solution. The P.W. Botha government particularly 
loathed international attempts to apply pressure on them. Yet, the South African and 
38 Willie Esterhuyse, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 25 November 1994. 
39 Niel Bamard, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 25 November 1994. 
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Namibian conflicts were more intricate than was initially obvious, as international 
interests in terms of the Cold War also played a role in determining attitudes towards 
South Africa The end product, however, was the growing isolation of South Africa in 
the international market and political scene. As Sisk notes: "The pursuit of apartheid 
entailed tremendous costs in international relationships for the South African regime, 
which in turn influenced the resources available to repress it.',4() 
The United Nations (UN) passed a number of resolutions which condemned apartheid 
as a "crime against humanity," the first of which was in 1968. In 1972 South Africa lost 
its voting rights,41 and in 1977 Resolution 418 was adopted by the UN Security Council 
which imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa 42 UN-backed sanctions 
against South Africa were introduced by the Security Council with Resolution 569 in 
1985. Member states were urged to: 
• Suspend all new investment in South Africa 
-.- Prohibit the sale of Krugerrands and all other coins minted in South Africa 
• Restrict contact in the field of sports and cultural relations 
• Suspend guaranteed export loans 
• Prohibit all new contracts in the nuclear field 
• Prohibit all sales of computer equipment that may be used by the South African 
army and police43 
Chase Manhattan Bank was the first to stopping granting loans to South Africa, and it 
created a snowball effect in the following years. After the bombing of among others 
Lusaka, which coincided with the visit of the Eminent Persons Group in 1986, the US 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in August 1986, and it was 
followed by sanctions from the Commonwealth and European states, including 
Britain.44 All these impacted heavily on South Africa's economy, as well as its policy 
options, pressuring the government in the direction of negotiations. As Aziz Pahad 
notes: 
40 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 65. 
41/bid. 
42 gopher://gopher.Wldp.org:70/00/Wldocs/scdlscounciVs77/16 
43 gopher:// gopher. Wldp.org:70/00/Wldocs/scdlscoWtciVs8S/l 0 
44 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 56. 
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''I don't want to underestimate the 1986 sanctions. PW's [Rubicon] speech 
was a disaster for their strategy because overnight it brought all the major 
powers onto the sanctions issue and that meant that you were caught in a 
pincher movement; the internal situation and the external and the economy 
was slowly collapsing anyway, because by that time they would have 
realised that the economy was collapsing and if they had carried on the way 
it was going, more and more unemployed, more people on the streets. So 
society in that sense was in a very serious crisis and negotiations was then a 
response to that. That's my own view.'"'5 
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According to Chris Landsberg of the Centre for Policy Studies, the Nkomati accord in 
1984 between South Africa and Mozambique limited the options of the ANC as they 
started to lose sanctuaries in frontline states. This weakened their military capacity to an 
extent and forced them to re-evaluate their strategies. The change in attitude of the USA 
and the Soviet Union at the Reykjavik summit in 1986 also played a role in accelerating 
a situation of stalemate in South Africa. Both superpowers were starting to search for 
solutions to costly regional conflicts, which signified to the South African government 
and the ANC respectively a change in attitude from their backers. In 1986 Oliver 
Tambo had a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, where the former applied pressure on 
the ANC-leader to adapt their policies. This was followed in 1987 by an explicit 
statement to the ANC from Moscow that they were starting to favour a negotiated 
settlement in South Africa 46 
According to an unconfirmed account, Gorbachev told the SACP's Joe Slovo during a 
visit to Moscow in the mid-1980's that the SACP would have to decide whether they 
still wanted to be regarded as Stalinists, and pressured him to realign the SACP's 
policies. Coupled to these events were the negotiations on the Angolan and Namibian 
issue, which led to a transfer of Namibia under a democratically elected government. 
Hence, as the Soviet empire started to crumble and the USA attempted to extract itself 
from regional conflicts, the traditional allies of both the South African government and 
45 Aziz Pahad, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 4 November 1994. 
46 Chris Landsberg, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 6 December 1994. 
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the ANC receded. This created a situation where both parties were unable to secure an 
outright military victory, exacerbating the mutually hurting stalemate. 
3.4.4. The mutual nature of stalemate 
From the a}?ove discussion it can be argued that the factors which impacted on stalemate 
were on the whole more detrimental to the government's position, and that the ANC 
only stood to gain from a deterioration of apartheid. What is important to keep in mind 
though, is that the ANC was focused on achieving liberation and eventual upliftment of 
especially blacks in South Africa, coupled with a form of majority rule. A well-
developed infrastructure and healthy economy was in their best interest, hence a 
protracted and destructive transition would have undermined their chances of later 
success if they could achieve their primary goals. The legitimacy crisis of the 
government further impacted directly on the lives of blacks, as increased 
disillusionment and unrest led to situations such as the states of emergency between 
1985 and 1987. A mutual perception of these factors were crucial in the start of South 
African negotiations. 
3.5 The Start of Negotiations 
The official changes in policy of the ANC and South African government were not 
solely born out of reactions to domestic and international pressures. As has been 
mentioned, informal talks between elites of both leading groups had been underway 
from as early as 1985, and these impacted on the strategies of the two parties. In the 
same sense it can be argued that the mutually hurting stalemate and the inherent dangers 
of continued conflict as evident in 1989 did not lead to the start of negotiations, but 
rather served to accelerate the process as it had been unfolding since 1985. Due to the 
informal nature of the preliminary meetings it became possible for parties to gauge the 
other's perceptions on issues such as reform and transformation, without having to 
reach agreement. These meetings helped a great deal to create an atmosphere for 
dialogue. The coming about of the bargaining about bargaining phase will subsequently 
be discussed. 
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3.5.1. Laying the groundwork 
In 1983 a discussion document entitled Basic Political Conditions for the survival of the 
Afrikaner was circulated among members of the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) by the 
newly elected chairman Pieter de Lange. In it was argued that apartheid had become 
counter-productive to the survival of white South Africans, and that room should be 
made for black participation in politics. The document created grave tension among 
members and many left the society as a resuh of it.47 What is important about this 
~ocument is that it signified a shift in perceptions among members of the ruling group 
on the issue of compromise and multilateral strategies. According to Willie Esterhuyse, 
however, its importance should not be overemphasised. He argues: 
"The idea was not to go for negotiations. I think the alternative was always 
reform or revolution and the attempt was to steer things in a direction where 
the Afrikaner sort of kept its control over important mechanisms. De 
Klerk's idea of power sharing was the Broederbond's idea of power sharing 
The idea was not to negotiate themselves out of power, it was to get into a 
position where there was a sort of joint management and where the minority 
could play a very effective role in determining the course of events. No one 
in the Broederbond believed in the release ofMandela and the unbanning of 
the ANC, that was not on the cards .. .lt was part of a power play in an 
attempt to eo-opt in a different manner the other population groups into a 
system where the minority elite will remain not in power but will be there in 
the engine room .. .It dealt with minimum conditions but the document was 
important from a psychological point of view. It finally confronted decision 
makers and leaders with the reality that, listen, we need an alternative. And I 
think in this sense it was important. But what then happened, a lot of 
unintended consequences which they had to deal with emerged which led to 
different sort ofpositions.',48 
A similar sentiment is expressed by Sparks who describes the AB in the early 1980's as 
" ... the main agency for trying to find a way out of the Afrikaners' historic dilemma: 
47 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 52 - 53. 
48 Esterhuyse, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
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how to abandon apartheid and come to terms with the black majority without losing 
control of the country and ultimately the national identity of the Afrikaner volk.',..9 De 
Lange, who drafted the document, concurs in the following manner: 
"We never abandoned the idea that the whites would have power, but they 
wouldn't have power in an ordinary sense because the power previously had 
been political and economic and bureaucratic and technica~ whereas the 
struggle was being built up on boycotts, on strikes, on mass action, that was 
real power. "50 
I would argue that the primary importance of the AB document is the change of attitude 
it signified among individuals close to, and in government. It is unrealistic to expect a 
document circulated in AB circles circa 1983 to espouse the idea of majority rule under 
a black (probable ANC) government. If a party considers the possibility of negotiations, 
even if it is only implied, the default position it takes is usually that of an ideal 
settlement, as was the case with the document. Without prior contact a party does not 
yet sufficiently understand its opponent's positions on issues. Consensus and 
compromise are not yet explicitly stated as goals, but the possibility of it signifies a shift 
in perception. Therefore the AB document is important in the sense that it implicitly 
helped to create an environment for negotiations, by redefming the issue in non-zero 
sum terms. 
The ANC similarly realised that they might have to entertain the idea oftalks in future 
and should be prepared for it. According to Willie Esterhuyse: 
"[T]he one thing that the ANC lacked, especially the diplomats, was an 
insight into what the Afrikaners were thinking ... The interesting thing 
is ... Tambo was the one who was very very emphatic about the fact that they 
should get to know Afrikaners within the establishment to find out what was 
going on in their heads because at that stage a small group in the ANC also 
49 Sparks, A Tomo"ow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Revolution, 
Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 1994, p. 72. 
50 Pieter de Lange, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 12 October 1994. 
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to build a plank."51 
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At that stage direct contact was not only impossible for the ANC, but also for the South 
African government. In 1984, Profs. Willie Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche of the 
University of Stellenbosch received a message from Lusaka that the ANC would like 
them to travt\1 to Lusaka for possible meetings. Both met the criteria set by the ANC, as 
both were government advisors and influential Afrikaners. It was seen as an ideal 
opportunity for dialogue without direct contact between the government and ANC. 
News of the proposed trip reached P.W. Botha however, and the two academics were 
summoned to his office, were he requested them not to go, as it would seem to signify a 
start of negotiations with the ANC, to which they complied. 52 
According to Esterhuyse, "[Botha] said I can't afford for you to go because of the 
symbolism of it will be negative and we can't have all sorts of intermediaries and so on. 
If anything should happen it should be the government. "53 Thabo Mbeki affirmS the 
account and adds that such a meeting could have been seen as the start of negotiations 
between the ANC and South African government, which the government was not 
prepared to do at that stage. 54 According to Esterhuyse, Mbeki admitted to him later that 
the time was not ripe for talks in 1984.55 According to my assessment the ANC was not 
prepared to enter into formal negotiations in 1984, for the following reasons: 
• its cadres were still bent on achieving a military victory and would have opposed 
such amove 
• the proponents of negotiation were still only a faction within the ANC. 
• the stalemate had not yet reached its ceiling, creating no immediate incentives for 
negotiation on both sides 
What is significant of the 1984 attempt at dialogue is the changes in attitude from 
influential elites associated with both sides, entertaining the idea of discussions. It did 
51 Esterhuyse, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
s2 Sparks, Tomo"ow is Another Country, p. 76.; Waidmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 76. 
s3 Esterhuyse, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
s4 Thabo Mbeki, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. 
ss Willie Esterhuyse, interview by author, 19 Jtme 1996. 
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not, however, signify the start of prenegotiation as a commitment from the parties 
themselves to find a mutual solution to the conflict was still lacking. It was rather an 
unsuccessful attempt at information gathering, which in itself plays an integral part in 
any decision to negotiate. For this reason strategy changes were not on the cards yet, but 
if the meeting had taken place it might have had an effect on strategies from either side. 
3.6. The Mandela initiative 
During the late 1970's and early 1980's political prisoners began to institute court cases 
against'the government regarding their rights, privileges and the government's release 
policy. Many of these cases were instituted by prisoners on Robben Island, and the 
government lost an increasing number of them. A decision was made by the justice 
department to search for a possible solution, and a think tank was held on Robben 
Island around 1982.56 The meeting was initiated by the minister of justice, Kobie 
Coetsee, and was attended by senior officials of the justice department and prison 
services. The primary motivation was to find a solution for the problematic court cases, 
and it was decided that a new release policy would have to be devised. According to 
Coetsee, by focusing on such a solution, he became more aware of the prisoners' 
environment in general, and specifically individual prisoners. He states: " .. .I became 
perhaps exposed to the individual personality of Mr. Mandela ... the individual Nelson 
Mandela."57 
As a result more lenient release proposals for security prisoners were approved by 
parliament, and a decision was also made to transfer Nelson Mandela from the island. 
This was decided in order to arrange his future release, along the lines that he would 
~~~turn to Transkei.58 In March 1982 five ANC leaders, including Mandela, were 
transferred to Pollsmoor prison in Cape Town. Despite letters from Mandela to among 
other Hendrik Verwoerd and the justice minister appointed in 1980, Kobie Coetsee, no 
56 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. Coetsee was unsure about the exact year that the think tank met. It 
could have been at the end of 1981. 
57 Coetsee, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
ss /bid 
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government officials had responded to his requests for discussions. The move seemed to 
signify something for Mandela, but nothing was forthcoming yet. 59 
3.6.1. First Contact 
The first contact between a government minister, in the form of Kobie Coetsee, and 
Nelson Mandela took place in November 1985, when the former had to be hospitalised 
for surgery. Mandela describes the meeting as follows: 
"In 1985 .. .1 was taken to Volks Hospital in Cape Town under heavy 
security ... But I had another visitor, a surprising and unexpected one: Kobie 
Coetsee, the minister of justice. Not long before, I had written to Coetsee 
pressing him for a meeting to discuss talks between the ANC and the 
government. He did not respond ... But that morning I was amazed. The 
government, in its slow and tentative way, was reckoning that they had to 
come to some accommodation with the ANC. Coetsee's visit was an olive 
branch. "60 
This meeting is regarded as the initiation of the bargaining about bargaining phase, the 
first phase in the negotiation process that would lead to a mutually agreed settlement 
eight years later. Whereas Mandela in his capacity had already communicated a desire 
to discuss negotiations, the hospital visit by Coetsee was the first indication by the 
government that it might consider talks. The implication of this was that leaders on both 
sides were slowly reassessing a zero-sum view of South African conflict, thereby 
implying that any solution would have to be found jointly. Such a reassessment is 
crucial for negotiations to begin, and only at the above meeting was it fust implicitly 
conveyed. 
According to Mandela no politics were discussed at the hospital meeting, but "it was 
clear that he was putting out feelers.'.61 Coetsee stresses that the meeting was not a 
result of his chance meeting with Winnie Mandela the previous day while on a flight to 
59 Mandela, N. Long Walk to Freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela, Randburg: Macdonald 
Purnell, 1994,pp.497,512. 
60 /bid, p. 512. 
61 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 25. 
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Cape Town. He argues that interaction was made easier in a more comfortable 
environment and within the context of previous policy changes. The hospital was seen 
as an ideal venue, as Coetsee took it upon himself never to see Mandela as a prisoner. 
According to Coetsee preparation was done in detail prior to the meeting, including 
such issues as who were to perform the operation. He states that the preparation and 
meeting were sanctioned by P. W. Botha, who wanted to prevent any interference by 
foreign media or doctors. According to Coetsee he made use of the opportunity to send 
goodwill signals to Mandela 62 After Mandela recuperated fully upon his return to 
prison, he was separated from his fellow prisoners and put in a private cell, where 
according to him, he decided to use the opportunity to start discussions with the 
government.63 He describes the decision as follows: 
"It was clear to me that a military victory was a distant if not impossible 
dream ... They must have known this as well. It was time to talk. 
"This would be extremely sensitive. Both sides regarded discussions as a 
sign of weakness and betrayal. Neither would come to the table until the 
other made significant concessions. The government asserted over and over 
again that we were a terrorist organisation of communists, and that they 
would never talk to terrorists or communists ... The ANC asserted over and 
over that the government were fascistic and racist and that there was nothing 
to talk about until they unbanned the ANC, unconditionally released all 
political prisoners and removed the troops from the townships. 
"A decision to talk to the government was of such importance that it 
should only have been made in Lusaka. But I felt that the process needed to 
begin ... "64 
3.6.2. The Eminent Persons Group 
According to Mandela he wrote to Coetsee twice after he was separated from his fellow 
prisoners, asking for a start to talks about talks, but received no response. 65 The next 
high-profile meeting that presented itself was with the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) 
62 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. 
63 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 513. 
64 !bid, pp. 513-514. 
65 Jbid, p. 516. 
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in early 1986. The group comprised of seven members of Commonwealth states, and 
was eo-chaired by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and former 
Nigerian ruler General Olusegun Obasanjo. The EPG's mission was to collect 
information on the South African situation and attempt to engineer a solution to the 
conflict. For this reason they also met with cabinet ministers of the South African 
government individually and collectively. According to the group one of their goals was 
" ... to encourage, through all practical ways, the evolution of ... a process of political 
dialogue [with a view to establish a non-racial and representative government].'.66 
Waldmeir argues that both Mandela and the government were eager to exploit the 
meetings to their advantage. Mandela saw it as an opportunity to put forward his and the 
ANC's case, whereas the government was trying to drum up support for its strategy of 
gradual reform. 67 
The first contact the EPG had with Mandela was with a personal visit by Obasanjo on 
21 February 1986 in the guest house at Pollsmoor prison. At this meeting they discussed 
the nature of the delegation's brief, and it was decided to arrange two more meetings 
with all members present. According to Obasanjo, in his conversation with Mandela the 
latter argued for a "negotiated government" in South Africa, being very careful not to be 
too far ahead or too far behind ANC attitudes at that stage.68 The first of the planned 
meetings took place in May 1986, and topics relating to South Africa's future and 
possible solutions to the political impasse were dis~ussed. According to Mandela he 
stressed his commitment to a negotiated settlement, but emphasised that he would not 
reject violence until such a process was present. He asked the group to convey his 
sentiments to the ANC in Lusaka, which at the same time was meant as a message to 
the government. 69 
The government, however, was not eager to accept advice on how to resolve the 
conflict. Olusegun Obasanjo notes that "I thought every government wants to present a 
good face to the world. The South African government ofP.W. Botha is no exception, 
they wanted to present a good face to the world."70 However, at a meeting between the 
66 Mission to South Africa, p. 19. 
67 !bid, p. 95. 
68 !bid 
69 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, pp. 317-318. 
70 Olusegtm Obasanjo, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 8 November 1994. 
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EPG and cabinet ministers, the latter did not react well to a statement by Malcolm 
Fraser that the EPG was in South Africa to help the government. According to 
Obasanjo, Chris Heunis, then minister of constitutional affairs, " ... wanted to kick us 
within the first ten minutes ... [He] jumped up and said who asked you for your help." 71 
The government presented their position in a document handed to the EPG at a meeting 
between the cabinet and the delegation. In it they argued the following: 
"It is the conviction of the Government that any future constitutional 
dispensation providing for participation by all South African citizens should 
be the result of negotiations with the leaders of all communities. 
"The Government will not prescribe who may represent black 
communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa. 
"The only condition is that those who participate in the discussions and 
negotiations should forswear violence as a means of achieving political 
objectives."72 
The government then proceeded to list a number of premises on which negotiations 
would be based. These included: 
• eo-responsibility and power-sharing between those communities on matters of 
national concern 
• the protection of minority rights, without one group dominating the other73 
Finally, they made the following statement: 
71 !bid 
"The South African Government also confirms that the situation of 
detainees or prisoners will be reviewed as violence recedes and normality 
returns; and 
72 Mission to South Africa, p. 80. 
73 !bid, p. 81. 
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• it is positively committed to ~d actively involved in contributing to the 
peace, stability and development of the Southern African region."74 
86 
The last statement turned out to be ironic in the light of further events. On 19 May 1986 
the South African army launched air and commando raids on suspected ANC bases in 
-·· Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. This was on the morning of the planned second 
meeting with Nelson Mandela, and a planned meeting between a constitutional 
committee of the government and the EPG. The raids were launched on the orders of 
P. W. Botha, and sent a clear signal to the EPG and international community on the issue 
of what was deemed to be outside interference in the domestic policies of South Africa. 
Despite initial overtures to the EPG by the government, the strategists behind the Total 
Onslaught had the final say on South Africa's position vis-a-vis the ANC and 
negotiations. 
When the meeting with the government took place after all, the EPG did not raise the 
issue of the raids, but rather proposed the notion of a negotiated settlement as part of a 
report on their mission. The proposals were turned down us unacceptable by the 
government. 75 The Mandela meeting was cancelled, and the EPG left South Africa in 
June 1986. According to Landsberg, the report published by the EPG included the first 
public proposal of negotiation as a solution to the South African dilemma. 76 It did not, 
however, address the issue of sanctions, as all members did not support sanctions as a 
strategy. 77 Despite this, the army raids into neighbouring states left leaders with anti-
sanction sentiments such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan with little choice, 
and sanctions were introduced shortly afterwards, as an unintended consequence of the 
EPG mission. 
Chester Crocker, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa at the time, reflects on 
the passive role of Western governments during the EPG's visit, and argues that the 
government was split between those who wanted to utilise the EPG in order to force the 
ANC into a decision on violence, and those who first wanted to eradicate black 
74 !bid 
75 !bid 
76 Landsberg, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
77 Obasanjo, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
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resistance.78 Obasanjo makes a similar observation when he states that ''the cabinet was 
divided between the doves and the hawks, and the hawks had their day."79 This typifies 
the conflicting attitudes which were prevalent in government circles at the time on the 
issue of negotiation. In my opinion the raids served as a severe blow for the perceptions 
ofthe government's good faith intentions, despite the probable interpretation by some 
government officials that they were merely contributing to the stability of the region, as 
stated. 
The South African government was however not the only party who was internally 
divided on the issue of negotiations. A similar situation existed in ANC circles, where 
debate was heated over the question of negotiation vis-a-vis the armed struggle. After 
the May 1986 raids the pressure increased on pro-negotiation ANC-members to discard 
notions of peaceful settlement. The internal conflict within both parties led to a situation 
in the South African transition were individuals on both sides, rather than the collective 
of executives and supporters paved the way for talks. Hence, internal conflict on both 
sides was a crucial determinant of the method of bargaining which transpired during the 
bargaining about bargaining phase. 
3.6.3. The Committee 
After the EPG mission, Nelson Mandela and Kobie Coetsee had a meeting at Coetsee's 
house. They discussed the impasse regarding negotiations, and Mandela asked for a 
meeting with P.W. Botha and Pik Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nothing 
transpired, however, and Mandela wrote Coetsee another letter, to which he also did not 
receive a responSe. Mandela was, however, increasingly granted daytrips, and from 24 
December 1986 he was taken on various excursions in and around Cape Town and the 
~estem Cape under supervision.· Although his release was not imminent due to the 
deadlock over the violence issue, it seemed that preparation for it had begun. Yet, 
Mandela argues that he regarded it as a tactic to make him long for freedom and extract 
concessions from him. 80 
78 Crocker, C. High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1992, pp. 305 - 306. 
79 Obasanjo, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
80 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, pp. 520 - 52. 
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In 1987 Mandela resumed contact with Coetsee. P. W. Botha still regarded the Transkei 
option as the ideal solution to the question ofMandela, hence no movement towards an_ 
agreed conflict resolution mechanism was forthcoming. At the meetings negotiations 
were still not discussed expJicitly, as Botha still regarded Mandela's case as 
problematic. This was signified by a meeting that was organised between Mandela and 
George Matanzima, brother to the head of the Transkei government, at Coetsee's house. 
The two men met, and according to Coetsee both were very conciliatory, but they still 
did not see eye to eye politically. 81 
As time progressed Botha became more interested to learn about Mandela's proposals, 
and at his request Coetsee assembled a committee which could enter into discussions 
with Mandela on a more formal basis. 82 The members of the committee were Coetsee; 
the commissioner of prisons, General Johan Willemse; the director general of prisons, 
Fanie van der Merwe; the head of the National Intelligence Agency, Niel Barnard; and 
his deputy, Mike Louw.83 This more structured approach signified a change in the 
government's attitudes towards (pre)negotiation, yet still none of it was public 
knowledge or declared to the cabinet. The composition of the committee was significant 
in that it reflected a conscious decision to involve non-politicians. One reason for this 
decision was the fear that information might be leaked if politicians were involved. 
The National Executive Committee of the ANC got word of possible talks between 
Mandela and the government, and became worried. A letter of Oliver Tambo was 
smuggled to Mandela, asking him what the situation was. Mandela replied that he was 
trying to initiate contact between the ANC and the government. Because of the 
suspicion in him from the ANC in exile, Mandela saw the government's tactics as an 
attempt to drive a wedge between him and the ANC. His perception could also have 
been caused by the fact that Botha as well as the committee's participants continued to 
shun any outside intervention or mediation. One of the first points conveyed to Mandela 
at the first meeting was that there was not going to be any mediation; a condition to 
81 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. 
82 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 100. 
83 Sparks, Tomo"ow is another country, p. 36. Bamard and Louw were included after initial discussions 
between the others and Mandela, where the latter eventually agreed upon their participation. The first 
meeting between all the members of the committee and Mandela took place in May 1988. 
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which he agreed. 84 This served the purpose of co-ordinating contact with Mandela 
centrally, ensuring a united front against him, and keeping exit costs low. According to 
Niel Barnard: "(t]he more the outside world tried to become involved the more stubborn 
we became to not try and let them have any kind of involvement ... "85 Although 
intermediaries such as the committee was used, the government was always aimed at 
having a direct line of communication between themselves and the ANC. I am of the 
opinion that this was because of suspicion towards the neutrality of third parties, as the 
prevailing opinion of outside persons were that Mandela should be released as soon as 
possible. For the government, perceptions of their own power came into play, hence to 
strengthen their position they regarded it as imperative that they should keep the 
initiative. 
What is interesting is that Mandela did not report of these meetings v1a his 
communication channels to Lusaka. He was also vehemently opposed to any talks 
between the government and the exiled ANC leadership, and grew increasingly so. 
According to one source, a proposal was made to him during his discussions with the 
committee that the government should initiate contact with the ANC in exile. He 
completely refused, and insisted that if the government wished to do this, they should 
smuggle the persons involved into the prison.86 This was probably due to his suspicion 
that the government might attempt to drive a wedge between him and them, and extract 
an embarrassing statement or compromise from either side. Yet, it could also have been 
an attempt to consolidate his powerbase within the organisation, making a deal with the 
government dependent on him, or stalling talks with the ANC until he was released. 
Although exit costs were always kept in mind, it was increasingly doubtful whether the 
government through the committee could extract themselves from talks with ANC 
figures as time passed. Especially in light ofMandela's age and international pressure to 
release him, Botha and his officials realised that if he died in prison, it would cause a 
severe outcry and backlash both domestically and internationally. Mandela probably 
also realised this. Therefore, I would argue that it became crucial for talks to continue 
84 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 April 1997. 
85 Barnard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
86 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 April1997. 
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on issues such as Mandela' s release until agreement could be reached. The elusive 
contract zone could however not be found during Botha's term in office. 
Mike Louw confirms that Mandela was afraid they might "make mischief' and that the 
two sides would be played off against one another. Louw argues that the committee was 
actually afraid that such a perception had already taken root within the ANC outside, 
and that they were wondering if they could still trust Mandela. He states: 
"And here we were making progress I think as far as the talks were 
concemed ... with an indication of how Mr. Mandela's mind was working, 
and putting our money on him so to speak that he would do the right thing 
when he was eventually released. And at the same time we were worried 
that he was losing confidence of those outside so we had to do something to 
get the other side on board as well. "87 
All the government sources with which I have spoken, deny that there was ever an 
attempt to drive a wedge between the ANC in exile and Nelson Mandela. They stress 
that it became important, as Mandela's release became more imminent and doubts in his 
leadership surfaced, that the exiled ANC leadership should also be engaged. This, 
however, remained a tricky situation as the leadership wasn't as easily approachable and 
the risks involved in terms of the government's constituency were quite huge. Not 
surprisingly, however, the point of view of ANC members remain that division was 
sought between them and Mandela. 
According to an anonymous source the main aim of the committee was to discuss 
Mandela's release with him. 88 Sparks notes that Niel Barnard had a brief to question 
Mandela on his views of three issues crucial to the government. These were his 
assessment of violence as a means to and end, his attitude towards communism, and his 
flexibility on the issue of majority rule. 89 According to Barnard he conveyed this to 
Mandela at the first meeting by telling him " .. .I have been instructed to talk to you, and 
the reason is we must find out are you interested in a peaceful settlement? What are 
87 Louw, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
88 Anonymous, interview by author, 18 April1997. 
89 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 48. 
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your views on the use of force and what are your views on communism ... " On the issue 
of majority rule he states that Mandela was asked " ... are you interested in a peaceful 
political system, and indicating from that, what would be the positions of 
minorities ... ?''90 
Mike Louw reiterates the above as issues that were discussed and also mentions issues 
such as Mandela's view of South Africa's political future, the question over the youth's 
perceptions, and South Africa's involvement in neighbouring states that were discussed. 
He divides the issues into topics of the day and strategic future predictions. According 
to Louw the committee's approach was to gather information from Mandela on his 
assessment of the issues. He states that they made as little input as possible in order to 
listen to Mandela, but adds "[w]e were not supposed to convince him, but [in] many 
instances we were of the opinion he was a bit out of touch to our lives, and we gave a 
few inputs to see how he would react ... "91 
It is clear from these recollections that the government's aim was to gather as much _ 
information as possible from Mandela, in order to weigh up their options and formulate 
their strategies in the event of his release. The meetings had the effect of forcing them to 
evaluate their own positions and decide if a negotiation range was possible within the 
parameters ofboth sides' ideal settlements, concurring with Gibson's outline of the first 
phase in negotiation. As Morley and Stephenson note, they had to assess the feasibility 
of demands. The fact that they "evaluated" Mandela in the light of a possible adversary 
in official negotiations, in other words whether they could negotiate with him, signified 
an implicit acceptance that any solution to the dilemma of this prisoner and the problem 
of the ANC would involve a multilateral strategy. This is a crucial precondition for 
negotiation as outlined by Zartman and Berman and Du Toit. For the government it was 
not just a question of who to negotiate with and what to expect. The problem had to be 
redefined. 
To further influence Mandela and inform him of current thought on political, social and 
economic issues, preparations were made for him to meet with influential South 
90 Barnard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
91 Louw, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
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Africans of all sectors. To ensure better communication and secrecy in this regard, he 
was transferred to .Victor Verster prison in December 1988, a move initiated by Kobie 
Coetsee. Yet that was not the only rationale behind the move. By relocating Mandela to 
a house on the outskirts of the Victor Verster prison grounds, and allowing him to meet 
with more of his own contacts, an attempt was made to demystify him, as reports of 
meetings with other ANC members were sure to leak out.92 This was also a 
government-sponsored attempt to bridge the gap between him and the increasingly 
suspicious ANC-NEC in Lusaka. Furthermore the government, faced with dread 
scenarios when Mandela was released, began to release other prisoners in order to 
prepare ANC supporters for Mandela. 
During Mandela's incarceration at Victor Verster, approximately 44 meetings with 
prominent organisations and/or persons were arranged for him. At these meetings 
Mandela was informed of issues ranging from ec~:n10mic policy to international affairs. 
The argument from government side was that Mandela needed to appear credible upon 
his release, as his leadership was not a giy_en. 9~ This, coupled to the daytrips was also an 
attempt to accustom him to public life. Apparently Willemse played an important part 
within the committee advocating the release of Mandela, as he argued that negotiations 
should be held only when all persons were on an equal footing. 94 
The talks with Mandela turned out to be frustrating at times for the committee members, 
as Mandela would return to unresolved issues weeks after they've been discussed. He 
would also stick to the positions he'd taken in. As Mike Louw notes: "He had 27 years 
to work on his points and he was sticking to them."95 Despite this perceived lack of 
willingness to compromise, talks continued. A possible explanation for Mandela's non-
movement could be that his positions were already compromises to a certain extent, and 
that the real compromises still had to come from government side. Niel Barnard notes 
that Mandela argued from the start of discussions that any new dispensation should be 
democratic, and whoever won power would run the country; but also recognising that 
the country could not be run without Afrikaner leaders and their supporters.96 This 
92 Barnard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
93 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. 
94 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 April1997. 
95 Louw, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
96 Barnard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
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placed the onus for movement on the government's side - for them to accept the 
possibility of an ANC-led government. 
According to Kobie Coetsee the talks he had with Mandela on constitutional issues was 
not part of a negotiation process yet, but was related to the setting up of an agenda. 97 A 
formal agenda was not yet forthcoming, however, as no official commitment to 
negotiate a new dispensation had tak_e_:Q. place on either side. Similarly, no concrete 
legislative or constitutional changes were discussed during the committee-Mandela 
meetings, but rather what should be done from each side to reach such a point. The 
mutual reiteration of preconditions for bargaining served the purpose of moving towards 
preliminary bargaining, subsequent discussions inevitably lead to issues such as the 
release of political prisoners, the removal of restrictions on the ANC, and the issue of 
violence. 
Despite this, no real progress was being made in terms of action taken by the 
government. Mandela started to grow more and more restless and on more than one 
occasion demanded to speak directly with P. W. Botha, as he effectively had the final 
say on all issues of reform. According to Barnard, Mandela told him " ... you are not 
such a bad guy and I happen to like you here and there, but you don't have the political 
power and I want to talk to the man with political power, and that is P.W .... "98 After 
several failed attempts by Mandela to secure such a meeting, it at last took place on 5 
July 1989 under strict security, with Mandela being smuggled into Tuynhuys at night. 
Prior to the meeting, in March 1989, Mandela had sent a detailed memorandum to P.W. 
Botha in which he argued that a negotiated settlement should be found to solve the 
'-
problem of conflict. Although Botha had resigned as leader of the National Party in 
February 1989, he was still State President, and Mandela regarded him as the primary 
person who could initiate change. In the memorandum Mandela proposed a start to 
negotiations between the ANC and the government if the latter would drop three of its 
preconditions. These were the call on the ANC to reject violence, the demand that all 
links are broken with the SACP, and the condition that the ANC should abandon the 
91 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. 
98 Bamard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
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concept of majority rule. He also argued that the fears of whites would have to be taken 
into account, yet reconciled with the idea of a democratically elected majoritarian 
government. 
These issues were not addressed at the meeting with Botha, however, as it was mainly a 
"courtesy call. "99 Still, although the meeting itself did not produce much of a result in 
terms of the negotiation process, it was a significant step in South African history. The 
outcome of the meeting did, however have a significant impact. The most notable 
outcome was the shock announcement of the meeting by Botha the weekend after, 
during a hunting trip with some cabinet members, when he circulated a photo taken of 
him and Mandela among those present. It created an uproar as the cabinet realised that 
they were not informed of contact with Mandela for a significant time. Botha again 
circulated the photo at a security council meeting the following Monday, and in the 
same week the story of the meeting reached the newspapers. 100 The importance of the 
aftermath was that, whatever statements were made, the news of such a meeting started 
to prepare supporters on both sides, until then oblivious of the process, for contact with 
theANC. 
By the end of the committee meetings with Mandela a report was compiled by Mike 
Louw in collaboration with the other members. According to Louw the main conclusion 
was that Mandela was a man of integrity, and a man with which the government could 
deal with, keeping in mind that he was immovable on some issues. This served an 
important role later in convincing the government to engage Mandela in talks, without 
having to worry that he would continuously shift between positions. What is significant 
is that all the persons who were involved in the committee regarded Mandela as 
probably the most important role-player in all the talks that led to a new dispensation. 
An anonymous source regards the committee-Mandela meetings as probably the most 
significant cause of the negotiated settlement. 
99 Mandela, Long Road to Freedom, pp. 538- 540. 
100 !bid 
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3. 7. Establishing contact with the exiles 
One problematic aspect of talking with Mandela was that, despite his status, he was but 
one individual within the ANC. Even if he would play a big role in a negotiated 
settlement, he had been separated from his colleagues for too long to assert his 
leadership role and refine his views on a ongoing basis. The government realised early 
on that if they were going to engage Mandela in talks, they also had to engage the ANC 
leadership, as a solution could not rest on the decisions of one man. The latter was a 
-logistical nightmare, however, as talks with the ANC outside South Africa was not as 
morally defensible as talking with prisoners of the government. The influence of 
audiences was very important, and the government could not risk being seen to talk with 
the enemy by their supporters. For this reason as many planned meetings as possible 
between white South Africans and the ANC were quashed between 1984 and 1986, 
when extra-governmental persons started to attempt contact on their own. 
Although it is denied by government negotiators, it would have been an appealing 
option and a logical strategy to attempt and create tension, even a possible rift, between 
the ANC and Mandela. Given the context of post-1985 South Africa, and the 
increasingly obvious realisation by the South African government that they would 
probably have to regard the ANC as future opponents in negotiation, such a tactic would 
have been implicitly accepted. It can even be argued that the government attempted to 
prepare Mandela in such a way that he would be the local and international choice when 
it came to a decision of who to support. If bargaining is regarded as an attempt between 
parties to exchange scarce resources and simultaneously acquire as much possible 
advantage for themselves, the offering of freedom to Nelson Mandela in exchange for a 
rejection of violence is a fine example of the carrot-stick dimensions of negotiation. 
Although it is argued that the government perceived itself to be in a powerful position, 
prenegotiation served as the ideal forum to alter the ANC's perception concurrently, as 
well as create a disturbance in the power relationship. Hence, for the government, as for 
any side in bargaining, a weakening in the opponent's bargaining power would have 
been advantageous, whatever their end goal was. This study therefore argues that it was 
to be expected that the government would at least implicitly try and create dissension in 
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ANC ranks if it meant that they would be weakened in negotiation. This is due to the 
nature of bargaining. 
Even government intermediaries such as Willie Esterhuyse argues that a strategy to 
divide the ANC might have been the case. He states that "I may be wrong, and I hope I 
am wrong. I think in that period, make it '84 to '88, the idea was still to see if they 
could get a split in the ANC, between the nationalists and the so-called communists, 
which is a wrong sort of categorisation."101 Aziz Pahad reiterates the sentiment and adds 
that it must have seemed uncanny for the government that the ANC and Mandela's 
arguments correlated so closely. He states that the similarities were a blessing in 
disguise, as it would have sent a signal to the government what the ANC's positions 
would be, regardless which leader is negotiated with.102 
3.7.1. Being handed an intermediary channel 
Whatever the underlying strategy of the Mandela discussions, the~government needed 
information on the position of the ANC in exile. This was especially evident in 1985 
after the report issued at the ANC's Kabwe conference. The ANC declared it would 
negotiate only over the modalities of the transfer of power, yet recommended that a set 
of preconditions for negotiations be drawn up, and the government started to realise the 
need for firsthand information on the ANC. A similar situation was evident in ANC 
circles, where members were interested in gauging the attitude and mentality of 
Afrikaners. Yet in light of ANC policy and internal differences, they were in a similar 
dilemma as the government and could not initiate direct contact, for the fear of a 
backlash from supporters. Furthermore, both parties feared that a move from their side 
might signify weakness on their behalf. What was needed was either a chance 
occurrence or a mediated effort from a third party. The latter scenario was the one that 
presented itself in 1987. 
In February of that year, Michael Young, who was head of communications and 
corporate affairs at the British mining conglomerate Consolidated Goldfields, met with 
Profs. Willie Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche of Stellenbosch University in order 
101 Esterhuyse, interview by Waldrneir, 1994. 
102 Pahad, interview by Waldrneir, 4 November 1994. 
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to gauge whether they would be interested in another attempt to meet with the ANC. 
This was part of an effort to make contact with elites within the establishment who 
might be interested in talks with the ANC. The idea had its <>rigin in a series of 
unsuccessful meetings between British business elites and the ANC during 1986, when 
Oliver Tambo reportedly asked Young to establish contacts between the ANC and 
Afrikaners. 103 Young discussed the proposal with Rudolph Agnew, the chairman of 
Consgold, who gave his qualified support. Young then proceeded to gather names of 
possible contacts within the Afrikaner establishment, and contacted Fleur de Villiers, 
who was a Johannesburg-based consultant for Consgold at the time. De Villiers steered 
him towards Esterhuyse and Terreblanche.104 After initial contact was made, Young and 
Humphrey Woods, another senior official within Consgold, proceeded to organise the 
frrst meeting. 
Three weeks after the start of preparations, Esterhuyse received a visit from two senior 
NIS officials at his home. It was apparent that they had information on the proposed 
meeting, as they asked Esterhuyse if he would be prepared to advise them on how to 
deal with the issues of constitutional and political renewal. This included reporting back 
to them on any ANC meetings, as they had set up a small committee consisting of five 
NIS officials who were working towards a new strategy in dealing with the ANC. 105 
Esterhuyse complied on the condition that he could inform the ANC of it, which was 
accepted by the officials. The NIS committee comprised ofNiel Barnard, Mike Louw, 
Maritz Spaarwater, and two other unnamed persons: a woman and a man. The only 
other person informed of Esterhuyse's role was P.W. Botha!06 It is important to note 
that this committee was set up one year prior to the committee that met with Nelson 
Mandela, of which Barnard and Louw were also part. Due to Botha's knowledge of 
both developments, it might have been a deciding factor in co-ordinating the 
committees with dual membership. 
According to an unconfirmed account, an attempt to broker contact between the ANC 
and the government was also made by a lawyer in the Western Cape who regularly 
103 This could not be established as fact, as some sources doubt whether Oliver Tambo made the plea. 
104 Sparks, Tomo"ow is Another Country, pp. 78- 79. 
105 !bid 
106 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 79. The fact that P.W. Botha knew of the indirect link with the 
ANC was confirmed to the author by an anonymous source. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
corresponded with P. W. Botha. The person claimed to have links with the ANC in exile 
and offered his services as facilitator to Botha, who instructed Stoffel van der Merwe, 
then minister of information, to liaison with him. Apparently Van der Merwe 
misinterpreted Botha's instruction as a mandate to establish official talks and 
approached the Swiss government for funding. They complied and an office was set up 
for the lawyer, who organised some preliminary meetings with the ANC, but did not 
show up. Botha, who was oblivious of the developments, meanwhile undertook a visit 
to Switzerland and was subsequently thanked for the opportunity he granted the Swiss 
to assist in setting up dialogue. Needless to say he was furious when he learnt of the 
initiative and V an der Merwe, as a result, almost lost his cabinet position. The project 
was then cancelled. One other attempt to mediate the conflict was made by the Dutch 
government, but it never passed the initial stages and as a result was cancelled .. 
3.7.2. The role ofthe National Intelligence Service 
Before the discussion is continued it is important to reflect on the role and influence of 
the NIS on the whole transition process in South Africa. A question that need to be 
answered is why did the NIS play such a seemingly crucial role in the move towards 
negotiation with the ANC? This is especially relevant in the light of the common 
assumption that they were a central cog in the repressive machinery of apartheid. 
Furthermore, in terms of negotiation, are intelligence agency officials a logical choice in 
relationships that require the building of trust? What were the motivations and aims of 
the NIS in South Africa's prenegotiation phase? Answers to these questions are 
important when analysing South Africa's transitional negotiations, especially in the 
light of a broader application when dealing with deeply divided societies. 
It has become a common assertion that a great amount of hostility existed between 
National and Military Intelligence, dating back from the Vorster government. According 
to Kobie Coetsee a change in preferences were evident in Botha's coming to power, as 
he preferred advice from the military security establishment.107 This is evident when 
looking at the increasingly important role that people like Gen. Magnus Malan and 
bodies such as the State Security Council played under Botha's presidency. According 
to Coetsee he was instructed by Botha to close down the NIS. However, he came to the 
107 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. 
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conclusion that NIS provided one of the few openings to the world for the embattled 
government, in terms of its monitoring capacity. After a dramatised arrest of a Russian 
spy, Botha's perception of the NIS changed to a more favourable position. Coetsee 
argues that this led the way to develop an under-utilised aspect of the NIS's capacity, 
namely making analyses and predictions regarding domestic politics and compiling 
future scenarios as a strategic aid to government. According to Coetsee the two state 
departments that specifically made use of this capability were the departments of justice 
and correctional services. The underlying antagonism between the two intelligence 
bodies stayed prevalent however. 108 
According to Niel Barnard the NIS advocated talks with the ANC even before 1986. He 
states that a report compiled in 1984 by P .S. Swanepoel, the NIS Chief Director of 
Evaluations at the time, argued that the government should start talking with Mandela. 
The report also sketched a scenario that the release of Mandela in Johannesburg could 
attract almost two million supporters - a dreaded prospect for the government. This 
assessment convinced the NIS that a strategy of gradually demystifying Mandela should 
be implemented, a cause ofMandela's eventual prison transfers. 109 
According to Willie Esterhuyse an argument can be made out that National Intelligence 
understood what intelligence was all about, as opposed to information. He states that 
whereas MI reacted more to incidents of sabotage and how perceived perpetrators could 
be tracked down, NIS thought more strategically. After events such as the signing of the 
Nkomati accord in 1984, where NIS was intimately involved, and later on the 
Angola/Namibia negotiations, where Barnard was one of the three main negotiators, 
they would probably have made an assessment that the process of change would 
become irreversible with time, and decided to act more proactively. Esterhuyse argues 
that concomitantly they probably expected a division between blacks in time, a 
perception which had unintended consequences. He says that on numerous occasions 
after 1987 he had discussions with the small committee ofNIS officials on the topic of 
strategic reform, and that they were the crucial strategists on government side 
throughout the initial stages. 110 
108 !bid 
109 Bamard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
"
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Another explanation by Esterhuyse for the prominence of NIS in setting up dialogue, 
was the competition between them and :MI. According to him they were attempting to 
gain ascendancy as the primary intelligence body in South Africa, and for this reason he 
does not regard their move as morally motivated. He states that the strategies discussed 
internally by the NIS focused on an alternative to the Total Onslaught strategy that was 
then eminent during the Botha government. However, the nature of the Total Onslaught 
idea placed the managing of responses to it more in :MI's field of expertise. According 
to Esterhuyse the NIS's strategies thus had to focus on the part of the political spectrum 
they had sole access to, which turned out to be external movements of extra-political 
organisations. The officials that met with Esterhuyse in 1987 told him that the NIS 
needed a form of dialogue with organisations like the ANC to counter the one-sided 
information they had on them. He notes, however, that he does not think they were at 
that stage aiming at the setting up of negotiations. 111 
Chester Crocker argues that Niel Barnard's presence in the Namibian negotiating team 
brought in a key constituency. This can be argued for the South African case as well. He 
states: 
"While National Intelligence did not posses the clout of the SADF's military 
intelligence directorate on regional military issues, it offered a distinct 
viewpoint on both regional and global issues. In addition, its domestic 
intelligence function gave Barnard a major say on anything related to the 
African National Congress."112 
Esterhuyse's assessment of the NIS was that they were faced with a complex dilemma, 
and said to them "I can't do a thing like this and act as an informant. I am prepared to 
act as a sort of informal messenger but I can't be an informant."113 He continues: 
"The fascinating thing about the discussions I have had in so many, what 
they called safe houses ... was that we sat there sometimes for a whole day 
discussing policy alternatives which then indicated to me that the strategists 
in government were not just confused, but found themselves at a crossroads. 
111 Esterhuyse, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
112 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 407. 
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that something had gone wrong somewhere."114 
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Another reason, despite the need for a strategic approach, that Esterhuyse mentions as 
explanation for why the NIS became involved, is the need for secrecy and low exit costs 
that existed. The official position of the NIS, which Esterhuyse also had to convey to 
the ANC, was that they would not personally engage in discussions. 115 Therefore they 
had to make use of an intermediary in order to distance themselves from any 
involvement with the ANC. Yet, if a positive link could be proven between the ANC 
and NIS, they would be able to reply that it was their responsibility to gather 
information on the ANC and the talks merely served as a purpose for them to do their 
jobs. 116 The end product was that in no way could the government be held responsible, 
and some sources were at the time of writing still reluctant to confirm whether P.W. 
Botha knew of the contact. This is because it is still a sensitive issue, given the context 
at the time, to acknowledge that persons in government initiated contact with the ANC 
that would lead to the current dispensation, regardless of the reasons. 
The high level of incompatibility between NIS and MI is illustrated by the security 
preparations that were made for Esterhuyse during and in-between the European 
meetings. These were not as much aimed at protecting him from the ANC, but from 
agents associated with MI. For this reason Esterhuyse approached a prominent 
government official and personal friend, and as an insurance tactic Esterhuyse informed 
him of the developments, in case something went wrong. Esterhuyse had contacts 
within the cabinet, who for instance informed Esterhuyse when an MI official named 
him as a ANC courier at a State Security Council (SSC) meeting. At that stage only two 
people in the SSC knew of the initiative and could do nothing. Despite training 
Esterhuyse received in general safety and detecting car bombs, he was also protected by 
NIS officials for a period of time, illustrating the severe risk ofMI interference. 
The significance of the NIS behaviour in terms of their conflictual relationship with Ml, 
lies in the affirmation of the serendipitous nature of the process. As Esterhuyse notes, 
114 !bid 
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the actions of the NIS had many unintended consequences, of which an eventual 
transfer of political power to the ANC was one. This does not mean that the 
characterisation of these events as prenegotiation is invalid. The recognition was evident 
that a form of co-operation would be necessary in future tc resolve the conflict, and that 
in itself served to formalise negotiation at a later stage. The fact that negotiation did 
occur in the end, and was not suppressed by a knee-jerk reaction by the NIS, shows that 
the unintended consequences were partly due to an inadequate delineation of parameters 
by the NIS of their own bargaining position. 
3.8. The external initiative 
After Michael Young met with Sampie Terreblanche and Willie Esterhuyse in February 
1987 and both expressed their willingness to meet with the ANC, he attempted to recruit 
some other high-ranking Afrikaners. On the recommendation of Esterhuyse he 
approached Johan Heyns, moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church; Pieter de Lange, 
head of the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB); Tjaart van der Wait, rector of Potchefstroom 
University; Willie Breytenbach, a civil servant turned academic; and Marinus Wiechers, 
professor in law at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Heyns, De Lange and V an 
der Wait declined to partake. 
Between October 1987 and 1 July 1990 eight meetings took place between the ANC 
and prominent Afrikaners. The first meeting took place in October 1987 at a hotel 
known as The Complete Angler in Marlowe. From the establishment side Esterhuyse, 
Terreblanche, and Breytenbach was present, ~cl from the ANC side Aziz Pahad, Harold 
Wolpe, Wally Serote, and Tony Trew. The meeting was chaired by Michael Young, and 
was mainly an exercise in breaking the ice. Nothing substantial wr. discussed, as only 
vague arguments were made from both sides on what their perceptions were of South 
Africa's situation and future. It was decided that more meetings were to be organised. 117 
The second meeting between the groups took place in February 1988 at the Eastwell 
Manor Hotel in Kent. Thabo Mbeki joined· the ANC delegation and Marinus Wiechers, 
117 Willie Esterhuyse, informal discussions with author, 19 June 1996-3 November 1997. 
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Tjaart van der Wait, and Naas Steenkamp, president of the Chamber of Mines, joined 
the Afrikaner group, while Young again chaired the meeting. Both sides had compiled 
agendas of the issues they wanted to discuss, yet reiterated that they had no official 
mandate to negotiate on behalf of the government or ANC respectively. This was a 
crucial aspect of these talks, and a reason why most participants did not regard it as 
negotiations. Esterhuyse states that the ANC constantly reminded the other participants 
that it was not a meeting with the ANC, but rather with members of the ANC. The 
issues that were discussed at this meeting included: 
• the ANC's position on violence 
• the ANC's preconditions for negotiation 
• the role of leaders in pacifying militant supporters 
• the ANC's political and economic policy 
• the relationship between civil and military powers in South Africa 
• the proposed National Statutory Body which aimed at including blacks in political 
decisionmaking 
• the ANC's stance towards minority rights and black-on-black violence 
• the resumption of international sporting links by South Africa 118 
Esterhuyse notes that the discussions were at all times informal and that delegates 
explored only hypothetical events. One side would present the other with a scenario and 
assess their reply in terms of concessions they might be willing to make. Despite the 
more formal dialogue, participants were also awarded ample time to engage in personal 
discussions. This created the ideal situation to pursue dual track deliberations, where the 
groups workshopped agenda issues, and Esterhuyse and Mbeki debated possible 
agendas for formal negotiation in private. Esterhuyse informed Mbeki of the NIS link, a 
factor which was never explicitly conveyed to the other members, with the exception of 
the ANC's Jacob Zuma, who also attended some meetings. Hence, the private 
discussions dealt more with concrete issues and obstacles to negotiation, as both Mbeki 
and Esterhuyse would report back to their respective leaderships and return with 
different proposals. According to Esterhuyse he had a relatively free hand to decide on 
118 !bid 
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which issues to raise with Mbek~ but from time to time the NIS committee would 
supply him with questions and proposals to convey indirectly to the ANC. 119 
From the third meeting, discussions took place mostly at Melb Park, a house owned by 
Consolidated Goldfields. Both delegations introduced new participants on a regular 
basis, with the greatest fluctuation taking part in the Afrikaner group. At the request of 
the ANC, Esterhuyse shuffied the composition of the group in order to introduce the 
ANC members to a divergence of views, especially regarding economics in the later 
stages. During the course of talks approximately twenty different people were brought 
in by Esterhuyse. Prominent figures that were included from the fifth meeting included 
Marinus Dalling of Sanlam; Attie du Plessis, the brother of minister of finance Barend 
du Plessis; Mof Terreblanche, who was a close friend of F.W. de Klerk; Willem 
Pretorius of the Metropolitan Group; Gert Marais, the editor of Finansies en Tegniek; 
Louis Kriel, the head ofUnifruco; Ebbe Domisse, the editor of Die Burger; and Emst 
Lombard of the Dutch Reformed Church. 120 
For the third meeting in August 1988 the participants were Esterhuyse, Terreblanche, 
Wimpie de Klerk, the brother ofF. W. de Klerk on the one side, and Mbeki, Pahad, and 
Trew on the other with Young chairing. The issues that were discussed in the group 
included: 
• the release ofNelson Mandela 
• the ANC's commitment to exercise control over its grassroots supporters 
• the use of violence by the ANC 
• the question ofNamibia 
• white support for reform121 
At this meeting the ANC presented a conciliatory document for discussion in the group, 
which included their proposals for a new South African dispensation. The issue of a 
suspension of the armed struggle if the ANC were unbanned was also discussed. 122 
119 /bid 
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Against the backdrop ofMandela's transfer to Victor Verster prison, the fourth meeting 
took place at Flitwick Park in Bedfordshire in December 1988. All of the August 
participants were present, and the group discussion centred around the following issues: 
• the divisions within government agencies regarding the ANC 
• the proposed Democratic Party as opposition to the government 
• the issue of Mandela's release as a precondition for the suspension of the armed 
struggle 
• the ANC's discussion document put forward at the previous meeting 
• the question ofNamibia 
This meeting served as a very important turning point for Esterhuyse's group in terms 
of their approach to the talks. Whereas they usually attempted to explain the 
complexities of changing the government's attitude, and argued for a wait-and-see 
approach, they now started to seek answers to questions such as what should be done to 
ensure an open process?123 Esterhuyse regards the meetings before December 1988 as 
part of a stage where discussions were held on procedures to get negotiation on track. 
The second stage were more focused on positions and principles. 124 Esterhuyse and 
Mbeki also increasingly discussed the release of Mandela and possible direct contact 
between the NIS and ANC to organise such an event. During the course of 1988 the two 
of them also had one private meeting in a hotel in England. 
In April1989, two months after P.W. Botha resigned as National Party leader and was 
replaced by F. W. de Klerk, the fifth meeting took place at Mells Park. Although De 
Klerk was not yet state president (and would only become acting state president in 
August 1989) the discussion inevitably centred around the expectations participants had 
of reform under De Klerk's leadership, once he took over. At that stage, De Klerk was 
not oblivious to the meetings between Esterhuyse's group and prominent ANC figures, 
as his brother kept him informed. Although F.W. de Klerk did not support the idea, 
Wimpie de Klerk declared at this meeting that his brother was eager to know what the 
ANC positions on various issues were, for instance their conditions for a start of 
123 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 85. 
124 Esterhuyse, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
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preliminary talks. The ANC delegation reiterated that the release of Mandela and the 
unbanning of the ANC were of primary importance. What was not known to most of 
those present, however, was that detailed discussions on these issues had been going on 
between Mbeki and Esterhuyse, on the behest of Barnard, who r~ached a stage in the 
talks with Mandela where direct contact with the exiled ANC were increasingly sought 
after. However, F.W. de Klerk as a new player introduced new factors and concerns for 
those involved, and no plans were made for an actual meeting at first. 125 
3.8.1. Direct Contact 
By June 1989 the preparations to establish direct contact were underway. It is my view 
that the power struggle within the NP must have had a significant effect on the decision 
by the NIS to meet directly with the ANC. After all the preparations that were made 
since 1985, it would have been frustrating for the NIS to be moved out of the 
president's sphere of advisors, and effectively deprived of political influence or status. 
The presentation of a fait accompli to the new leader must have seemed to be the only 
solution to ensure a continuing of the process. Esterhuyse and Mbeki had to meet 
personally to finalise a possible meeting. Esterhuyse was informed by Barnard, 
however, that British Intelligence might have picked up on the meeting, and did not 
discuss anything of significance with Mbeki when they met at the offices of British 
American Tobacco (BAT). Instead, he slipped the latter a note stating that they might be 
under surveillance. They dispersed and met up again at a nearby pub, where a code 
word and telephone number were handed to Mbeki, which were used to set up the 
meeting. 126 
The NIS could not meet without the consent of the president though. This created a 
dilemma for them, as De Klerk, who was to become the new president, had limited 
information on the events of the past few years, and it was unsure whether he would 
agree to such contact, especially in the light of his perceived conservatism. To ensure 
that a meeting could take place, they capitalised on his lack of experience in the 
president's job and the distraction of the recent power struggle. On 16 August 1989, one 
day after De Klerk was sworn in as acting president, Barnard tabled a proposal at a 
125 Esterhuyse, informal discussions with author, 19 June 1996-3 November 1997. 
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meeting of the State Security Council. The proposal argued in vague terms for direct 
contact to be established with the ANC. A resolution was accepted under De Klerk' s 
chairmanship which effectively granted the NIS permission to engage in direct 
discussions with the ANC, contrary to official policy.127 The resolution read: 
"It is necessary that more information should be obtained and processed 
concerning the ANC, and the aims, alliances and potential approachability 
of its different leaders and groupings. To enable this to be done, special 
additional direct action will be necessary, particularly with the help of 
National Intelligence Service functionaries."128 
This gave NIS the official mandate they needed to finalise arrangements for the 
meeting. Amid a large degree of mutual suspicion, the meeting took place on 12 
September 1989 at the Palace Hotel in Lucerne, Switzerland. Of the NIS, Mike Louw 
and Maritz Spaarwater attended, and of the ANC, Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki. No 
concrete agreements were reached at this meeting~ as it centred arou,nd the sticky issues 
that prevented negotiation. The ANC's Barare Declaration released apprpximately three 
weeks earlier spelled out the ANC's official position, and the talks created an 
opportunity to discuss the ANC's preconditions in _detail. Both sides made use of the 
opportunity to exchange views, and both affirmed their commitment to negotiation 
under certain conditions. 129 
When Spaarwater and Louw reported back to F.\\;'". de Klerk about the ANC's 
commitment to negotiation, De Kle~ was furious to learn of the meeting, and argued 
that he was not informed. The resolution was again shown to him, to which he had to 
accede it gave them the prerogative to talk with the ANC, and Louw convinced him that 
it was an investigative meeting, not a negotiating one.130 At this point the NIS strategy ,.. 
faced a possible obstacle. If De Klerk decided to quash any further meetings, the whole 
process could stall. He did not, however, and agreed for further contact to take place in 
order to thrash out preconditions for negotiations. 
127 Ibid.; Sparks, Tomo"ow is Another Country, p. 111. 
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129 Sparks, Tomo"ow is Another Country, pp. 112- 114. For a good overview of the NIS-ANC meetings 
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Whereas it seems that the government officials were very dependent on the consent of 
their leaders throughout the process, the ANC seemed to be less. In August 1989, just 
prior to the first direct contact, Oliver Tambo was hospitalised after he had suffered a 
stroke. It did not seem to have an adverse affect on the ANC strategy though, as Mbeki, 
his logical successor, was intimately involved in the process as well as a leading 
strategist, and continued with the meetings. None of the role-players refer to the 
incident, which implies that it could be insignificant. Yet, it is worth keeping in mind to 
when the bargaining phases are analysed, in order to ascertain if dependency on 
leadership did play a role. 
The sixth meeting between the Afrikaner group and the ANC members also took plac~ 
in September 1989. The discussions as could be expected turned again to Mandela's 
release and the unbanning of the ANC as preconditions for negotiations. Despite the 
usual members, Kriel, Lombard and Domisse took part on the Afrikaner side. While 
Wimpie de Klerk opened a new channel to his brother, Esterhuyse still kept the link to 
Barnard open. Wimpie de Klerk started to raise issues which concerned his brother, and 
these and other questions were discussed with more of a common purpose among the 
participants, as they perceived them to be more official. No-one was yet formally 
informed of the Esterhuyse- Mbeki channel. The issues included: 
• the expected timetable of a transition 
• the influence of the SACP on the ANC 
• the issue of violence during a negotiation period 
• the ANC's views on power-sharing 
• the ANC's control over its internal alliance partners 
• the status ofMandela within the ANC 
• black-on-black violence 
• the acceptability of group rights in a new dispensation 
• the lifting of sanctions 
• the role of intermediaries 
• the implementation of the Namibian peace-accord 
• the international context 
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Although the Mells Park talks kept the momentum of the process going, its significance 
reduced after the first direct contact was established between the NIS and the ANC. 
This was due to the official mandate that the NIS received from De Klerk, and the 
"' 
ANC-group acquired after the Harare Declaration. Two more Mells Park meetings took 
place after the ANC-NIS contact started, as the ANC still wanted to engage as many 
prominent Afrikaners as possible to determine their positions on various issues. It also 
operated as an efficient link to the NIS strategists. 
Bargaining about bargaining serves as a forum where parties can establish contact 
without the responsibility to maintain it. Douglas notes that parties enter the first phase 
of negotiation with radically opposing views, and severe distrust, which ideally gets 
adapted as their positions become more conciliatory. Because prenegotiation serves as a 
dress-rehearsal for possible future bargaining, it offers parties the opportunity to 
ascertain whether their opponents will be susceptible to change through mutually 
accepted agreements, without being bound by decisions. It also serves as an exercise in 
confidence building, to extend personal relationships with adversaries and establish 
mutual trust.. Aziz Pahad gives an excellent account of this process at the Mells Park 
meetings: 
"[C]learly [at] every first meeting, [there was] fear and apprehension about 
this animal you are meeting across each side. But fortunately the 
atmosphere was such that it was easy to break that quickly. And then of 
course the discussions were never: 'We like each other.' Everybody put 
their views and there were very sharp exchanges on almost every topic. 
Sharp but not antagonistic ... Outside of the formal sections we exchanged 
ideas to battle out positions. I think the significance of those were that we 
had very good formal discussions, but the informal discussions around 
dinner or just sitting up to three, four in the morning allowed us to go 
beyond people's ... You come with a prepared agenda, but when you get to 
two or three you start discussing everything and your agenda and set 
positions go out of the window. I · want to believe that we came from 
extremely different positions at those meetings - not a coming together of 
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thinking, because that was never going to happen, hopefully we would not 
all think alike, but we would begin to understand what is the general 
direction, what are the possibilities, what are the frameworks around which 
negotiations can start. "131 
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Because of the generally accepted imminence of the release of Mandela, the 
government proceeded with its tactic to prepare grassroots South Africans for the 
inevitable event and demystify Mandela. On 15 October 1989 the government released 
the first group of high-profile political prisoners, which included Waiter Sisulu, ~e~ _ 
Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni and Raymond Mhlaba who served with Mandela at 
Robben Island prison. The government's tactic was still that of gradually initiating 
change in order to take its supporters with. An international dimension is also ascribed 
to the release by some analysts. According to Sampie Terreblanche F.W. de Klerk was 
pressured by Margaret Thatcher to deliver on his reform promises after a personal 
meeting between them in June 1989. Thatcher had to face a Commonwealth meeting as 
chairperson in October 1989, -and could not turn up with empty hands, as she was 
severely criticised in the past for her support of South Africa. The timing and 
significance of the move was designed to boost both Thatcher and De Klerk's images at 
the meeting. The argument is supported by the fact that De Klerk immediately left the 
room and phoned Thatcher on the day the decision to release the group of prisoners was 
made. 132 
In the first weekend of December 1989, the cabinet held its first bosberaad under the 
leadership ofF.W. de Klerk at D'Nyala game reserve near Ellisras. The purpose ofthe 
weekend-long meeting was to discuss the ANC's preconditions for negotiation an~ 
formulate a response by the government. According to Roelf Meyer, then a deputy 
minister , it was decided during the course of the weekend to accept the ANC's main 
negotiation demands. A decision was taken to release Mandela and other political 
prisoners and unban proscribed political organisations. 133 The debate apparently became 
heated when the question of the SACP surfaced, as some ministers, namely Magnus 
Malan, Adriaan Vlok and Kobie Coetsee were strongly opposed to their unbanning. 
131 Pahad, interview by Waldmeir, 4 November 1994. 
132 Sampie Terreblanche, interview by author, 18 June 1996. 
133 RoelfMeyer, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
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Others argued that their exclusion from such a deal would create renewed problems. 
Although no concrete strategic decisions emerged, the bosberaad played an important 
role in bringing the cabinet on board for major reforms. 134 
On 13 December 1989 Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk had their first meeting, along 
with Coetsee, Willemse, Barnard and Louw. They discussed issues such as the ANC's 
preconditions for talks as set out in the Harare Declaration, and the concept of group 
rights as proposed by De Klerk for a new dispensation. The meeting was not aimed at 
negotiating Mandela's release, but served as an introductory discussion on the 
imperatives for negotiation to take place. This would be the first of three meetings De 
Klerk had with Mandela before the latter's release135 
The NIS committee that initiated contact with the ANC were still very much a factor in 
the strategic planning of government actions. They probably had the most extensive 
information available on ANC positions due to their long involvement with the Mells 
Park meetings. From that it was evident that the ANC would not accept an incremental 
approach to the unbanning of parties. As 2 February 1990 crept closer, which was the 
date scheduled for the opening of parliament, Barnard and Louw argued extensively 
with De Klerk over the need to make a clean break with official policy and unban all 
organisations, as he was still uncertain about the implications an unbanning of the 
SACP would have. They seemingly convinced him of their case, and helped in 
preparing the framework of his opening speech. Their involvement ensured that very 
few people, even in cabinet, knew what De Klerk would say on 2 February. Despite its 
broad framework being decided, the speech was still unfinished the night before, and De 
Klerk completed the final version on his own. 136 
On 2 February 1990 De Klerk delivered the speech that would signify to the world an 
apparent start to negotiations, yet in fact signified the introduction of the preliminary 
bargaining phase. The speech complied to the basic conditions set by the ANC for a 
start to negotiations. On 11 February 1990 Nelson Mandela was released from prison, 
and the onus now rested on the ANE:'s shoulders to reciprocate and build on the good 
134 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 106. 
135 Mandela, Long Road to Freedom, pp. 544 - 545. 
136 Anonymous, informal discussions with author, 1997. 
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faith signals sent by the government. Although the speech did not initiate a change in 
the way bargaining was conducted, as meetings continued to be conducted covertly at 
first, it signified a change in the nature of the talks. This was apparent in three more 
meetings the NIS and the ANC held to discuss the transition of the negotiating process 
into the open. They were conducted on in February and March 1990 in Lucerne, at the 
Bellevue-Palace Hotel in Berne, Switzerland, and at the Noga-Hilton Hotel in Geneva, 
Switzerland respectively. 137 The conduct of these meetings as an initiation of the 
preliminary bargaining phase will be discussed in the following chapter. 
3.9. The role of extra-governmental groups 
As is evident from both the Mandela- and the external initiatives, the bargaining during 
South Africa's bargaining about bargaining phase was conducted under conditions of 
immense secrecy. For people outside the process the only indicators of movement (or 
non-movement) were the official policy changes of the government and ANC 
respectively. 138 Against this backdrop various individuals and organisations in South 
Africa saw the need for contact with the ANC, in order to pressure the government into 
negotiations. A wide range of unsanctioned meetings with the ANC were conducted 
from 1985 to 1989 by concerned citizens and organisations, and the excursions were 
usually referred to as 'pilgrimages'. On the face of events from 1990 it seems valid to 
grant a certain amount of recognition to these meetings in initiating change through the 
lobbying of government. Yet, all the extra-governmental participants were oblivious to 
the contact that had been established with Mandela since 1985, and unaware of the 
imminent contact with ANC officials in Europe. It is therefore important to assess the 
impact of these meetings on government strategy. 
Approximately seventy five meetings between white South Africans and the ANC took 
place between 1985 and 1989.139 No unified purpose existed between the groups and 
individuals who partook in these events, except for a common interest in the views of 
137 Sparks, Tomorrow is AnotherCountry, pp. 115 -119. 
138 See section-3.3. 
139 Louw, R (ed.}, Four Days in Lusaka: Whites in a changing society, Five Freedoms Forum- African 
National Congress Coriference, Excom: Five Freedoms Forum, 1989, p. 160. 
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the ANC on various issues. Of all these meetings, the Dakar trip in 1987, which was 
organised by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative to South Africa (Idasa) and 
included more than fifty eminent Afrikaners from diverse backgrounds, received the 
widest exposure, acclaim and criticism. At the time of the meeting a state of emergency 
was still in place in South Africa, leading to widespread condemnation of the-trip by the 
government and Afrikaans media. According to the organisers the purpose of their trip 
was to gain information about official ANC policy on such issues as negotiation and 
violence. 140 By doing so the participants attempted to pressure the government in 
accepting negotiation as a possible strategy, or as one of the organisers, Alex Boraine 
states: "To emphasise the need for urgent genuine negotiations and to highlight the 
futility of ignoring the ANC as a political entity, we planned the Dakar conference. It 
was a serious attempt to address the stalemate which exists in our country."141 
For the NIS committee that were starting to organise its own contacts with the ANC in 
exile and with Mandela, these meetings only served as a nuisance and irritation. As Niel 
Barnard describes their attitude at the time: "We will talk to them [the ANC] on our 
own, directly, and that was the reason why we criticised that infamous Dakar meeting; 
the reason being that ... there was no way that we as a government were going to be 
prescribed by clerics, academics and the private sector as to how we should conduct the 
political business of this country."142 
All parties, however, readily agree that meetings such as those had an important role in 
sensitising white South Africans to the ANC, and preparing them for negotiation at a 
later stage. Barnard states that although they didn't find the reports that helpful, as they 
had their own information channels, meetings such as the Dakar trip "played an 
important role in psychologically preparing the grassroots of this whole process."143 
According to Mike Louw, Barnard regularly discussed the meetings with P.W. Botha, to 
which the latter was very much opposed. He argues that this complicated their strategy 
as it was crucial for them to take Botha along with them, yet he grew agitated by outside 
people trying to pressure him or offering him assistance. With regards to such pressures 
140 Jannie Gagiano, interview by author, May 1996 .. 
141 Boraine, A. Dakar Report Back, Cape Town: IDASA Occasional Papers, 1987, p. 3. 
142 Bamard, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
143 /bid 
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Louw says " ... there is no way he would have followed that path, he would have gone 
his own way and done it in his own manner, or he wouldn't have done it at all."144 
This led the committee to regard the meetings as obstructive; although the groups 
involved thought they were accelerating the process. According to Louw the first thing 
the NIS members told Thabo Mbeki's group when they met in 1989 was that extra-
governmental contacts with the ANC should be stopped. Louw disputes the notion that 
the meetings softened up ordinary Afrikaner people, as he says the meetings were 
viewed by them with suspicion and regarded as a possible plot by the ANC to break up 
Afrikaner hegemony. 145 Again, if bargaining is about maximising interest in a situation 
of give and take, this does not seem to be too inaccurate an assessment. It can be a 
logical speculation that the ANC would also have tried to weaken the opposition within 
a situation of dialogue, by creating division. 
Aziz Pahad argues that meetings such as the Dakar excursion should not be 
underestimated. He argues that this gave the ANC an opportunity to speak to a much 
broader subsection of South Africans than they would have if talks were only with the 
government. It also created an opportunity for both sides to discard their book 
knowledge of each other in favour of first hand information. He stresses that the idea 
was not to agree with everything the others said, but rather to gain knowledge of the 
others' viewpoints. According to Pahad, Dakar was important for its legitimisation role 
of subsequent meetings. He further argues that the meetings with various groups in the 
1980's set important precedents for events such as the Harare Declaration in 1989 and 
the Grootte Schuur Minute in 1990.146 
In view of the above, I argue that the role of these meetings in sensitising the 
government's constituency should not be underestimated. Although events such as the 
Dakar trip were severely criticised by the establishment in South Africa, it did play a 
role in making them aware of the common humanity of all South Africans, as this was 
an argument the participants usually pursued vigorously upon their return. It did not, 
however, influence the bargaining process that was underway between the government 
144 Louw, interview by Waldmeir, 1995. 
145 /bid 
146 Pahad, interview by Waldmeir, 4 November 1994. 
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and the ANC, both internally or externally. The motives and strategies behind the NIS 
group's initiatives were already developed by the time the pilgrimages started to take 
place. In fact, the extra-governmental initiatives ran the. risk of derailing the sensitive 
bargaining process that had been established. The inflamed reaction of audiences to 
contact with the ANC increased the risk of embarrasment for the government if its 
secret dealings were exposed, especially as the secrecy aspect of the initial phases 
would prove to be crucial to the success of the negotiation process as a whole. 
Hence, to argue in retrospect that the extra-governmental meetings with the ANC 
opened up the process by applying pressure on the government to also enter talks, is 
incorrect, as it ignores the developments that had been taking place behind-the-scenes. 
The EPG experience also showed that P.W. Botha did not react well to outside pressure 
and it is plausible that the extra-governmental efforts further infuriated him and set back 
the process of bargaining about bargaining. 
To better analyse the influences of groups and individuals on the negotiation process, it 
is necessary to study the characteristics and outcomes of preliminary bargaining as it 
transpired in the South African transitional negotiations. 
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CHAPTER4 
PHASE TWO: PRELIMINARY BARGAINING 
4.1. Introduction 
After the completion of the bargaining about bargaining phase, the South African 
transition process became more 'political.' Whereas strategists on both sides were 
responsible for the movement towards an acceptance of negotiation as a viable and 
legitimate strategy, politicians now started to play an important role in the delineation of 
bargaining parameters. An anonymous government source states that after De Klerk's 
speech, every ministerial department suddenly wanted to take over the process, and 
politicians increasingly took over the roles that administrators fulfilled up to that point.1 
A similar situation arose in ANC circles, where the separated alliance partners had to 
form a core negotiating group, and new people were introduced to the process. This 
signified a factor which can be crucial to the success of any negotiation process: the 
nature of the transition between bargaining phases. I argue here that a smooth 
changeover between phases is important in maintaining momentum gained in talks 
about talks. 
F.W. de Klerk's speech in February 1990 created an ideal environment for the 
continuance of negotiations initiated by a select group of people. Yet, to a certain extent 
the process had to start over again. By bringing it into the public sphere, thereby 
introducing new role-players and audiences, it again became necessary to build trust 
between individuals and delegations. Good faith that were established between 
individuals, especially intermediaries, became obsolete in the face of changing 
delegations. This study argues that to ensure a smoother changeover between phases, it 
is necessary to involve as many persons as possible from the bargaining about 
bargaining phase, in the preliminary bargaining phase. They can then also serve as 
facilitators between previously excluded persons. 
1 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 Apri11997. 
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Whereas the bargaining about bargaining phase focuses on the rather abstract issue of a 
willingness to cooperate, preliminary bargaining focuses on more practical issues that 
impede progress towards a mutually agreed settlement. Parties now have to delineate 
exactly what they are bargaining for; who is to be part of the process and who not; what 
issues are not negotiable; where, when and for how long the bargaining should take 
place; and what still needs to be sorted out before substantive bargaining can resume. 
The move to preliminary bargaining assumes that bargaining is formally accepted as the 
chosen method of conflict resolution. For all parties the stakes rise dramatically in such 
an event. Agreements become binding, exit costs become very high, and pressure 
mounts from external audiences and their expectations. According to Zartman and 
Berman' s analysis the second phase is focused on devising a formula to deal with the 
reasons for immediate conflict, and also provide a lasting solution to the situation.2 
In the South African case, however, it was not just a case of selecting a location, date 
and time for the first direct contact between the government and the ANC, as the 
unbanning order did not solve all remaining problems between the two. Individual ANC 
members were still proscribed, and numerous of their members were still in jail. To 
solve these and other remaining issues that impeded the official start of preliminary 
bargaining, some more discreet meetings had to be held through existing channels to 
arrange for a climate conducive to negotiation on an equal footing. Again the covert 
option was chosen as the best way in which to deal with such sensitive issues. 
4.2. The first year (1990) 
4.2.1. Organising public contact 
As was mentioned, the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in 
February 1990 did not initiate an immediate start to government-ANC meetings. The 
ANC on their side was caught unawares by the government's sudden move, and seemed 
to struggle to adapt in a changing climate during the first few weeks after the 
announcement. De Klerk offers the following explanation for the suddenness of the 
move: 
2 See section 2.4.4. 
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"The ... game plan was put together at the [1989] bosberaad. But the way in 
which we had to manage it was of course to really ... prevent any leaks, 
because it would have diffused the impact we wanted to achieve. Not for the 
sake of ourselves, but for the sake of South Africa. For the sake of ... almost 
a shock effect, ensuring that right from the beginning we're dealing with a 
new situation where we won't be sniping [at] each other from the old 
moulds in which we found ourselves. We really wanted to level the playing 
field, to clean the slate with one swipe, and to give a kick-start to a whole 
new process. So confidentiality was extremely important. "3 
118 
It is my view that the surprise unbanning of the ANC and other organisations was also a 
deliberate tactical move aimed at catching the ANC and the international arena 
unawares, thereby creating a favourable perception of the government. It also served the 
purpose of preventing advance planning from the ANC to counter the initiative with 
strategy moves of their own. The outcome was that it placed significant pressure on the 
ANC to reciprocate. After almost thirty years as a banned organisation the ANC now 
had to simultaneously adjust their strategies, consolidate the internal and external 
movements into a unified alliance, placate those supporters who still wanted victory by 
revolutionary means, and prepare for talks with the South African government in the 
space of a few weeks. The counter-effect of the initiative was that the government 
similarly had to deal with internal disagreement as they had no way of preparing their 
supporters for the change in policy. Concurrently they had to neutralise opposition from 
the right-wing who protested against the whole idea of a legitimate ANC, as well as 
address logistical and legislative problems regarding the status of proscribed ANC 
members. 
The direct channel of communication that existed between the ANC and the NIS served 
as an ideal conduit through which to organise direct negotiations. On 6 February 1990, 
four days after De Klerk's opening speech to parliament, Mike Louw and Maritz 
Spaarwater met with Thabo Mbeki and Aziz Pahad in Lucerne, Switzerland. The 
-
discussions focused on measures that still had to be taken in order to ensure a 
3 F. W. de Klerk. interview by Patti Waldmeir, 23 November 1994. 
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resumption of negotiation on an equal footing between the government and ANC. 
Difficulties still persisted on issues such as the status of political prisoners (let alone the 
definition of what constituted a political prisoner), and the return of exiles to South 
Africa. The NIS officials also asked for reciprocal measures by the ANC to assist in 
keeping the process peaceful. According to Louw: "[t]hat was a different kind of 
meeting. We were not feeling each other out any more. Now we were starting to set up 
structures and make practical arrangements.'"' 
Probably the most important aspect of the meeting was the decision to set up working 
committees to steer the_ initial stages of preliminary bargaining. Four groups were 
decided upon, and they had to deal with the following issues respectively: 
• the release ofNelson Mandela 
• the release of detainees 
• setting up discussions at the political level 
• the maintenance of contact between the NIS and the ANC's intelligence service5 
It should be noted that these ANC-NIS discussions have been inappropriately 
categorised by some authors as the initiation of the whole negotiation process. This is 
probably because of their secretive nature. Sparks describes proceeedings at the above 
second meeting between the NIS and ANC as follows: "Then there was the matter of 
starting the negotiation process. There would have to be an initial phase of talks about 
talks, of deciding who would represent whom and what form the process should take.',6 
I argue that this is an incorrect analyses of the nature and goals of these meetings. Talks 
about talks have already been completed at that stage, and according to the framework 
used in this study these meetings were part of preliminary bargaining. The discussions 
on the release of Mandela and political prisoners related to practical measures that 
needed to be taken, as the government already committed themselves to the release 
Mandela, and implicitly accepted the inevitability of releasing other prisoners. As Du 
Toit notes, preliminary bargaining inter alia involves reaching an agreement over 
4 Mike Louw, quoted in Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, pp. 115- 117. 
s /bid 
6 Ibid., p. 116. 
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preconditions, of which these meetings surely were part.7 For officially sanctioned 
' 
discussions to have taken place on the issue of preconditions to substantive bargaining,· 
before talks about talks have been conducted, is a theoretical impossibility. 
After 2 February 1990 a decision was made by De Klerk and his advisors to release 
Mandela as early as possible, and an initial date of 10 February 1990 was set. This was 
done in part to sustain the advantage gained by the government's initiative of 2 
February, and to place pressure on the ANC to reciprocate with concessions of their 
own. As has been mentioned, the seizure of the initiative by the government was 
successful as a bargaining tactic, and it offered them the opportunity to regain some 
moral high ground vis-a-vis the ANC. They wanted to extend this advantage with 
Mandela's speedy release. However, they misinterpreted his freedom as a bargaining 
resource they had control over. When De Klerk informed Mandela on 9 February 1990 
of his planned release in Johannesburg the following day, the latter refused it, and 
insisted that he'd be given a week notice and be released in Cape Town. Mandela 
realised that his continued imprisonment created an embarrassment for the government, 
especially in the light of their recent reforms. He subsequently manipulated this to his 
own advantage by ensuring his release on more of his own terms. After serious debate 
between De Klerk and Mandela a compromise was reached, and Mandela was released 
on 11 February 1990 from Victor Verster prison.8 
On 16 February 1990 the ANC NEC, including Mandela, met at the ANC headquarters 
in Lusaka, Zambia to discuss their response to De Klerk's call for negotiation. A 
decision was made to send an ANC delegation to meet with the government to discuss 
preconditions for negotiation. Sisk describes this meeting as the initiation of direct 
government-ANC talks about talks.9 In turn, Waldmeir describes events after Mandela's 
release as follows: 
"Before these two leaders [Mandela and De Klerk] could start their long 
courtship in earnest - before they could begin 'talks about talks' on a new 
constitution - their officials would need to hold 'talks about talks about 
7 See Section 2.4.6. 
8 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 153. 
9 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 85. 
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from the negotiating table."10 
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I regard both ther.e analyses as inaccurate, as the period after Mandela's release falls 
within the ambit of preliminary bargaining, for reasons discussed above. 11 
4.2.2. Preparations for official contact 
The third meeting between the ANC and NIS took place two weeks after the 6 February 
meeting in Berne, Switzerland. This was the first direct meeting that Niel Bamard 
attended, accompanied by Fanie van der Merwe, Louw and Spaarwater. The ANC 
delegation comprised ofMbeki, Pahad and Joe Nhlanhla. The aim of the meeting was to 
discuss preparations for the first fonnal contact session between the government and the 
ANC, and the return of exiles for that purpose. It was decided that a committee should 
be set up to steer the arrangements for the meeting. It was to be headed by Fanie van der 
Merwe from the government side and Jacob Zuma from the ANC side. Zuma, with two 
other exiled ANC members, Penuell Maduna and Gibson Mkanda, entered South Africa 
in late February under conditions of immense secrecy .. Other members of the ANC 
component, which totaled around nine participants included Mathews Phosa and 
Cumick Ndlovu. The government component comprised Van der Merwe, Mike Louw 
and Lieutenant General Basie Smit, then head of the Security Police. 12 A final European 
meeting was held in the first week of March 1990 to finalise arrangements on the 
Steering Committee and the status of its ANC members. 13 
The Steering Committee had a crucial role to play in terms of preliminary bargaining. 
Mutual trust and good faith had not yet been established between all the participants, 
and the decisions of the committee had to reflect a shared indication by the parties that 
10 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 158. 
11 Sisk does not discuss the meetings between the ANC and government intermediaries in Europe. In the 
absence of this information his argument might seem logical. However, the set of facts as presented in 
this study suggest otherwise, and for this reason bargaining about bargaining is regarded as having been 
completed at the time. 
12 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 122. According to Sparks, Roelf Meyer was part of the 
government delegation. He was, however, not mentioned by an anonymous source I spoke to. 
13 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 90.; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 118.; 
Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 158- 160. There are some discrepancies among the above sources 
regarding the exact dates that the committee was set up. What is certain is that the events mentioned took 
place between the end of February and early March 1990. A possible reason for the differing dates is the 
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they took negotiation seriously. According to Sisk the committee had to decide on such 
issues as the agenda of the talks, its location, the size and composition of the 
delegations, and what security measures would be taken to ensure the participants' 
safety. 14 An anonymous source who served on the Steering Committee adds that 
discussions also involved the date and nature of the meeting. He stresses however that 
the main goal of the committee was to ensure that the first meeting did indeed take 
place, and he adds that all decisions taken were negotiated. According to the source the 
Steering Committee's arrangements for the first meeting presented the first ever official 
agreement between the government and the ANC. 15 
It was decided by the committee that the first meeting would take place on 11 April 
1990 at the Groote Schuur mansion outside Cape Town. The choice of venue was an 
important one, and from a logistic sense the first meeting proved to be the most difficult 
to organise of the initial meetings. According to an anonymous source the choice of 
Groote Schuur was based on three important criteria. Firstly, the venue had to be able to 
accommodate a large number of people, and be able to cater for them, as it was decided 
that the delegations would be large due to the symbolic importance of such a forum. 
Secondly, it had to be ''politically correct", in other words conform to the criterion of 
neutrality. 16 Lastly, it had to be secure and well protected to ensure the safety of all 
involved. Any attack on the venue could have had a catastrophic effect on the 
negotiation process. Two alternative venues were also prepared in case of a crisis. 17 The 
first was aboard a ship in Simonstown Naval base and the second was at Y sterplaat Air 
Force Base.18 
Despite the unbanning of all restricted organisations, a problem arose when it became 
apparent that the secretary-general of the SACP, Joe Slovo, would I?e part of the ANC 
delegation. Although the issue of the SACP had been debated at the 1989 bosberaad it 
absolute secrecy in which the events took place, as the ANC members met with people like Smit, without 
the lmow1edge of his commanders. 
14 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 90. 
15 Anonymous, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
16 It is unsme why the president's mansion was chosen, as it did not quite conform to the criterion of 
neutrality. What seems to be certain is that practical considerations played a very important role, hence 
the Groote Sebum mansion was probably chosen for its capacity to house a large number of guests. 
17 !bid 
18 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 123. 
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had never fully been resolved, and the government still regarded members of the party 
as personae non grata. According to Sparks the issue came to a head at the 1990 Berne 
meeting. He states that Barnard unsuccessfully tried to convince the ANC members that 
Slovo's presence would present a problem to the government, as the ANC delegation 
asserted their right to choose whomever they wanted. Barnard then apparently 
telephoned De Klerk who refused to entertain the idea of Slovo present, and it was 
conveyed to those assembled. The ANC, however, did not budge on their position. After 
extensive deliberation and more calls to De Klerk, he acceded, and a decision was made 
that both sides could include whoever they wanted, even if it _meant the presence of 
ultra-right wingers on the government side. _§p~ks notes that De Klerk initially told 
Barnard : "How can you expect me as head of state to welcome the leader of the 
Communist Party into the country?"19 From this it can be inferred that De Klerk's 
motivation for refusing to entertain Slovo, was not only because of a suspicion towards 
Communist Party members in general, but also influenced by the perception of 
audiences. The government had to sell its reforms to skeptical supporters, of whom 
many were still bogged down in Total Onslaught perceptions of the conflict. It was 
therefore probably perceived that the positive image of the first meeting could be tainted 
by the presence of prominent communists. 
Waldmeir recalls a different version of the above events, describing the debate over 
communist members in the ANC delegation as having taken place when the Steering 
Committee was already at work in South Africa. According to her, Mandela played an 
important role in refusing to omit Slovo or other communists, despite opinion clashes 
within the ANC.20 Mandela does not make any mention of this issue in his 
autobiographical description of the build-up to the first public meeting. Only in a 
discussion on the build-up to subsequent meetings does he argue that the government 
continued to find the presence ofSACP members in the ANC delegations problematic.21 
An anonymous source does not offer exact dates but confirms that the issue was 
discussed during the build-up to the first meeting. 22 It is therefore accepted by me that 
the version offered by Sparks is the most accurate. Yet, regardless of where the debate 
19 !bid, pp. 118- 119. 
20 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 159. 
21 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 577. 
22 Anonymous, irtterview by author, 5 September 1997. 
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took place, the anticipated impact of audiences on the process once it was in the open 
became increasingly apparent. 
A second obstacle emerged in the first week of April 1990 when police shot at 
demonstrators in Sebokeng township and killed at least eleven. The ANC suspended the 
proposed meeting and a top level discussion was held on 5 April 1990 between De 
Klerk and Mandela, in the company of three senior ANC officials. Although the 
shooting impeded the development of mutual trust between the leaders, it was agreed 
that it would be investigated, and a new date for the Groote Schuur meeting was set for 
2-4 May 1990.23 The Steering Committee continued with preparations and temporary 
indemnities were granted to ANC delegation members. The ANC delegation was 
accommodated at the Lord Charles Hotel in Somerset West and afforded security police 
protection. A high level of mistrust still existed between the parties, however, and 
problems arose when the newly-arrived ANC members took to coming and going from 
the hotel without informing the police assigned to them. 24 This created a problem for the 
government who wanted to ensure that no attempts where made to harm the ANC 
group, lest it be interpreted as part of a government ploy to lure them into the country 
under false pretenses. 
4.2.3. The Groote Schuur Minute 
The precarious arrangements held out and on 2 May 1990 the first ever public meeting 
took place between the government and the ANC. According to an anonymous source, 
the moment the delegates met it was a success, as the primary goal which the Steering 
Committee was set up to address, was reached.25 Waldmeir gives an account of the 
initial reactions of party delegates at meeting their "enemies", and states that as a whole 
it was successful in adjusting mutual perceptions of each other. During the three days 
many exploratory conversations were held, which did not so much focus on negotiations 
as on the future of South Africa. General preconditions for a formal forum were 
addressed, including issues such as violence and the release of political prisoners, as 
both sides ~ere eager to extract concessions on preconditions from the other. At the end 
23 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 90. 
24 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 160. 
25 Anonymous, interview by author, S September 1997. 
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of the three-day summit a document was presented to the press which was known as the 
Groote Schuur Minute. Its preamble read as follows: 
"The government and the African National Congress agree on a common 
commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and 
intimidation from whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and 
to a peaceful process of negotiations. "26 
Implicit in the wording of the preamble was an agreement by both parties to suspend 
violence as a means to attain their goals. This meant that the ANC committed 
themselves to a process where good faith negotiation was seen as the primary conflict 
resolution mechanism; and while they did not explicitly discard the armed struggle as a 
strategic option, it was placed on a lower order of preference. Most of the agreements of 
the Groote Schuur Minute was seemingly focused on steps that had to be taken by the 
government to ensure an environment conducive to negotiation. Yet, many of them also 
included implicit remarks which committed the ANC to refrain from using violence in. 
the pursuit of their goals. The points of agreement included: 
• The establishment of a working group which had to decide on definitions for 
'political offences' and 'political prisoners', and set up a framework for their 
release. 
• The arrangement of temporary immunity from prosecution for high-ranking and 
selected members of the ANC members. An interesting aspect here was the 
motivation that these members would " ... assist in bringing violence to an end and to 
take part in peaceful political negotiations." 
• The review of security legislation and the repeal of the state of emergency, which 
included the a statement that " ... the ANC will exert itself to fulfil the objectives 
contained in the preamble." 
• The setting up of channels between the government and ANC which aimed at 
curbing violence.27 
26 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/minutes.html 
27 !bid 
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The issue of political prisoners remained one of the most difficuh to solve. Mandela 
notes that at Groote Schuur the government and the ANC debated the issue thoroughly 
but could not come to an agreement on who qualified for political prisoner status. 
According to him, the government argued for a narrow definition and the ANC wanted 
a broad as possible definition. He argues that the disagreement over a definition of 
'politically motivated' crimes turned out to be an issue " ... that would bedevil us for 
quite a while to come." Mandela also states that the ANC conveyed their constitutional 
model to the government at the Groote Schuur meeting. This entailed an elected 
constituent assembly that would draw up a new constitution, precursed by an interim 
government who would monitor the transition. The ANC proposed a multiparty 
negotiating conference to set up the interim government and the guidelines for the 
election of a constituent assembly.28 
The most significant effect of the Groote Schuur Minute was to acquaint former 
enemies with each other and start a process of confidence building between individuals. 
The concessions made by the government were important in establishing the notion of 
good faith, as not all ANC members and supporters were sufficiently convinced that the 
government meant to make meaningful changes to the South African political 
landscape. The Groote Schuur Minute also served the role of acquainting the supporters 
on both sides with new faces and a new style of politics. 
The government was still looking for a major concession by the AN~: They realised, 
however, that their best chance of gaining a conciliatory stance from the ANC was 
dependent on the implementation of the undertakings in the Groote Schuur Minute. 
Shortly after the meeting thirty eight high-ranking ANC exiles were indemnified. 
Although the committee on political offenders could still not agree on what constituted 
political crimes, parliament passed a bill in May 1990 which also indemnified political 
offenders from prosecution. In June 1990 the state of emergency was lifted, except in 
Nata1.29 In an attempt to stimulate some reciprocal measures from the ANC, F.W. de 
K.lerk asked Nelson Mandela prior to a six-week visit to Europe and North America if 
he would consider asking the international community to lift sanctions in the light of 
28 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, pp. 570-571. 
29 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 92. 
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changes that were implemented by the government. Mandela turned the request down, 
as sanctions were an important tool in keeping pressure on the government to continue 
with reform. He argued that significant reform still had to be implemented before the 
ANC could soften their stance on South Africa's economic isolation.30 
4.2.4. The end of unofficial contact 
Despite the formalisation of the process after 2 February 1990, two more meetings 
between ANC members and prominent Afrikaners took place at Mells Park. Esterhuyse 
still had a very important link to Barnard, and both sides made use of the opportunity to 
discuss issues as they were unfolding during the first few months of preliminary 
bargaining. The meetings adapted well to the new phase, as discussions moved away 
from hypothetical policy statements to discussions on probable negotiation strategies. 
The seventh meeting in the series took place on the weekend of 9 February 1990. The 
Afrikaner delegation consisted of Esterhuyse, Mof T erreblanche, Attie du Plessis, Ebbe 
Domisse and Willem Pretorius. Esterhuyse had permission to inform the ANC members 
of Mandela's imminent release one hour before the announcement by F.W. de Klerk 
would be made. The celebrations that ensued influenced the tone for the rest of the 
discussions during the weekend. Due to the composition of the group, economic issues 
were on top of the agenda. Serious discussions were also held on the issue of law and 
order, with debates shifting focus to ANC positions on a future South African 
dispensation. 31 
The last Mells Park meeting took place from 29 June to 1 July 1990. The ANC 
delegation again stayed the same, while the Afrikaner group consisted of Willie 
Esterhuyse, Willem de Klerk, Attie du Plessis, Willem Pretorius, Mof Terreblanche, 
Marinus Wiechers, and Fanie Cloete, a former constitutional advisor to Chris Heunis. 
For the first time a member of the South African government also took part in the 
meeting: Dawie de Villiers, then minister of Energy Affairs, attended with a mandate 
from the government. The meeting was signified by vigorous debates on issues that 
included: 
30 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 573. 
31 Esterhuyse, informal discussions with author, 1996- 1997. 
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• tactics by parties to delay formal negotiations 
• the need to convince ANC to accept compromises 
• deciding on participants to formal negotiations 
• the government's constitutional proposals and the issue of group rights 
• the state of the economy and the lifting of sanctions 
• the ANC's economic policy 
What is interesting of this last meeting is that Mbeki apparently stated that he was 
confident sanctions would be lifted soon. This conflicts with Mandela's position in his 
discussion with De Klerk a few weeks earlier. I offer two possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. The first could be that policy positions between ANC leaders were still not 
fully coordinated due to the long separation between different factions. The second 
explanation is that either Mandela or Mbeki was bluffmg. The good faith that had been 
established between the participants at the Mells Meetings could have impacted on 
Mbeki's statement. Mandela and De Klerk were still developing common trust, and it 
might have been the best strategic option to tell De Klerk that the lifting of sanctions 
were not eminent, in order to pressure him into conceding to more ANC demands. The 
Mells Park delegates, on the other hand, did not have a direct influence on the 
negotiation process, and as the Afrikaner group included a few economists it could have 
been an attempt to neutralise their worries. If Mbeki was bluffmg, it is not sure what the 
ANC attempted to gain. It could have been a move aimed at winning them over to a 
more moderate ANC view. 
4.2.5. Operation Vula 
While violence continued to be the main detractor of a good faith relationship between 
the government and the ANC during 1990, the increasing rapport between De Klerk and 
Mandela became the first significant case of personalities having an effect on the 
success of preliminary bargaining. Their developing relationship deteriorated in July 
1990, however, when the government arrested a number of prominent ANC members 
on the charge of attempting to overthrow the state by revolutionary means. Those 
arrested included Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils and Pravin Gordhan, as leaders of a 
covert operation known as Vula. The idea behind the project was initiated as far back as 
1986, with its main aim to allow a leadership group of the ANC in exile to infiltrate 
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South Africa and direct a popular uprising that would lead to the overthrow of the South 
African government. The project was started in 1988 primarily by Maharaj, and he 
developed an extensive communication network not only between the underground 
structures and Lusaka, but also be":ween Mandela and the exiled leadership. 32 
According to Maharaj, Vula stemmed from conflict that arose between the political 
wing of the ANC and MK over the role of recruits. New ANC members were 
continually lured out of South Africa to join M!(, which weakened the organisational 
capabilities of the internal movement. The issue continually surfaced at the 
Revolutionary Council leve~ and at a meeting held in Makeni, Zambia in 1986, 
Maharaj, Joe Modise and Joe Slovo proposed that senior ANC members from Lusaka 
should enter South Africa to provide integrated political and military leadership to 
internal units. The plan was accepted in principle and Maharaj drew up various 
proposals which divided the aim of the operation into three initiatives: political work, 
propaganda work and mass mobilisation.33 
Maharaj states that when he entered the country in 1988, ''the buzzword [among the 
UDF] was negotiations." This was due to meetings that had taken place between the 
UDF and Chris Heunis since 1985, and subsequently between the UDF and the United 
States, who also had contact with Heunis and were making overtures to both to start 
negotiations. According to Maharaj he bluntly told UDF officials to forget about 
negotiations and rather ensure that they consolidated the position of the ANC 
internally. 34 He argues: 
"From my point of view operationally, strategically I had already accepted 
that there is going to be negotiations. If the opportunity arose it would be 
Lusaka, it will be Madiba. But those of us on the ground, we just get down 
to redoubling our efforts to get the structures moving and our capacity to 
wage mass struggle ... [It] was clear that along the line you are going to have 
to negotiate. My problem was the other side is refusing, [it was] clear we 
have got to push hard, we have to pursue a strategy that doesn't say we are 
32 Sparks, Tomo"ow is Another Country, pp. 62- 67.; Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 81-82. 
33 Mac Maharaj, interviewbyPatti Waldmeir, 16 November 1994. 
34 /bid ' 
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for any eventuality ... when the moment for negotiations arises your strength 
will not be how many arms you've got, but how much leadership you've got 
for all round political struggle."35 
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The sentiments of Maharaj are echoed by Siphiwe Nyanda, who states that " ... the 
approach [ofVula] was not to differentiate between combat and political work."36 After 
the government's move in February 1990, the select few in the ANC who knew ofVula, 
were confronted with a different internal situation, and had to decide whether the 
operation should continue. During the build-up to the Groote Schuur Minute it was . 
decided to keep the project in place, but with a different function. By primarily focusing 
on the maintenance of high levels of mass mobilisation, it became an insurance policy 
against the possible failure of negotiations. The Vula operatives were arrested prior to 
what became known as the Pretoria Minute, the second official meeting between the 
government and the ANC. Their computer with documents were also seized, and the 
operation was immediately labeled as a communist plot to overthrow the government. 
The police's argument was based on a spurious link to a SACP meeting in May 1990, 
where the leadership reflected on their policy options in the light of the Groote Schuur 
Minute.37 Due to the use of a codename "Joe" in the operation's documents, the 
assumption was made that Joe Slovo was part of Vula The government attempted to 
use this as an opportunity to exclude Slovo from the ANC's negotiating team once and 
for all, but it failed, as no clear link was evident between him and the operation. The 
outcome was an embarrassment for the government, and for different reasons, the ANC. 
The arrested members were released after a few weeks. 38 
Mandela gives the following account of the events surrounding Vula: 
3S Jbid 
36 Mayibuye, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990, as cited by Lodge,T. ''The African National Congress in the 1990s," in 
Moss, G and Obery, I. (eds.), South African Review 6: From 'Red Friday' to Codesa, Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, 1992, p. 46. 
37 Collinge, J. "Latmched on a Bloody Tide: Negotiating the New South Africa," in !bid, p. 3. 
38 !bid 
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"De K.lerk called for an urgent meeting with me and read to me from 
documents he claimed had been confiscated in the raid. I was taken aback 
because I knew nothing about it. 
"After the meeting I wanted an explanation, and called Joe Slovo. Joe 
explained that the passages read by Mr. de Klerk had been taken out of 
context and that Vula was a moribund operation. But the government was 
intent on using the discovery to try to prise the ANC away from the SACP 
and keep Joe Slovo out of the negotiations. "39 
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According to Waldmeir, Mandela was furious with the Vula operatives, as it tarnished 
the image of the ANC as a party committed to negotiation. She argues that the incident 
highlighted tensions within the ANC on the issue of negotiations as a viable strategy to 
transform South Africa, as many still regarded it necessary that any mechanism of 
conflict resolution should only be aimed at the transfer ofpower.40 In a press statement 
issued on 22 June 1991, Mandela said the following: 
"On behalf of the African National Congress and its allies, let me clarify 
one further point. Vula and other similar projects did not in any way 
constitute the pursuance of a double agenda, nor did they constitute actions 
inconsistent with our search for a negotiated resolution. anything, they 
strengthened negotiations rather than undermine them."41 
It is my view that, despite the government's failure to analyse Vula correctly, it still 
projected a negative image of the ANC's commitment to good faith negotiations. Their 
ability to demand concessions was seriously weakened, as the government temporarily 
occupied the moral high-ground in the eyes of many spectators. This was short-lived, 
however, as the country-wide violence lead to an increasing amount of accusations 
directed at the government, charging them with fuelling the violence. 
39 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 577. 
40 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 162- 164. A different version of events is offered by one of the 
Vula operatives, Tim Jenkin, who states that Mac Maharaj resigned from Operation Vula in February 
1990, but rejoined after a discussion with Nelson Mandela. For a detailed account of Operation Vula from 
an ANC perspective, see Jenkin, T. "Talking To Vula: The Story of the Secret Underground 
Communications Network of Operation Vula," gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anclpr/1991/pr0 108.01 
41 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandela/pr91 0622.html 
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4.2.6. The Pretoria Minute 
Against the background of violence and distrust between the main parties, the Steering 
Committee organised a second meeting between the government and the ANC. The 
meeting was less symbolic than the first, hence less deliberation went into issues such as 
location and participants. According to a Steering Committee source the Presidency 
mansion in Pretoria was chosen because it was handy at the time. Most delegate 
members were in Pretoria at that stage, and the venue became just a ''place" to meet.42 
In the interim no real headway had been made on the issue of political prisoners, and 
violence showed no signs of abating. Both the ANC and the government were aware 
that these issues would crop up again, and they started to prepare arguments and 
proposals. According to Mandela, Joe Slovo approached him in July 1990, prior to a 
scheduled meeting of the ANC's NEC. He proposed to Mandela that the ANC 
voluntarily suspend the armed struggle in order to create an ideal climate for 
negotiations to proceed. Mandela agreed to support it and the idea was put forward at 
the NEC meeting two days after their initial discussion. It was not well received by all 
present, but after intense debate the NEC accepted Slovo's proposal. Mandela states that 
"I argued that the suspension could always be withdrawn, but it was necessary to show 
our good faith. "43 
I argue that the decision by the ANC to suspend the armed struggle was partly caused 
by the embarrassment caused by Operation Vula. Although the fact that Slovo proposed 
the idea was crucial in that he had undisputed radical credentials, the ANC had to realise 
that they would have to make some concessions soon. 44 The government was facing 
increasing pressure from its supporters and the right wing to halt the process, a step 
which would have been very frustrating for the ANC. The ANC-alliance also expected 
that the government would continue to raise the issue of the armed struggle, as it 
remained their primary precondition for formal negotiations. By preempting the 
government with their proposal they could succeed in claiming the initiative for such a 
move, and it could also partially consolidate good faith, which began to flounder after 
42 Anonymous, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
43 Mimde1a, Long Walk to Freedom, pp. 577- 578. 
44 !bid 
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events in Sebokeng and other townships in July 1990. This significant concession could 
in turn allow them to demand concessions on their outstanding preconditions. 
On 6 August 1990 the government and the ANC met for the second official meeting at 
the presidency in Pretoria. As the discussions grew in complexity and the participants 
began to get used to each other, the bargaining took a more earnest note. The Pretoria 
Minute that emerged from the meeting included the following agreements: 
• the suspension of armed action by the ANC 
• an undertaking by the government to release all political prisoners by 30 April1991, 
and allow all exiles to return home 
• the intention to form national, regional and local structures to address situations of 
conflict at these levels 
• an undertaking by the government to work towards the lifting of the state of 
emergency in Natal 
• an agreement for the commencement of constitutional exploratory talks between the 
government and the ANC 
• the establishment of a working group to deal with the implementation of the 
suspension of armed action.45 
The Pretoria Minute also recognised that other parties would have to be brought on 
board if negotiations continued. It stated: 
"We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a 
milestone on the road to true peace and prosperity for our country. In this 
we do not pretend to be the only parties involved in the process of shaping 
the new South Africa. We know there are other parties committed to 
peaceful progress. All of us can henceforth walk that road in consultation 
and co-operation with each other. We call upon all those who have not yet 
committed themselves to peaceful negotiations to do so now. '"'6 
45 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/minutes.html 
46 !bid 
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As part of the agreement to release political prisoners from 1 September 1990, the 
amended report by the Working Group on Political Offences set up at Groote Schuur 
was accepted in the Pretoria Minute. The report stated that all sentenced prisoners, 
persons liable for prosecution and persons in detention could be granted indemnity. It 
still did not include a common definition of a political offence, but it listed a number of 
guidelines which would help to determine whether or not an offence was political. 
These included: 
• a necessity to study the specific circumstances of each case 
• the recognition that 'common' crimes could also be regarded as political offences in 
the light of: 
Cl the motive of the offender 
Cl the context in which the offence was committed 
Cl the nature of the political objective 
Cl the legal nature of the offence 
Cl the object of the offence 
Cl the relationship between the offence and the political objective being pursued 
Cl the question whether the offence was committed with the approval of the 
organisation, institution or body concemed47 
Two additional working groups were set up in the Pretoria Minute to deal with the detail 
of the ANC's suspension of the armed struggle and agenda items for a future 
constitutional conference respectively. This action again confirms the status of these 
meetings as part of preliminary bargaining. Sisk argues that the Pretoria Minute was a -
key agreement in the build-up to substantive negotiations. According to him: 
47 !bid 
"The pact signalled not a political alliance between the two players ... but an 
agreement that during the transition both the regime and the liberation 
movement would respect each other's role as an indispensable· player in the 
process. The state's repressive machinery would be rolled back at the same 
time the ANC agreed to 'suspend' the armed struggle. Thus, the 'vital ' 
interests' of the government and the ANC could be met: neither would be 
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It is clear from the above that the issues discussed formed part of preliminary 
arrangements and concessions that had to be made to create a suitable condition for 
formal negotiations. The 1990 summits did not centre around whether the government 
and the ANC would want to settle by means of negotiation, that was already decided in 
the bargaining about bargaining phase. It focused rather on issues relating to the agenda, 
participants, tactics, rules of conduct and preconditions to substantive bargaining. The 
common perception that these were still talks about talks persisted, however. In the final 
report of the Political Offences Working Group the main function of the Steering 
Committee is described as " ... to steer the talks about talks." It also describes the Groote 
Schuur Minute as " ... the first agreement on the talks about talks between the 
government and the ANC. 49 Despite this perception among negotiators themselves the 
framework as advanced in this study is deemed as a correct analysis of the phases of 
negotiation based on its functions. 
4.2.7. The matrix of violence 
As the working groups established under the two accords continued with their 
assignments, the two main parties set out to consolidate their support bases and initiate 
dialogue with other parties. However, an increase in violence remained an obstacle to 
the consolidation of the main bargaining relationship and relations soured between the 
government and the ANC. Speculation that a third force was destabilising the black 
communities grew more intense and the mutual trust established between Mandela and 
De Klerk deteriorated as a result. Numerous public allegations were made between the 
parties, each blaming the other for its lack of leadership in halting the violent tide. 
Contact was still maintained, but the interaction became more hostile as time passed. 
Mandela notes that on 23 July and 27 November 1990 he demanded an explanation 
from De Klerk why the security forces made no significant arrests after violent clashes 
between IFP supporters and ANC loyalists. He states that he never received any 
48 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 95. 
49 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/minutes.html 
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answers. 
50 The two leaders met again on 8 December 1990 to discuss the issue, but no 
solution was forthcoming. This point of conflict seriously impacted on the ability of the 
two figures to strengthen a relationship of good faith. De Klerk states that Mandela' s 
insistence that he should act on the incidences of violence, and his own frustration with 
Mandela that he could not sufficiently understand the complexity of the issue, was 
" ... the most important cause of friction in the run-up to the election between us."51 
Mandela and other ANC figures reiterated their belief on numerous occasions that the 
Third Force was a government sponsored attempt to weaken the ANC's support base 
and obstruct the process of transformation. The government continued to vehemently 
deny any such allegations. No conclusive link was found that tied De Klerk to an 
official third force. If a link existed between any government negotiators and a third 
force, it creates serious doubts about the good faith intentions of the government at the 
time. The irony is that the increased violence and ANC complaints of government 
collaboration placed the most pressure on the government, who had to concede on 
numerous issues of security to prove their bona fide intentions. Hence, if it was part of 
the government's strategy, it was counter-productive to the negotiating process. It does 
not fall within the scope of this study to investigate the existence of a third force in 
more detail. It should be noted, however, that although the NIS gained superiority over 
MI in the bargaining about bargaining phase, the rift between them still existed. The 
notion of a faction within the state apparatus fuelling conflict in townships can therefore 
not be discarded. 
On 16 December 1990 the ANC held a consultative conference in South Africa, where 
the issue of negotiations was heavily debated. Despite strong opposition it was decided 
to continue with preliminary talks, and Mandela reiterated that some meetings with the 
government would have to be confidential, despite criticism against this method. 
According to Sisk, Mandela noted that those who oppose secret meetings "did not 
understand the nature of negotiations. "52 The ANC also called for the maintenance of 
50 Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, pp. 579- 580. 
51 De Klerk, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
52 The Star, 22 December 1990, cited in Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 98. 
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sanctions and the release of political prisoners by 30 Apri11991, threatening to suspend 
talks if this did not transpire. 53 
4.2.8. The nature of the transition 
The most contentious issue between the government and the ANC was the nature of the 
transition. The two parties had completely opposing views on how a new constitution 
and dispensation would be introduced. The ANC reiterated in 1990 that only an elected 
constituent assembly should have the power to draft a new constitution, a position 
supported by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and Azanian People's Organisation 
(Azapo ). It also foresaw an interim government to guide the period of constitution 
writing. As their proposals would involve elections based on one person one vote before 
a new constitution was in place, it created problems for the government, who's strategy 
did not involve negotiating themselves out of power, but rather ensuring that any new 
dispensation would be crucially dependent on their veto and support. This was due to 
the obvious numerical advantage that Africans (as mostly supporters of the ANC) had 
over whites and other minority groups. 
The government proposal relied on the concept of a multiparty conference to negotiate 
the constitution under which elections would then take place. The inherent nature of a 
bargaining situation would to an extent exclude the influence of support, as parties 
would compete on an equal footing and rely more on perceptions of power than 
numerical backing. The mechanisms for continued white power would thus be in place 
before suffrage was extended to a black majority. The preference for a multiparty 
conference was also voiced by the IFP and the Democratic Party (DP). The ANC in turn 
regarded this as an attempt to make any electoral outcome irrelevant, and rejected it. 54 
The government made use of a number of conferences in 1990 to argue their position. 
They envisaged a bicameral parliament with members representing ethnic groups, a two 
thirds majority requirement in the senate to pass legislation and a revolving presidency. 
Emphasis was put on the concept of group political rights, described as the freedom to 
53 !bid, pp. 97- 98. 
54 Friedman, S. ( ed.), The Long Journey: South Africa's quest for a negotiated settlement, Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, 1993, p. 14. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
138 
associate with one's own group without anyone being forced to do so by law. 55 As a lot 
of measures were included in the government proposals to ensure that the old power 
configurations could still exercise influence (without explicitly stating it as such), it 
remained incompatible with the idea of a constituent assembly. The government realised 
that its only chance of consolidating such a system would be with a multiparty forum 
where it could muster support of old allies, hence the disagreement with the ANC. In 
1991 the ANC replied to these proposals by stating: 
"[T]o ensure checks and balances, they propose mechanisms that will be 
unique to South Africa, ensuring that whites retain the accumulated 
privileges of apartheid under the guise of constitutional principle. "56 
On 8 January 1991 a concession was made by the ANC NEC on the nature of the 
transition. In a speech delivered by Mandela the ANC reiterated its position that a 
constituent assembly should draw up a new constitution, but also proposed an all-party 
conference to clear the way for the establishment thereof. Mandela argued as follows: 
"The summoning of such a congress would constitute the first step in the 
process leading to the adoption of the new constitution. Unless it were 
mandated by the people themselves, this congress would not itself have the 
power to draw up a constitution. 
"The all-party congress, which can only be convened after all obstacles 
to negotiations have actually been removed, would have to carry out three 
tasks. These are: 
• To set out the broad principles within which the detailed constitutional 
work would be carried out; 
• To determine the make-up of the body, such as an elected Constituent 
Assembly, that would draw up the constitution; 
• To establish an interim government to oversee the process of transition 
until a new parliament was elected, and a democratic government 
formed, on the basis on the new constitution. "57 
ss Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, pp. 125- 128. 
s6 gopher:/ I gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/ 1991/pr0904. 01 
s1 gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1991/pr0 108.01 
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By stating the need for an all-party forum, the ANC implicitly acceded that it was 
necessary for all parties to be involved in steering the preliminary stage of the transition. 
Whereas it previously argued for elections to take place first and foremost, it now 
accepted that elections would only follow after the rules for a constituent assembly were 
set by all South African parties. Sisk argues that the issue was in all likelihood 
discussed at the December meeting between Mandela and De K.lerk (ignoring the call 
among ANC members for greater transparency in negotiations). He states that it created 
renewed tension between the ANC and movements such as the P AC and Azapo, and 
" ... further served to legitimate the white minority government's role in forging a post 
apartheid South Africa." According to Sisk the proposal gave new life to the South 
African negotiating process, as no preconditions were set for participants. 58 
The ANC concession signified the establishment of a contract zone between the ANC 
and the government on the nature of the transition (albeit a small one). Sufficient 
common ground existed for negotiations to enter a new dimension, that of creating a 
platform for constitutional negotiations, as either a movement towards a constituent 
assembly or a new constitution, depending on the outcome of further deliberations. 
Other issues had to be addressed first, however, as the fate of political prisoners and the 
climate of violence were still unresolved. 
4.3. The build-up to an all-party conference 
Despite initial contact between the government and Mangosuthu Buthelezi at the start of 
1990, and informal talks between the ANC and the P AC, other parties were still 
excluded from most discussions. Between the IFP and the ANC virtually no dialogue 
was forthcoming, due to the animosity caused by violent attacks and retributions 
between their supporters. On 29 January 1991 delegations of the ANC and IFP, led by 
Mandela and Buthelezi respectively, met to discuss the setting up of peace structures. A 
common agreement was reached which aimed at stabilising conflict-ridden 
58 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 99. 
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communities. The meeting was crucial in establishing recognition of the IFP as a 
legitimate participant in the South African transition. 
The ANC also continued to forge ties with the PAC and Azapo. On 1 February 1991, 
the day of the opening of parliament, they jointly protested throughout the country 
against the continuance of the tricameral system. De Klerk, however, surprised again 
when he announced the abolition of all apartheid legislation within the coming year. In 
doing so, he regained initiative in steering the transition process and increased the 
governmenfs commitment to good faith negotiations. Sisk argues that the move was 
also motivated in the light of conditions set by the international community for the 
lifting of sanctions. 59 
4.3.1. The D.F. Malan Accord 
On 15 February 1991 government and ANC delegations met again to thrash out issues 
relating to the ANCs suspension of the armed struggle and the release of political 
prisoners. This was necessary because deadlock had ensued in the Armed Action 
Working Committee, set up under the Pretoria Minute. The meeting took place behind-
the-scenes at the D.F. Malan Airport outside Cape Town. Once again the venue was 
chosen for practical reasons, as the agenda dominated preparatory work by the Steering 
Committee. After intense debate between the parties agreement was reached on steps 
that had to be taken by the ANC in accordance with their suspension of the armed 
struggle. It became evident from the meeting that the relationship between the parties 
had deteriorated to a certain extent. This could either be ascribed to a loss of good faith, 
or preliminary posturing before the planned all-party conference. The escalating 
violence played a large role in discussions such as these. The government questioned 
whether the ANC should be allowed to set up defence structures in the townships, and 
the ANC from its side expressed the need for the government to also commit itself to a 
non-violent approach. Both parties still held each other to blame for the unprecedented 
number of violent deaths throughout the country, and adopted their bargaining positions 
accordingly. A Liaison Committee was appointed to implement the accord. The main 
agreements of the D.F. Malan Accord included the following: 
59 !bid, p. 101. 
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• Under the terms of suspension of "armed action" and ''related activities" the ANC 
would stop: 
a Attacks by means of armaments, firearms, explosive or incendiary devices 
a Infiltration of men and material 
a Creation of underground structures 
a Statements inciting violence 
a Threats of armed action 
a Training inside South Africa 
• The mutual acceptance that a democratic process implies and obliges all political 
parties and movements to participate peacefully and without resort to the use of 
force, hence: 
a no political party or movement should have a private army 
• All inhabitants of South Africa were entitled to hold peaceful demonstrations to 
express their views 
• All violence and intimidation from whatever quarter accompanying mass action 
should be eliminated 
• Nothing agreed upon or omitted from any agreement would invalidate or suspend 
the provisions of any South African law.60 
On the face of it, the main concessions included in the D.F. Malan Accord were made 
by the ANC. It is important to note, however, that the meeting was set up to deal with 
deadlock over issues regarding the ANC's suspension of the armed struggle, and as 
such was a logical conclusion of the Pretoria Minute. Hence, it might seem as a one-
sided agreement. A major concession made by the ANC, which signified a distinct shift 
from their policies prior to 1990, was the acknowledgement that no agreements reached 
during the transition could invalidate or suspend the provisions of any South African 
law. The accord raised angry commentary from within the ANC's own ranks, as many 
prominent members felt it necessary to maintain underground structures in case of a 
setback in negotiations.61 By agreeing to suspend armed action, and clearly defming it, 
the ANC proved beyond doubt its public commitment to good faith bargaining, but also 
ran the risk of embarrassment if disillusioned supporters acted against the agreement. 
60 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/minutes.html 
61 See Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 103. 
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I 
The government was in a similar position. It agreed to peaceful conduct in the D.F. 
Malan Accord, but did not have control over all its state sponsored forces of coercion. If 
allegations of a third force proved true, the government's good faith would seriously be 
' 
cast in doubt. 
This raises an important point with regard to prenegotiation in deeply divided societies. 
Due to the usual secrecy under which prenegotiation is conducted, and the suspicion 
among members excluded from bargaining proceedings towards negotiation as a 
mechanism of conflict resolution, negotiators are likely to be viewed as weak when they 
make concessions. This then leads to a backlash among supporters, who try and prevent 
it from occurring. To prevent supporters from slowing down movement towards 
settlement, negotiators might enter into agreements even more secretly, in the hope of 
presenting them as significant gains to their supporters. The problem arises when 
supporters do not fully understand the implications of agreements, are not briefed on the 
details, or are wholly opposed to them. Their subsequent actions can incur a significant 
loss of face for the negotiators who attempt to prove their good faith beyond doubt in 
the bargaining arena. Hence, any agreement reached by prenegotiators invo Ives a 
significant amount of risk, as their audience might inadvertently or on purpose 
transgress its parameters, and cause the negotiators to lose face among their bargaining 
opponents. 
4.3.2. Attempts to broker a stalemate 
To an extent, this is what happened. The township violence did not decrease after the 
signing of the accord, and the ANC became frustrated with what they perceived as a 
lack of commitment to a peaceful transition by the government. The government also 
had made slow progress with the release of political prisoners and the indemnification 
of exiles, and the perception arose that they were stalling the implementation of the 
Groote Schuur Minute. The government argued, however, that the lack of progress was 
due to logistical difficulties as the ANC had not furnished them with lists of their 
members in prison or exile. Due to mounting criticism from their supporters that the 
government was dictating the transition, the ANC issued an ultimatum on 5 April1991, 
stating that they would suspend all talks with the government if nothing was done to the 
escalating violence. The also demanded: 
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• the immediate dismissal of law and order minister Adriaan Vlok and defence 
minister Magnus Malan 
• the outlaw of traditional weapons 
• a commitment by the SADF to show restraint in crowd control 
• the transformation of single-sex worker hostels into family housing 
• the establishment of an independent commission to administer hearings on security-
related issues62 
The ANC announced that 30 April 1991, the date set for the final release of political 
prisoners, would be the deadline, and vowed to start with a mass action campaign on 9 
May 1991 if demands were still not met. Collinge notes that the decision was taken in 
consultation with the regional structures of the ANC and its allies, which explained for 
its hawkish nature. 63 The government latched onto this and retaliated through Gerrit 
Viljoen, who blamed the SACP underground structures for manipulating the ANC into 
taking such positions.64 By doing this the government alluded to the D.F. Malan 
agreement which committed the ANC to a suspension of underground structures. As a 
strategy it failed, however, as no conclusive proof could be mustered. Hence, the 
government set itself to meet the demands. 
De Klerk attempted to solve the problem by proposing a commission of inquiry into 
violence as well as a multiparty summit on violence. The offers were rejected by the 
ANC. Despite some reforms on the issue of traditional weapons the ANC remained 
adamant that it would suspend talks, as no substantial measures were introduced to 
address their demands. On the issue of the two ministers' dismissal, De Klerk flatly 
refused. By 30 September under a thousand political prisoners had been released, and a 
new wave of applications streamed in just before the deadline. The government 
encountered serious problems in trying to avert the suspension of talks and mass action, 
and to add further insult, the conference on violence was rejected by most parties.65 
62 !bid, p. 104. 
63 Collinge, ''LaWlched on a Bloody Tide," p. 23. 
64 Lamence, P. ''South African Comm1mist Party Strategy Since February 1990," in Moss and Obery 
( eds. ), South African Review 6, p. 83. 
65 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, pp. 104- 105. 
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A breakthrough came when a group of concerned religious leaders on their own volition 
approached both parties in an attempt to break the deadlock. Concerned by the ongoing 
violence, they wanted to prevent open hostility between the parties as they feared it 
might lead to a further increase in violence. Both the government and the ANC had 
significant problems in controlling all their members and supporters, and it was feared 
that a loss of good faith between the respective leaderships could spill over into violent 
conflict on the ground, as ANC-IFP conflict was already on the increase. In a number of 
separate meetings with Mandela and De Klerk the religious leaders urged them to find a 
compromise on the outstanding issues. The effort was successful and on 9 May 1991 the 
government and the ANC met for discussions. After intense debate it was agreed that an 
all party conference on violence, organised by a neutral party, should be held as soon as 
possible. The government committed itself to stronger measures in dealing with the 
issues of cultural weapons and violence. Both parties accepted contact should be upheld 
through the working committees.66 
On 27 May, after the peace conference initiated by De Klerk was boycotted by several 
parties and hence failed to produce any binding agreement, the ANC issued a statement 
confirming their support for a neutrally organised peace conference. They declared: 
"The ANC remains committed to participation in a conference on violence, 
structured to produce binding agreements with enforcement mechanisms in 
such areas as: 
• a code of conduct for all political parties 
• a code of conduct for the security services 
• elaboration on the powers and functions of an independent Commission 
on Violence 
• a comprehensive programme of community reconstruction. 
"The ANC shall, in consequence, continue to support the initiatives 
undertaken by religious leaders and organised business to ensure that such a 
broad-based conference is speedily convened."67 
66 !bid, pp. 106-107. 
67 gopher:/ /gopher.anc.org.za:70/11/anc/pr/1991/pr0527.0 1 
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A Liaison Committee was set up at the De Klerk conference, and on 22 June 1991 it 
met with business and religious leaders to discuss the possibility of an all-party peace 
conference. A Preparatory Committee was set up to co-ordinate the arrangements for 
such a meeting, which began its work shortly after. 
In the first year after the unbanning of the ANC the preliminary bargaining phase was 
very much dominated by the government, who capitalised on the ANC's perceived 
inability to exercise strong central leadership over its various allied segments. The 
relationship between De Klerk and Mandela proved to be a very important aspect in the 
consolidation of the negotiating process. After the D.F. Malan Accord, however, the 
power relationship slowly began to shift in the ANC's favour. This was partly due to the 
government's inability to deal effectively with the violence, and the ANC's increased 
effectiveness in mobilising its supporters behind its positions. Despite accusations 
against the ANC that it undermined the establishment of good faith in the bargaining 
relationship, the government's ability to assert the good faith principle became seriously 
hampered by the destabilising violence. The Mandela-De Klerk relationship 
concomitantly deteriorated. Two events in the latter half of 1991 further strengthened 
the ANC's hand in demanding concessions from the government. 
4.3.2.1. The 48th Annual ANC Conference 
From 2- 6 July 1991 the ANC convened in Durban for their first full conference on 
South African soil in 31 years. The expectations were high that the issue of negotiations 
might prove to be divisive among the different factions within the ANC. As was 
expected, some heated debates took place over the issue, but in the end it was accepted 
that negotiations were reaching a critical stage and should be continued. In his opening 
address, Mandela deftly couched the strategy of negotiations in ANC rhetoric, setting 
the tone for further discussions. He argued that the struggle was not over, and that 
negotiation was one of the strategic pillars of ANC policy. Mandela further argued that 
the negotiations signified the success of the struggle in forcing the government to 
engage the ANC.68 The declaration adopted by the conference reiterated the ANC's 
demands for substantive bargaining and it's commitment to a transfer of power. The 
declaration included: 
68 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/sp91 0700-02.html 
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• a commitment to resolve the South African conflict by peaceful means 
• a demand that the government should similarly demonstrate its commitment to 
peace and reconciliation 
• a demand that all political prisoners had to be released 
• a call to set up an interim government and constituent assembly, preceded by an all 
party congress 
• a resolution that the ANC would remain a national liberation movement, rather than 
become a political party69 
In his closing address, Nelson Mandela, who had been elected as president of the ANC, 
argued that "[ o ]n the question of negotiations, this conference has given us all a very 
clear mandate. We have reaffrrmed the premise that negotiations is a terrain of struggle 
leading to our central objective, the transfer of power to the people." He acknowledged 
that the ANC negotiators had been criticised for their lack of consultation prior to 
bargaining events, and stated that the problem would be addressed. 70 This was in 
contrast to his statement at the consultative conference in December 1990 that those 
who complained against the secretive nature of negotiations did not understand the 
process.71 
From the July 1991 conference the ANC-leadership received its first official mandate to 
negotiate with the government, and indeed continue with the preliminary bargaining 
that had been underway for over a year. The mandate had a positive effect on the 
ANC's relative bargaining power, as it secured the support of all its leading allies for its 
strategy of bargaining. A renewed urgency emerged among the newly elected 
leadership, which would accelerate the negotiation process in the months to come. 
4.3.2.2. lnkathagate 
Against the background of arrangements for the all party peace conference, the 
government's image received a severe blow on 19 July 1991. It was reported in two 
newspapers, the Weekly Mail and New Nation, that the government had supplied the IFP 
with a substantial amount of money between November 1989 and April1990 to conduct 
69 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/conf/ declare48.html 
70 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslspeeches/sp910700-03.html 
71 See section 4.2.6. 
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mass rallies, thus enhancing the image of the IFP to the international community. As at 
least one of the marches was directly linked to violent clashes between the ANC and the 
IFP, allegations that the country-wide violence was government-sponsored gained 
renewed credibility. The Inkathagate scandal, as it became known, seriously damaged 
perceptions of the government's and De K.lerk's good faith in negotiations.72 
The ANC moved swiftly to capitalise on the revelations. In a press statement issued on 
the same day they argued that "It is evident to us that the government is pursuing a 
double agenda of talking peace while it wages war on the ANC and the democratic 
movement." They repeated their demands that Vlok and Malan be dismissed, counter 
insurgency units within the SADF and SAP be disbanded, an independent inquiry be set 
up to investigate the causes of violence, and that sanctions should be held in place. With 
regard to the two ministers they stated that "We shall test President de Klerk's own 
commitment to maintaining the search for peace on course against his actions in this 
regard.' m 
The disclosure of covert government-IFP collaboration created a dilemma for De K.lerk. 
Despite attempts to discard the collusion as a non party-political strategy aimed at the 
lifting of sanctions, it was clear that it was a damaging episode and that the government 
needed to reassert its good faith intentions. The problem for De K.lerk was that he could 
not afford to alienate his supporters or the state agencies under control of the two 
ministers, namely the police and defence force. On 29 July 1991 De K.lerk announced a 
compromise position: the cabinet would be reshutlled. Malan and Vlok were demoted 
to the ministries of prisons and forestry and water affairs respectively.74 The 
government could, however, no longer claim to steer the process, and its policies and 
actions as a result became reactive rather than proactive. The ANC's recurring argument 
that the government could not take part in and control the transition process was 
strengthened as a result. Hence, the notion of an interim government became more 
obvious, and opposition to it less defensible. 
72 Sisk. Democratization in South Africa, pp. 110- 112. 
73 gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1991/pr0719.01 
74 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 110. 
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4.3.3. The National Peace Accord 
By September 1991 the Preparatory Committee of the National Peace Initiative, 
consisting of government, ANC and IFP delegations as well as religious leaders, 
concluded the final arrangements for an all party peace conference. This included at 
least two behind-the-scenes meetings between De Klerk and Mandela. On 14 September 
1991 thirty one parties met at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg for the signing of the 
National Peace Accord.75 At the end of the meeting, there were twenty two signatories 
to the agreement, which in principle signified a major step in the direction of creating 
conditions conducive to good faith bargaining. 76 The following undertakings and 
agreements were included in the National Peace Accord: 
• The establishment of a multiparty democracy in South Africa is our common goal. 
• Since insufficient instruments exist to actively prevent violence and intimidation at 
regional and local levels, it is agreed that committees be appointed at regional and 
local levels to assist in this regard. 
• A National Peace Committee shall be established to assist in implementing the 
Accord. 
• All political parties and organisations shall actively contribute to the creation of a 
climate of democratic tolerance. 
• The police shall exercise restraint in the pursuance of their duties and shall use the 
minimum force that is appropriate in the circumstances. 
• No public funds shall be used to promote the interests of any political party or 
political organisation and no political party or political organisation shall accept any 
public funds to promote its interests which shall have the effect of interfering 
negatively in the political process. 
• The government shall not allow any operation by the security forces with the 
intention to undermine, promote or influence any political party or political 
organisation at the expense of another by means of any acts, or by means of 
disinformation. 
15 Jbid, pp. 113- 115. 
76 http://www.udw.ac.za!UDWINPNAbout.txt The PAC, CP, AWB and AZAPO abstained from signing 
the agreement 
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• In pursuit of this understanding the parties agree that no weapons or fire-arms may 
be possessed, carried or displayed by members of the general public attending any 
political gathering, procession or meeting. 
• No private armies shall be allowed or formed.77 
The inclusive nature of the National Peace Accord set the stage for an all party 
conference to negotiate the nature of the transition. The government and the ANC as the 
two main parties, still disagreed on what the aims of such a forum should be. Both 
supported the notion of an all party ~onference, albeit for different reasons. A 
committee headed by two judges began to arrange the event after the signing of the 
Peace Accord. Although the ANC and the government participated in the arrangements, 
they also engaged in confidential bilateral meetings. At these meetings issues relating 
mostly to decision-making procedures and the agenda were discussed. 
4.4. Codesa: substantive bargaining? 
A preparatory meeting between twenty odd parties was held on 29 and 30 November 
1991, and the government and ANC conveyed their agreement on a decision-making 
mechanism to the other parties. The mechanism, known as 'sufficient consensus' would 
entail that where full consensus was not forthcoming among all participants, consensus 
among the two major contenders would be sufficient to establish agreement on any 
given issue. 78 The P AC immediately balked at the notion, and walked out of the 
meeting on the second day oftalks, claiming that collusion by the government and ANC 
would effectively exclude all other parties from having a say on major issues. 79 Other 
parties also criticised the mechanism, but none discontinued its participation. The 
sufficient consensus principle would become a crucial instrument in forging deals 
between the government and the ANC under the pretence of multiparty talks. For this 
reason it remained a bone of contention throughout the process. Another issue which 
remained unresolved was the IFP's insistence that the king of the Zulus should have a 
separate delegation, as he represented a different constituency. Despite the fact that it 
77 http://www.udw.ac.za/UDW/NPA/ 
78 Friedman, (ed.), The Long Journey, pp. 24-25. 
79 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, pp. 203 - 204. 
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was rejected by the other parties, the IFP provisionally committed themselves to 
participate in the multiparty process. Mangosuthu Buthelezi would stay away, however, 
in protest of the ruling. 
The most important facet of the preparatory meeting's work was the drawing up of an 
agenda for the all party conference. The following issues were identified: 
• creation of a climate for free political participation 
• definition of general constitutional principles 
• agreement on a constitution-making body/process 
• creation of transitional arrangements 
• decision about the future of the TBVC homelands 
• agreement on the role of the international community in negotiation 
• selection of a time frame 
• creation of a mechanism for implementation 
• discussion of other issues80 
The completion of the agenda set the scene for the first meeting between South Africa's 
major parties to discuss the nature of the transition to a future dispensation. The 
preparations for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), as the talks 
were to be known, also signified, in the eyes of the negotiators, the end of the 
preliminary bargaining phase and the ushering in of substantive bargaining. 
In light of the differing approaches to Codesa, especially between the ANC and the 
government, it can be argued that Codesa was merely an extension of preliminary 
bargaining. An all-encompassing contract zone was not yet forthcoming from the two 
major parties, with a crucial difference in their perceptions on what Codesa's function 
would be. I take a different view, however, and regard Codesa as the start of substantive 
bargaining for the following reasons: 
80 /bid, p. 203. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
151 
• agenda 
At the start of Codesa, all parties had already committed themselves to the 
"establishment of a multiparty democracy in South Africa". 81 This meant that agreement 
existed on what an all-party conference should ultimately succeed in creating. When the 
parties drew up an agenda for Codesa, the issues reflected the goal to which the parties 
would be working, namely a new constitution. Issues such as· the future of the TBVC 
homelands, agreement on constitutional principles and the creation of transitional 
arrangements, all reflected substantial issues which had a bearing on the nature, scope 
and principles included in a new constitution. The negotiation process was politica~ 
therefore the parties themselves would not draw up a constitution, as this would be done 
by constitutional experts, but rather negotiate its structure and content. The agenda 
reflected this by identifying the main topics which would have to be included in a 
constitution. 
The question can be asked but why did the ANC and the government remain vague 
prior to Codesa over the pivotal difference in their strategies? I argue here that both of 
them regarded a multiparty conference as the ideal forum to build up support for their 
preferred mode of transition, from which they could attempt to out-bargain the 
opponents on the issue. 
• tactics 
Despite a lot of work that still had to be done on the quelling of violence countrywide, 
all possible agreements regarding tactics had been reached. The Pretoria Minute, D.F. 
Malan Accord and National Peace Accord together resolved the issue of violence and 
subversion as bargaining tactics. In these agreements it was decided that the transition 
should be peacefu~ and most parties committed themselves to constructive tactics. The 
implementation was not yet finalised, but it was decided, most notably by the ANC, that 
the process should continue despite such obstacles. For this reason a move to 
substantive bargaining was made. 
81 See the National Peace Accord, section 4.2.4. 
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• preconditions 
A similar situation to that above existed regarding preconditions for substantive 
bargaining. Problems still existed with the release of all political prisoners, but the ANC 
decided that it would continue with the process. A major factor urging them forward 
was the violence. It was commonly accepted that the transition, due to the uncertainties 
surrounding it, played a role in fuelling violence, as party supporters on the ground 
attempted to strengthen their relative positions vis-a-vis each other. It is also a 
possibility that the ANC regarded the outstanding issue of political prisoners as an ideal 
lever of power to coax opponents into concessions. Whatever the rationale behind 
parties' perceptions, preconditions were sufficiently met (at least in a formal sense) to 
proceed with substantive bargaining. 
• rules of conduct 
The National Peace Accord laid down rules for all signatories regarding their code of 
conduct and the principles they should adhere to in the search for a peaceful settlement. 
Participants were represented as equal partners, and it was agreed to that no actor should 
have the capacity to use its position unfairly in order to gain any advantage. The 
equality principle was important in laying the groundwork for substantive bargaining. 
• participants 
The National Peace Accord also played an important part in convincing both the ANC 
and the government that the process could no longer be steered bilaterally. To 
effectively bring all possible parties into the process, it was necessary to convene a 
multiparty forum. The other parties were not as involved in preliminary bargaining, and 
their inclusion into negotiations meant taking the next step towards a new constitution, 
hence the start of substantive negotiations. Deliberations were finalised on who could 
partake in the forum prior to its start, signifying the end of prenegotiation. 
From the above it is evident that all issues relevant to preliminary bargaining seemed to 
be sufficiently addressed by the end of November 1991, at least in the eyes of the 
negotiators. For this reason Codesa, which involved a new forum with a new agenda, 
can not be regarded as an extension of preliminary bargaining, but rather signified the 
start of the substantive bargaining phase. 
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4.5. Codesa 1 
On 20 December 1991 nineteen parties took part in the first plenary session of Codesa 
at the World Trade Centre !it Kempton Park. For such a significant event the choice of 
venue raised a few questions. Sparks notes that Codesa "assembled at an improbable 
place at an improbable time," as the venue was neither imposing nor rich in history.82 I 
am of the opinion that the venue was, exactly for these reasons, ideally suited for the 
event, as it conformed to all the conditions of neutrality. No party could assert a historic 
link to the venue, and as it was ideally placed next to Johannesburg airport, simplifying 
transport arrangements. 
Despite a public argument on the first day of Codesa between Mandela and De Klerk on 
among others, the issue of the ANC's armed struggle, Codesa produced some 
significant results. A declaration of intent was signed by all the parties except the 
Bophuthatswana government and it was agreed that five working committees would be 
set up to negotiate agreements on the following issues:83 
• the creation of a climate for free political participation and the role of the 
international community 
• constitutional principles 
• transitional arrangements 
• the future of the TBVC homelands 
• time frames for the transition84 
A Gender Advisory Committee was also set up to advise on the gender implications of 
agreements. Its structure was similar to that of the working groups, yet it did not fulfil 
the same functions. 85 The Declaration of Intent was mainly an undertaking by the 
participants ofCodesa to work towards a new, democratic South African dispensation in 
which all South Africans would be able to participate. In this effort, the parties 
committed themselves to a peaceful transition and the active pursuit of reconciliation. 
82 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 130. . 
83 The IFP only signed the Declaration of Intent at the second plenary meeting of Codesa in May 1992. 
84 Cooper, C., et al., Race Relations Survey 1991192, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1992, p. li. 
85 Friedman (ed.), The Long Journey, p. 32. 
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The Declaration of Intent was purposely vague on the nature of the transition, as this 
was the main point of conflict between the government and the ANC and still had to be 
negotiated. The signatories committed themselves "[t]o set in motion the process of 
drawing up and establishing a constitution ... " which was an ambiguous enough 
statement to include both a constituent assembly and a multiparty constitution writing 
body as possible solutions.86 It can be argued, however, that the nature of Codesa 
signified a slight move in the government's favour, as the working group agreements 
(made by non-elected representatives) were to form the basis of a new constitution. 87 
The structure set up at Codesa to coordinate the negotiations was made up of the 
following: 
• two delegates and two advisors from each party in each working group 
• a steering committee in each working group, with members selected from the 
delegates 
• a daily management committee of eight members from different parties, to maintain 
the momentum of the process and settling procedural disputes within working 
groups 
• a head management committee 
• a secretariat, in charge of administration 
• administrative personnel, offered by the Consultative Business Movement 
It does not fall within the scope of this study to offer a detailed analysis of the 
substantive bargaining phase in the South African transitional negotiations, as it is 
mainly concerned with the issue of prenegotiation. 88 In light of the arguments proposed 
in Chapter 1, it is necessary, however, to give a brief overview of substantive bargaining 
events as they transpired in order to gain a clear understanding of the reasons for their 
deadlock between 1992 and 1993. 
86 
"Appendix G, Convention for a Democratic South Africa: Declaration of Intent," in Cooper et al., Race 
Relations Survey 199111992, pp. 557-558. 
87 Friedman notes that the working group decisions were theoretically not binding as the full convention 
had to ratify them. However, as each party had delegations in all five working groups, the chances for 
rejection were slim. Friedman (ed.), The Long Journey, p. 32. 
88 For an analysis of substantive negotiations see Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1991192; 1992/93.; 
Friedman (ed.), The Long Journey.; Friedman, S. and Atkinson, M (eds.), South African Review 7, The 
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4.5.1. Differing perceptions 
When the working groups started their deliberations on 6 February 1991, the chances of 
deadlock were already significant. At the opening of parliament on 24 January 1991, 
F.W. de K.lerk outlined the government's view of Codesa and its role in the transition. 
According to this view Codesa would act as a forum for the drawing up of a set of 
principles for a transitional constitution, which in its turn would make provision for a 
transitional parliament. When such a constitution was finalised, a general referendum 
would be held to determine whether the general population accepted it. White votes 
would be counted separately, and only if the general population and the majority of the 
whites supported it would an election be held to establish the transitional parliament. 
This parliament would then be charged with drawing up a final constitution, again with 
the provision of a white veto.89 
The government's proposal entailed an implicit acceptance that an elected body would 
write the final constitution, yet by arguing for a white veto it wanted to ensure that the 
'old' government could steer the process and block any unwanted constitutional 
measures. By conceding on one of the ANC's demands it hoped to secure a reciprocal 
gesture. 
The ANC, however, still regarded Codesa's role as that of a negotiating forum to decide 
on the form of a transitional government. Such a transitional government would have 
binding authority, approved and ratified by the tricameral parliament. When it was 
consolidated it would hold elections for a constituent assembly, which in its turn would 
draft the first and final constitution. The ANC explicitly rejected the notion of a white 
veto at any stage of the process.90 
The government's hopes for reciprocity were met, yet the ANC's concession was not 
aimed at sanctioning a white veto over the constitution. Instead, they agreed to offer the 
tricameral parliament a say over the transitional arrangements, to ensure legal 
continuity. This dispute over the role and functions of Codesa were to be expected, as 
Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994.; and Sisk, 
Democratization in South Africa 
89 !bid, p. 206. 
90 !bid 
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no prior agreement on the nature of the transition existed. When it surfaced, however, it 
highlighted a crucial issue with regards to the negotiation process, namely that 
prenegotiation was not sufficiently completed. Due to the inclusion of other parties into 
the fold of negotiations at the end of 1990 and the recurring violence that hampered the 
development of good faith between the two main parties, it had been decided to press 
forward with the negotiation process. However, a complete contract zone did not exist 
between the two main parties, and their differences were set to hamper progress at 
Codesa. 
Despite differing perceptions between the ANC and the government on negotiation 
issues, the increasing momentum of the transition started to unsettle the white right 
wing and its supporters, who excluded themselves from Codesa. In February 1992 their 
opposition to the negotiations became increasingly vocal, and on 17 February 1992 
white sentiment towards the process was conveyed through a resounding by-election 
victory for the Conservative Party (CP) in Potchefstroom. De Klerk responded by 
calling an all-white referendum on the issue of negotiations, scheduled for 17 March 
1992, to reassert his mandate for reform. After intense public lobbying by the NP, the 
DP and big business, 68.6 percent of those whites who voted supported De Klerk's 
initiative.91 
Due to the positive result of the referendum, the government's negotiators, bolstered by 
the outcome, apparently returned to their Codesa working groups with a sense of 
renewed strength. Friedman states that, according to numerous Codesa delegates, a 
notable shift in attitude among government and NP negotiators became evident after the 
1992 referendum. Whereas they were conciliatory before the event, they became more 
obstructive upon their return and attempted to unilaterally enforce agreements. 92 This is 
denied by among others Kobie Coetsee.93 Another source argues that it was not a case 
of a conceited attitude, but rather an attempt by the government and NP negotiators to 
assert their perceived stronger position in the eyes of their opponents as well as their 
supporters. He also states that the result of the referendum might have influenced the 
attitude of ANC negotiators as well, as they had no real indication of what their support 
91 !bid, p. 209. 
92 Friedman ( ed. ), The Long Journey, pp. 40 - 41. 
93 Coetsee, interview by author, 1996. 
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would be. A regular concern of the ANC delegation was that they would not be able to 
secure at least two thirds of the electoral support, and the strong support for the NP-
government among whites in the referendum exacerbated this concern. A possible 
explanation for the lack of progress after the referendum could have been a decision by 
the ANC to first consolidate support via mass action before the process reached an 
advanced stage. 94 I am of the opinion that both explanations are plausible, and that the 
government's aggressive approach after the referendum was in all likelihood countered 
by a similar, yet more subtle approach by the ANC, who aimed to ride out the perceived 
wave of government support before returning to hard bargaining. 
A sign of the government's new approach was a set of proposals tabled after the 
referendum, which aimed to ensure a set of transitional executive councils which would 
oversee the levelling of the playing field before any elections took place, or a 
constitution writing body was formed. The implications of these proposals would be a 
lengthier transition and an increased opportunity for white vetoes over crucial issues. 
The ANC rejected these proposals and argued for a constituent assembly elected on a 
proportional basis with a two-thirds majority decision-making rule. They also proposed 
multiparty committees in the interim government to approve legislation. As the 
opposing perceptions mounted it was decided to arrange for a second plenary session of 
Codesa on 15- 16 May 1992 to speed up the process.95 
4.6. Codesa 2 
The setting of a date for Codesa 2 was aimed at coaxing parties into settlement on 
outstanding issues, as they had to submit their final reports at the meeting. As the 
planned session drew closer, however, it became clear that certain issues remained 
problematic. The government continued with the hard-line stance they adopted after the 
referendum and insisted on a transitional government that would be in place for a few 
years. The ANC, in an attempt to counterweigh the government's perception of power 
94 Anonymous, interview by author, 18 Apri11997. 
95 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, pp. 209- 210. 
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threatened with mass action. It was felt that a countrywide show of support for the ANC 
could deflate the government's perception and edge them towards compromise. 
Whereas most of the working groups had reached agreements on key issues, serious 
deadlock occurred in working group two. The issue under dispute was the percentage a 
constituent assembly would need to make decisions affecting regions. As the two 
opposing views were held by the ANC and the government, the sufficient consensus 
principle could not be used to break the logjam. On 15 May 1992 Codesa 2 convened 
despite no consensus on the issue. This led Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk to meet 
privately on the same night in an attempt to solve the impasse at the highest level. They 
could not reach an agreement, however, and it was decided to refer the issue to 
Codesa's Management Committee.96 Despite Codesa's inability to produce a complete 
settlement, the working groups made significant progress on individual issues. Broken 
down into individual working groups, the agreements reached included the following: 
• Working group 1 
a Despite the priority of the release of political prisoners, the government and ANC 
should resolve the issue bilaterally and prevent it from hampering progress on other 
ISSUeS. 
a An interim executive, once it has been established, should be consulted on any state 
of emergency; and the regulations issued thereunder should be justiciable in a court 
of law. 
a Any discriminatory legislation should be repealed. 
a All disputes between parties should be resolved peacefully. 
a It would be illegal to be in possession of any weapon at a political gathering. 
a An independent body to regulate the telecommunications industry needed to be 
established. 
a The bodies set up under the National Peace Accord needed to be developed further. 
a All the security forces would be placed under the control of the interim body, once 
established. 
96 1bid, pp. 210-211. 
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a A task group had to be set up to discuss the role of the international community in 
the transition. 97 
• Working group 2 
a During the transition period legislative power would be vested in an interim 
parliament consisting of two houses, with membe~s being proportionally elected. 
a A final constitution should be drawn up by the national assembly in the interim 
parliament and accepted by a 70 percent majority. 98 
• Working group 3 
a The transition period would consist of two stages. In the first stage a multiparty 
transitional executive council (TEC), in conjunction with existing legislative and 
executive structures, would facilitate the transition, level the playing field, and 
create a climate conducive to free political participation and the holding of :free and 
fair elections. The second stage was not discussed.99 
• Working group 4 
a The independent homelands would participate in the transitional arrangements. 
a The independent homelands should be incorporated in South Africa.100 
a Civil servants in the homelands would not be retrenched and would keep their 
benefits and salaries. 
a A technical committee would be set up to address all issues pertaining to 
incorporation. 101 
97 Cooper, C. et al., Race Relations Survey 1992193, Johannesburg: South African Institute for Race 
Relations, 1993, pp. 499-503. 
98 Ibid., pp. 503 - 504. 
99 Ibid., pp. 504-506. This includes a detailed overview of the workings of the TEC. 
100 The Bophuthatswana government delegation did not support this decision. 
101 Ibid., pp. 506 - 507. 
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• Working group 5 
CJ A drafting committee had to be drawn up which would ensure that qualified experts 
were responsible for drawing up legislation arising from agreements reached at 
Codesa.102 
Despite significant movement towards a new constitution, issues central to the transition 
remained unadressed by Codesa. The deadlock that existed centred primarily on 
decision-making mechanisms of an interim government, which had a crucial bearing on 
the nature and outcome of the transition. The government still preferred an extended 
transition phase, where existing government structures could exercise as much control 
as possible over the writing of a constitution, and day-to-day governance. Central to 
their position was the idea of a minority veto for whites, either in its direct form or 
enshrouded in high decision-making percentages. The ANC preferred a speedy 
transition, in which a new constitution could be implemented as soon as possible and 
the transfer of political power be made a reality. It was evident that the two parties still 
did not agree on what the outcome of negotiations should be, as no contract zone 
existed on crucial issues. 
The establishment of a contract zone is essentially a bilateral exercise, and it is my 
opinion that the sheer size ofCodesa's working groups hindered progress on substantial 
issues. According to Friedman, a senior NP source admitted that the original vision for 
Codesa was that of a multiparty conference driven by the three major parties, namely 
the government/NP, the ANC and the IFP. It was agreed by the NP prior to Codesa that 
only these three parties would have representation on all working groups. Smaller 
parties, however, demanded full participant status, and this lead to a situation where 
working groups were very large and proceedings cumbersome. Hence, Friedman argues 
as follows: 
"What was time-consuming was the . elaborate attempt to create an 
impression of multiparty debate. Codesa was a bargaining forum rather than 
a problem solving exercise- for good reason. There is little point in joint 
102 Ibid., pp. 507 - 508. It should be noted that working group 5 did not discuss any time frames for the 
implementation of agreements reached at Codesa, which it was formed to do, as agreements were reached 
at too late a stage. 
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discussion on several issues shows clearly that there was no consensus on 
this- without agreement on the nature ofproblems ... there clearly can be no 
search for solutions."103 
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The structure of Codesa to a certain extent forced the government and the ANC to 
discard their negotiation strategy of covert, bilateral meetings in favour of a public, 
consultative strategy. As they both realised that such a strategy would hamper progress, 
they initiated bilateral discussions, held in-between official working group meetings, to 
discuss issues and positions beforehand. This enabled them to cut down on official 
debates within working groups, as the principle of sufficient consensus ensured that 
their agreements would be accepted.104 A senior government negotiator goes as far to 
say that the working groups did absolutely nothing in achieving settlements, and that the 
working group structure was merely window-dressing for the public and the other 
parties involved. He argues that the real bargaining took place behind the scenes. 105 This 
is an extraordinary statement, but if correct, holds a very important lesson to similarly 
divided societies when brokering a new dispensation; namely that the smaller the 
number of participants, the better the chances for agreement. 
The Working Committee of Codesa convened for the first time on 25 May 1992 to 
discuss the deadlocked issues, but similarly could not reach agreement. As the process 
dragged along it became apparent that an effective channel of communication would 
have to be set up between the government and the ANC to discuss the deadlock. The 
Mandela-De Klerk relationship was effective when singular decisions had to be made or 
good faith re-established, but it could not deal with the complex strategic questions 
involved in the search for a settlement. Furthermore, the external environment for 
bargaining was not improving, as violence continued to flare up around the country. In 
light of the crude symbiosis that had evolved between violent events and breakthroughs, 
it is not ironic that a violent event would serve as the catalyst for serious behind-the-
scenes bargaining. 
103 Friedman (eel.), The Long Journey, pp. 58-59. 
104 This is not to say that no debate took place within work groups and the two main parties steamrollered 
all issues. It merely served as a strategy to prevent getting bogged down by large numbers of delegates. 
105 Anonymous, interview by the author, 9 Apri11997. 
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4. 7. Deadlock 
On 17 June 1992, a day after the ANC-alliance started with a mass action campaign to 
force the government into conceding on their demands or stepping down, IFP-
supporters in Boipatong, a township outside Johannesburg, led an attack on houses of 
ANC-supporters, killing 15 people and injuring many more. The incident caused 
outrage from the ANC, and in a strongly worded statement they proclaimed that they 
placed the blame for the incident "squarely on the shoulders of Mr F.W. de Klerk." 
After an emergency meeting by the ANC NEC on 23 June 1992, it was decided to 
suspend negotiations with the government. In a statement released after the meeting, the 
ANC leadership accused the government of pursuing "a strategy which embraces 
negotiations, together with systematic covert actions, including murder, involving its 
security forces and surrogates." 
The NEC also referred to the existing deadlock in negotiations, by stating: "What is at 
issue is more than the crisis of the negotiations process. The fundamental reason for the 
deadlock is whether there is to be democratic change, or white minority veto 
powers."106 The ANC urged De Klerk to commit himself to the creation of an elected 
Constituent Assembly which would draft a new constitution and the establishment of an 
interim government. A list of preconditions for the resumption of negotiations was 
drawn up and the ANC argued that "[t]he response and practical steps taken by the De 
Klerk regime to these demands will play a critical role in determining the direction and 
speed with which bona fide negotiations can take place."107 The preconditions included: 
• The termination of all covert operations including hit squad activity. 
• The disarmament, disbanding and confinement to barracks of all special forces as 
well as detachments made up of foreign nationals. 
• The suspension and prosecution of all officers and security force personnel involved 
in the violence. 
• The government should ensure that all repression in the self-governing states and 
the homelands would be ended. 
106 gopher:/ I gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1992/pr0618.0 1 
107 gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1992/pr0623.01 
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• The immediate implementation of the programme to phase out the hostels and 
convert them into family unit accommodation. 
• Installation of fences around hostels. 
• Guarding of the hostels by security forces on a permanent basis, monitored by 
multilateral peace structures, and the expulsion of those who occupy the hostels 
illegally. 
• Regular searches of hostels with the parti~ipation of multilateral peace structures. 
• Banning the carrying of all dangerous weapons in public on all occasions, including 
'cultural weapons.' 
• The implementation of an International Commission of Inquiry into the Boipatong 
Massacre and all acts of violence as well as international monitoring of the violence. 
• The release of all political prisoners. 
• The repeal of all repressive legislation, including the laws which were passed during 
the previous session of parliament.108 
To breach the impasse caused by the ANC's suspension of negotiations and their 
subsequent preconditions for the resumption of talks, it became clear that an informal 
communication channel had to be formed. The conflicting demands for a new 
constitution illustrated the acute absence of a contract zone between the government and 
the ANC. In order to establish such a contract zone, it became necessary to revert back 
to issues relating to the agenda, tactics, preconditions and rules of conduct associated 
with preliminary bargaining. The consolidation of the transition process thus relied on a 
return to prenegotiation. The building of a good faith relationship also remained crucial 
to the success of negotiations, and this could not be done while bargaining on the nitty 
gritty of a new constitution. However crucial the relationship between Mandela and De 
Klerk still proved to be, it had deteriorated badly, and it was decided to develop contact 
between Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC secretary general and its chief negotiator in 
working group 2 and Roelf Meyer, the newly elected minister of constitutional affairs, 
who took over the role of the government's chief negotiator after the departure ofGerrit 
Viljoen. The whole scenario forced the government and the ANC to 'relearn the 
mutually hurting stalemate,' since the crises of violence and deadlock reminded them 
that a successful transition would depend on their willingness to compromise. Hence, 
108 !bid 
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their decision to continue with behind-the-scenes negotiations reflected a new sense of 
urgency in their search for a solution. 
4.7.1. The establishment of the National Economic Forum 
The mass action campaign in June 1992 was not solely an ANC strategy aimed at 
gaining concessions from the government, it was also the result of a stand-off that 
existed outside of the bargaining forum between labour and government over key 
economic issues. Central to the dispute was the notion of a national economic forum. 
Although business, labour and government agreed on the need for such a forum, they 
could not decide on what its scope should be. After intense bargaining took place 
against a backdrop of mass action, it was anounced in August 1992 that the National 
Economic Forum (NEF) would convene for its first plenary session in September 
1992.109 
The significance of this event is that the need for an economic forum was originally 
proposed a year earlier at a behind-the-scenes meeting between members of the ANC 
and prominent Afrikaner and business leaders. The two groups, who included many 
Mells Park participants, met at Hartebeespoort Dam in August 1991, in the wake of the 
Inkathagate scandal and a general loss of good faith between the main negotiating 
parties. The ANC delegation included Thabo Mbeki, Aziz Pahad, Tony True and 
Penuell Maduna. From the Afrikaner side Attie du Plessis, Willie Esterhuyse and Leon 
Wessels attended, whereas Marinus Dalling, who organised it, could not attend. One of 
the issues that were discussed dealt specifically with the causes of South Africa's 
economic decline. It was decided among the participants that a national economic forum 
should be set up to steer the economy during the transition. Du Plessis was appointed as 
the person who would set up the structures and offered informal support from the ANC. 
A follow-up meeting was also held between him, Esterhuyse, Pahad and Mbeki from 
where the developments that would lead to the forum's inception in September 1992 
were put in place. 
The above bilateral agreement is a significant event in terms of the prenegotiation 
process. First, it emphasises the importance of good faith, as parties who had a good 
109 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1992/93, pp. 326-329. 
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working relationship returned to their old lines of communication when the process 
seemed slow-moving. Second, it reaffirms the effectiveness of secrecy in implementing 
sensitive agreements. I doubt whether all parties would have supported the way in 
which the decision to set up an economic forum was made, yet it reflected the method 
of bargaining which would prove the most successful throughout the process. 
4.8. Breaking the deadlock: the channel 
The call to engage in behind-the-scenes discussions in order to resolve the impasse 
came, surprisingly, from the ANC through Ramaphosa. This is significant when 
analysing the Codesa 2 deadlock. It is unverifiable whether allegations made by the 
government at the time are true, that the ANC deliberately scuppered Codesa 2, because 
they were not fully prepared for a final agreement. It is, however, not implausible to 
argue that internal differences within the ANC and the expectations of supporters who 
still regarded the negotiations with suspicion, could have prompted the ANC to frrst 
embark on a public show of power, hence generating support among more militant 
members; before the issues could be resolved, probably in terms more beneficial to the 
ANC.U0 One government source actually ascribes the deadlock to the government's 
tactics in Working Group 2. According to him, the government moved around between 
positions too much and this resulted in a loss of good faith between the delegations. 
On 26 June 1992, Mandela sent a memorandum to De Klerk in which he formally stated 
the ANC's position on the deadlock and reaffirmed the preconditions for a resumption 
of formal negotiations. The memorandum dealt with two broad issues, which it 
identified in the following manner: 
"First there is the cns1s m the negotiation process itself. The central 
blockage stems from the refusal of the NP government to move together 
with all of us in the process of truly democratising South Africa. Secondly, 
110 According to Friedman (ed.), The Long Journey, p. 85., another theory suggests: " ... that Ramaphosa 
and Meyer, independently perhaps ... concluded that no amount of last-minute manoeuvring could produce 
an agreement at Codesa 2 which had any realistic hope of surviving. As their colleagues battled to reach 
an agreement which they had decided could not endure, they - independently or in concert - determined 
that Codesa should die, to be replaced by the hard bargaining which might bridge the divide." 
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state secwity forces and the police in the violence as well as your 
unwillingness to act decisively to bring such violence to an end has created 
an untenable and explosive situation."111 
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In reference to his 1989 letter to De Klerk, Mandela restated that the two issues which 
needed to be addressed were the demand for majority rule in a unitary state and the 
concern of white South Africa over this demand, and that ''the most crucial task which 
will face the government and the ANC will be to reconcile these two positions." He 
argued that the government attempts to reconcile them was solely based on the notion of 
a white veto, whereas the ANC had proposed constitutional principles as a method to 
bind a Constituent Assembly. Mandela said that the transition needed to be finalised 
within a relatively short time frame, as the government's bona fides were in doubt on 
the issue of complicity in violence: "The evidence shows that either the NP government, 
even at its top most levels, sanctions such activities or that it is powerless to restrain the 
very forces it created." In conclusion he wrote: "Our demands are the minimum 
measures required of your government if it is to establish a credible base for resolving 
the impasse our country has reached."112 
On 2 July 1992 De Klerk replied in writing to Mandela's memorandum. The reply 
included a lengthy discussion of the government's position on the issues under dispute 
and a strong attack on the ANC for what the government perceived to be disruptive 
policies. De Klerk's memorandum also included the government's proposals on an 
interim constitution, a transitional government and a constitution writing body. The 
following points were argued: 
• The use of mass mobilisation by the ANC to issue demands on the negotiation 
process was just as unacceptable to the government as the use of violence for that 
purpose. 
111 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/mem.o920626.html 
112 /bid 
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• The government was committed to a constitutionally structured transition, as 
opposed to the ANC's ''unstructured and immediate transfer of power before a 
proper Transitional Constitution is negotiated." 
• The ANC was responsible for obstructing the negotiation process and engineering 
the Working Group 2 deadlock at Codesa. 
• The use of threats and ultimatums by the ANC had a detrimental and erosive effect 
on the mutual trust that was beginning to develop in the negotiations. 
• The ANC seemed to view negotiations as an "area of struggle", which in the 
government's view excluded the notion of compromise. 
• The government did not orchestrate any violent attacks, but rather regarded 
statements made by ANC leaders and the setting up of self defence units as 
contributing to violence. 
• The ANC had a "bad track record in maintaining agreements and can be considered 
an unreliable negotiating partner."113 
On 9 July 1992, Mandela replied to De Klerk's letter, and stated the following: 
• The call by the government to hold face-to-face talks on their differences would be a 
wasted opportunity, as it would become bogged down in decisions on an agenda. 
• To broach the impasse it would be imperative to isolate the question of transitional 
arrangements from that of the constitution making body, as the two parties' focus 
differed. 
• The ANC regarded the writing of a constitution by an non-elected constitution 
making body as undemocratic. 
• The ANC regarded it as necessary that all interim arrangements relating to the 
administration and governance of regions should be such as not to pre-empt the 
decisions of the constitution making body. 
• The elevation of transitional arrangements to the central focus of negotiations by the 
government betrayed its pre-occupation with obtaining guarantees of a 
constitutionally entrenched role for the National Party. Unless the question of the 
constitution making body is dealt with as the primary focus of negotiations, issues 
relating to transitional arrangements would be deprived of their proper relevance. 
113 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transitionllett2july.html 
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• The question of the form of government should be left to a democratically elected 
constitution making body. 
• The ANC rejected the government's claim that it was doing everything in its power 
to stop the violence and still regarded the government as instrumental in fermenting 
unrest.114 
It is my view that the correspondence between the two leaders merely served as 
posturing on unresolved issues, a process characteristic of prenegotiation. The rationale 
behind the letters was not that of resolving issues through bargaining, but it determined 
the climate in which the "channel", set up between Ramaphosa and Meyer, would 
operate. As such the memoranda served as policy guidelines for the negotiators to 
structure their arguments. 
The two delegations which constituted the channel, led by Ramaphosa and Meyer, met 
approximately 43 times between 23 June and 26 September 1992 in an attempt to revive 
the negotiation process. Although not completely impervious to events outside, their 
aim was mainly to reach an agreement which would see the ANC return to negotiations. 
Whereas both Ramaphosa and Meyer had direct links to Mandela and De Klerk 
respectively, they were also assisted by two chief advisors each. Meyer's aides were 
Niel Barnard and Fanie van der Merwe, who had both been involved in the process 
virtually from the start, while Ramaphosa was assisted mainly by Mac Maharaj and Joe 
Slovo, although Mohammed Valli Moosa, Penuell Maduna and Mathews Phosa among 
others also attended some meetings. 115 The six delegates had limited experience 
working together outside of large delegations, and an initial period of confidence-
building ensued as the negotiators weighed up their opponents. 116 
4.8.1. Personalities 
During this period of intense bilateral talks, the role of personalities became very 
important, as mutual trust and good faith were crucial to any breakthrough. This 
corresponds to the approaches of Douglas and Morley & Stephenson, who argue that 
114 http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandela/fwletter .html 
115 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 April1997.; RoelfMeyer, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
116 The first formal contact between Ramaphosa and Meyer was in 1991during the preparatory work for a 
multiparty conference. Van der Merwe and Maharaj had previously worked together while members of 
Codesa' s Secretariat. 
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the interpersonal bargaining relationship comes to the fore during phase two of a 
bargaining process. Douglas also identifies the increase in autonomy that individual 
negotiators receive in this phase, which corresponds to the South African case.U7 
Although the most significant paring was between Meyer and Ramaphosa, V an der 
Merwe and Maharaj usually worked together on the technical details surrounding 
agreements, with Barnard and Slovo discussing broader strategic issues. The role of 
Mandela and De Klerk also remained important, as tentative agreements were usually 
referred to them individually for evaluation before final acceptance. 
In terms of personalities, the choice ofRamaphosa and Meyer as chief negotiators were 
conducive to the resolution of deadlock, despite their different styles and approaches. 
Ramaphosa's experience in labour disputes made him a very tough negotiator who 
could force concessions, a fact which certainly played a role in his selection. Meyer 
acknowledges that "[t]hese guys had an advantage over us, they'd been through 
negotiations par excellence in the mining industry ... while we had to learn through 
experience on a daily basis- you can't read these things in books."118 Meyer, on the 
other hand, represented a more conciliatory approach from the government, which was 
crucial for establishing movement in the process. 
According to Meyer, the period between June and September 1992 was crucial for the 
bargaining process as a whole, as it was only here that he and Ramaphosa learned to 
trust each other.119 He states that in retrospect the government should have settled at 
Codesa 2 if they wanted to receive a better deal, but that the continued process ensured 
the firm establishment of good faith as a guiding principle for the negotiations and its 
aftermath. 120 According to Meyer the relationship between him and Ramaphosa 
remained businesslike, which was to the advantage of the process. As no personal 
expectations existed it made bargaining easier and more effective. He states: "It was sort 
of professional, while at the same time one of trust and mutual respect."121 
117 See Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.3. 
118 RoelfMeyer, quoted in Waldmeir,Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 210. 
119 RoelfMeyer, interviews by author, 8 October 1996 and 5 September 1997. 
120 Joe Slovo acknowledges that the government would have received a better deal had they settled at 
Codesa 2 and states: " ... thank goodness the other side rejected it, because I think in retrospect it was 
giving too much away ... I think it was not a compromise we should have put forward. It wasn't well 
thought out enough." Joe Slovo, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 14 November 1994. 
121 RoelfMeyer, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 16 November 1994. 
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Ramaphosa confirms that Meyer established his integrity and good faith in their 
meetings during 1992 and 1993. He points out that their bargaining relationship 
_ developed to such an extent that later on "[w]e had established [a] type of rapport, we 
didn't need to take false positions on certain crucial matters."122 With regards to the 
pairing strategy Ramaphosa argues: 
"[The chemistry that we developed] was conducive to solving problems. 
One of the key things in negotiations is to find a whole lot of mechanisms to 
resolve problems, to a point of appointing smaller groups and maybe 
identifying two people on both sides who get on well together and give 
those issues to them and they eventually come up with a solution, that's 
what happened with Roelf and me. " 123 
The mutual trust that transpired in the deadlock-breaking discussions did not mean that 
the meetings were devoid of any hostility or aggressive posturing. All the negotiators 
agree that some discussions were very heated. Meyer recalls that "[t]hat was the period 
during which we had our most bitter fights, Cyril and myself: but at the same time we 
moved closer almost on a daily basis ... " 124 The function of good faith is not to create a 
bonhomie among negotiators, but to ensure that clashes of opinion do not result in 
deadlock or vindictive retaliatory measures. This was evident among the South African 
delegates, who despite differences of opinion on many issues, continued to bargain with 
the sense that the other party was not purposely aiming to derail discussions. An 
indication of this is that one of the events that all negotiators recall clearly involved a 
bitter exchange between Ramaphosa and Meyer, to the extent that their aides had to 
intervene. 125 Both Ramaphosa and Meyer claim to have gained an ascendancy over the 
other afterwards. Whichever way, the existence of sufficient good faith allowed the 
talks to continue. 126 
122 Cyri1 Ramaphosa, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. 
123 !bid 
124 RoelfMeyer, interview by Michael Holman and i>atti Waldmeir, 21 June 1994. 
125 For a more detailed account of the event see Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 211 - 212. 
126 See Mac Maharaj, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 31 January 1995.; Cyril Ramaphosa, interview by 
Patti Waldmeir, 19 January 1995.; RoelfMeyer, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 16 November 1994. 
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A different situation existed between Mandela and De Klerk, however. Many of the 
negotiators believe that the public clash between the two leaders at Codesa 1 created a 
rift which would only widen during the years to come. 127 Especially the issue of 
violence proved to be conclusive in gradually breaking down trust between them. Most 
ANC negotiators, as well as some government negotiators, argue that Mandela 
repeatedly rode roughshod over De Klerk at private meetings aimed at sorting out 
outstanding issues. They argue that Mandela grew frustrated with De Klerk's apparent 
shifting on issues, which led him to become very intransigent. 128 
4.8.2. Audiences 
One detractor of the way prenegotiation was conducted from June to September 1992 
was the animosity it created between especially the government negotiators and their 
immediate audience. As prenegotiation usually requires the greatest policy shifts from 
parties in a negotiation process, it can cause negotiators to become unpopular in their 
own camp. The movement from a zero sum configuration of conflict to a non-zero sum 
involves major concessions from both sides. In the case of the pre-September 1992 
talks, however, the government was expected to concede the most, as prenegotiation 
dealt with unresolved issues stemming from previous negotiation. The ANC regarded 
their preliminary concessions as finalised and pressured the government to establish 
good faith from their side by conceding on outstanding issues. 
According to a government negotiator, the establishment of trust is not only relevant 
between opposite negotiators, but also crucial between negotiators and their leadership. 
If negotiators do not have the full support of their leadership, selling a bargain becomes 
much more difficult as they can be perceived as traitors when making significant 
concessions. The rift between those in bargaining situations and those outside becomes 
even larger in the aftermath of agreements, as the latter still tends to "blow off 
revolutionary steam" on deals they do not comprehend. It therefore becomes necessary 
for negotiators to be able to stand their ground against audiences when agreements are 
127 Apparently the clash stemmed from a miscommunication. as De K.lerk sent a message to Mandela 
prior to the first plenary session to inform him of his intention to address the issue of the armed struggle. 
The message was never conveyed, hence Mandela's indignation at De Klerk's statements during the 
closing argwnents, which led to the bitter exchanges. 
128 Ibid. 
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reached, as reneging on a deal because of outside pressure can harm the good faith of 
the bargaining relationship. 129 
According to Meyer, De Klerk on most occasions supported the negotiators whenever 
decisions and tactics were discussed by the cabinet. The differences in perception that 
still existed between them he ascribes to the fact that "F.W. did not go through the daily 
negotiating process that I went through - our nature, our experience, our orientation is 
different."130 The rest of the cabinet were usually extremely critical towards the deals 
proposed by the negotiators. Meyer notes: 
" ... we were negotiating right through that final period, the last three weeks 
and so [before the Record of Understanding], working out the details, [and] 
every time we reported back we were given hell on our own side - why 
can't you get this and why can't you get that? And every time we tried to 
explain that this is the situation and this is the reason and that and that. "131 
Waldmeir notes that the ANC negotiators experienced a similar situation: 
"But both sides say the toughest battles were not those at the World Trade 
Centre but those which took place between the rival camps. 'There are two 
aspects of negotiation- negotiating with the enemy, and negotiating with 
yourselves. The latter is ten times more difficult,' ANC negotiator 
Mohammed V alii Moo sa once told me. "A camaraderie develops where 
your constituency is seen as your enemy, and the enemy as your ally," says 
his colleague, Frene Ginwala."132 
An excellent example of this dimension of negotiation occurred during the final 
bargaining sessions for what would be known as the Record of Understanding. 
Apparently two clauses remained problematic as the document proceeded through a 
number of drafts; one was an undertaking by the ANC to distance themselves from the 
129 Anonymous, interview by the author, 9 April 1997. 
130 Meyer, interview by Holman and Waldmeir, 1994. 
131 RoelfMeyer, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 10 February 1995. 
132 Wa/dmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 227. 
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SACP to a certain extent and the other an agreement that mass action would not be used 
to further goals pertaining to negotiation. Due to the problematic implementation of the 
first clause it was dropped and negotiators from each side were assigned to reach 
agreement on the second clause. One negotiator recalls that the general feeling among 
the group was one of solidarity against their respective leaderships, as the persons in the 
group had met a number of times already and they had realised a deal would not be 
possible on the issue. They therefore proceeded to discuss sport and general events of 
the day, waiting for time to pass in order to report a deadlock. After a while they 
touched on the subject under discussion, stating some general principles, but again 
realised a mutually acceptable deal would not be possible and adjourned when they 
were called back. It turned out that during their session the issue had been debated in a 
much more hostile manner between Mandela and De K.lerk, to the same effect that no 
agreement was forthcoming and the clause was dropped. 
The above account illustrates the increased identifiability which occur in prenegotiation 
between opposite negotiators in a similar situation. According to Morley and 
Stephenson identifiability can also increase as formality decreases. The nature of the 
June - September 1992 meetings, which were accompanied by some social interaction 
after meetings, illustrates this point similar to the Mells Park meetings between Mbeki 
and Esterhuyse. The nature of the rift that can appear between negotiators and their 
constituencies thus takes on the characteristics of a negotiator vs. non-negotiator 
conflict of interest. 
4.8.3. The external environment 
The 1992 prenegotiation phase did not take place in a contextual void, and events 
outside ofthe government-ANC meetings also impacted on the process. After deadlock 
ensued in May 1992 the government started to engage other dissident parties in talks 
with the aim of drawing them into the process. On 19 August 1992 the government met 
with the PAC and they agreed in principle to the notion of a constituent assembly. More 
talks were to follow soon between them, as well as between the government and Azapo. 
After the resignation of four members from the CP to form a pro-negotiation party, the 
Afrikaner Volksunie (AV), the CP also showed signs of joining the process. These 
events also played a role in moving the process towards renewed substantive 
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bargaining. As Zartman notes, one of the functions of prenegotiation is to reach 
consensus over which participants to include in substantive bargaining and which to 
exclude. 133 The position of the IFP remained problematic, however. Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi refused to attend Codesa 2 because of the ruling that the royal house of the 
Zulus could not constitute a separate delegation. 134 
Another important external factor was the implementation of a mass action campaign by 
the ANC throughout the country. This took place in the form of stayaways, marches and 
most significantly a general strike called by Cosatu on 3 August 1992, in order to force 
the government to accede to the ANC's demands. The success of the mass action 
bolstered the ANC's perception of their bargaining power and, in a move similar to the 
government's post-referendum actions, they decided to strengthen their position. One of 
the main obstacles to a transition remained the conduct of anti-ANC homeland 
governments, notably Ciske~ Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu, in opposing incorporation 
into South Africa on the ANC's terms. A decision was taken by the ANC to topple these 
governments by popular demonstrations, removing not only them as obstacles of the 
transition, but also as possible allies of the government. 
On 7 September 1992 the ANC held a march on Bisho, the capital of Ciskei, with the 
aim of taking the city under siege until Oupa Gqozo, the homeland's leader, stepped 
down. Despite attempts by the Ciskei government to declare the march unlawful, a 
... compromise position was reached that the march could proceed, but only to a stadium 
outside of the city. The ANC, however, devised a strategy for the marchers to break 
through the perimeter and proceed to the city under the lead of Ronnie Kasrils, a former 
head of intelligence ofMK. When the attempted break was made, Ciskei defence force 
soldiers who were set up around the stadium opened fire and killed 29 marchers, leaving 
many injured. The event immediately sent shockwaves throughout the country and 
Kasrils was reprimanded afterwards by the ANC for his lack of judgement. Whereas 
international opinion was tipped in the ANC's favour prior to the event, its aftermath 
saw severe criticism on both the government and the ANC for its inability to end the 
violence, and a call was made for the resumption of negotiations. The ANC reacted by 
133 See Section 2.5. 
134 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 199211993, pp. 34- 36.; Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, 
p.217. 
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condensing their preconditions to three issues. These were the release of all outstanding 
political prisoners including Robert McBride and two other ANC members who had 
been convicted of terrorist murders, the fencing in of hostels to prevent violent attacks, 
and the banning of so-called cultural weapons. 135 
4.8.4. Final obstacles to an agreement 
The release of the three prisoners remained one of the last obstacles to agreement. On 
24 September 1992 Mandela telephoned De Klerk and informed him that the agreed 
summit would not take place if the prisoners were not released. De Klerk asked for time 
to consult with his advisors, but did reply in the time agreed. Mandela then demanded 
that the three prisoners had to be released before the summit. On 26 September 1992 the 
negotiators met for a last session on the proposed Record of Understanding with De 
Klerk and Mandela present. The meeting was held to reach final agreement on the 
ANC's preconditions. The three issues that remained outstanding were the demand by 
the ANC for the release of the three prisoners, the fencing in of hostels and the ANC's 
mass action campaign, of which the decision had been discussed above. Some heated 
exchanges took place specifically on the release of the political prisoners. According to 
Ramaphosa the event transpired as follows: 
"The Record of Understanding was especially a bad one because we were 
dealing with the release of political prisoners, the death row ones, and they 
wanted amnesty and Madiba wouldn't yield on this, he wouldn't. And De 
Klerk had said publicly in the negotiations before they had to meet in a 
small group that they would never release them and Madiba [Mandela] said 
you must never put forward a position of intransigence like saying never, 
when you know in the end you are going to have to give in, because when 
you do give in you will be humiliated and I am trying to save you from 
humiliation. You should never use that approach, listen to what we have to 
say, the reason we are putting forward [demands] and don't take positions 
that you would have to abandon, because it is not good for you and your 
135 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 199211993, pp. 29- 30.; Sisk, Democratization in South Africp, 
pp. 217- 220.; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, pp. 147- 152. The government was especially 
opposed to the release of McBride, who was convicted in 1986 for the planting of a car bomb in Dw'ban 
which killed three people and injmed 69 others. 
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party. And then he would go on long about he is concerned about ensuring 
that his [De Klerk's] support base is not eroded, he is concerned about 
ensuring that the National Party does not lose support and its strength and so 
forth. And the way to strengthen is to work with the ANC and the way to 
work with the ANC means to give in to the ANC's demands, because if they 
don't give in to our demands we are going to humiliate them and he will see 
to it that it happens and so forth. And I am saying in a general sense it is 
always rather sad to see De Klerk harangued by Madiba on a whole range of 
issues, but especially on violence. At times it would descend into personal 
attacks which of course you know, you read about publicly, but some were 
quite vicious as they were repeated in closed sessions."136 
176 
De Klerk yielded and on 28 September 1992 McBride, Mthetheleli Mncube, Mzondeleli 
Nondula and 160 other political prisoners including Barend Strijdom, who had gained 
notoriety as the "Wit Wolf', were released. 137 The meeting then turned to the issue of 
hostels and according to Mac Maharaj, the ANC delegates were told privately by 
government negotiators that the cabinet could not agree on the document which had 
been prepared on the issue. He states that when the hostels question arose formally, De 
Klerk, however, argued that he had not studied the document and therefore could not 
sign it. He argued that the agreement should proceed, leaving the hostels issue to be 
resolved afterwards. Mandela refused and stated that he would have to declare the 
meeting a failure. De Klerk requested time to consult, and the document was cleared 
later the afternoon. 138 
On the whole government negotiators do not refute the perceptions of the events as 
described above. A government negotiator admits that certain government positions 
were dropped on the hostels issue, but argues that the clause was agreed to solely to get 
negotiations back on track, as that was regarded of primary importance at the stage. The 
feeling was apparently also that the agreements would not really be put in place and that 
it only obstructed progress towards multiparty talks. It seems as if the ANC during this 
phase started to make use of a tactic where any outstanding agreements were referred to 
136 Ramaphosa, interview by Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. 
137 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 199211993, p. 421. 
138 Maharaj, interview by Waldmeir, 31 January 1995. 
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the two leaders, in the knowledge that Mandela had an ascendancy over De Klerk in 
bargaining situations. In view of the poor working relationship between them, it seems 
contradictory to the common proposition that good faith in bargaining is crucial to reach 
mutually acceptable agreements. 
4.8.5. Bargaining with history 
A deciding factor in the government's continued commitment to negotiation could have 
been the perception that their position weakened increasingly as the process dragged on, 
and that a deal had to be struck as early as possible, before the ANC's bargaining power 
and support levels increased. According to RoelfMeyer, the government negotiators: 
" ... experienced [it] very often that our case was not often too good, because 
we had to fight against the historic background, not only popular opinion, 
but also the correct thing to do ... we often also publicly found ourselves in a 
difficult situation ... [as] a number of situations were very difficult to 
overcome from a negotiating point ofview."139 
A government negotiator states that both the ANC and government recognised that the 
power equation would logically move from the government towards the ANC as the 
negotiation process progressed, as the fact that the process dealt with a transfer of power 
to the ANC could not be disputed. He argues that any strong stance by the government 
had to be made at the beginning of the process if they wanted to strengthen their 
positions in the long term. Another government source argues that it is easy to criticise 
the government in hindsight for not securing better deals, but it should be taken into 
account that the government was negotiating with an organisation that would 
undeniably secure a majority of votes in a general election and hence, form the new 
government. This recognition by government negotiators was present throughout the 
negotiation process and informed their strategies. 140 
139 Meyer, interview by Waldmeir, 10 February 1995. 
140 Anonymous, interview by author, 18 April1997. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
178 
4.9. The Record of Understanding 
On 26 September 1992 the Record of Understanding was signed, which signified the 
ANC's return to negotiations. Most observers were oblivious to the long hours of 
negotiation that went into its drafting and acceptance. The document itself noted that 
meetings had taken place between Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa since 21 August 
1992, when they were, in fact, initiated shortly after the ANC's suspension of 
negotiations. The Record Of Understanding included the following significant 
agreements: 
• There would be a democratic constitution assembly/constitution-making body which 
had to: 
o be democratically elected 
o draft and adopt a new constitution, implying that it should sit as a single chamber 
o be bound only by agreed constitutional principles 
o have a fixed time frame 
o have adequate deadlock breaking mechanisms 
o function democratically i.e. arrive at its decisions democratically with certain 
agreed to majorities 
o be elected within an agreed predetermined time period 
• During the interim/transitional period there would be constitutional continuity and 
so constitutional hiatus. In consideration of this principle, it was further agreed that: 
o the constitution-making body/constituent assembly would also act as the 
interim/transitional Parliament 
o there would be an interim/transitional government of national unity 
o the constitution-making body/constituent assembly cum interim/transitional 
Parliament and the interim/transitional government of national unity would 
function within a constitutional framework/transitional constitution which would 
provide for national and regional government during the period of transition and 
would incorporate guaranteed justiciable fundamental rights and freedoms 
o the interim/transitional Parliament could function as a one-or two-chambered body. 
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• All remaining political prisoners would be released. On the prisoners that no 
agreement existed discussions would take place to secure their release in stages 
• Some problematic hostels identified by the two groups would be fenced and policed 
to prevent criminality by hostel dwellers and to protect hostel dwellers against 
external aggression. 
• The public display and carrying of dangerous weapons would be prohibited, subject 
to exemptions based on guidelines prepared by the Goldstone Commission. 
• The right of all parties and organisations to participate in peaceful mass action in 
accordance with the provisions of the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone 
Commissions' recommendations were recognised.141 
4.10. The aftermath of the Record of Understanding 
Although the main concessions included in the Record of Understanding were made by 
the government, the ANC's commitment to a two-phase process, a government of 
national unity and constitutional guidelines to guide the writing of a new constitution, 
also contributed to the establishment of a contract zone between the parties. The Record 
of Understanding signified the possibility of a mutually agreed settlement emerging 
from good faith negotiations for the first time. Booysen regards the power gains made 
by the ANC in 1992, culminating in the Record of Understanding as a "levelling [of] 
the playing field of negotiating power."142 The perception of both parties that they were 
dealing with an equal negotiating partner led the way to the establishment of a new 
forum for substantive bargaining. 
The signing of the Record of Understanding did not yet signify the formal end of 
prenegotiation in the South African transition. It remained a bilateral agreement to mark 
the return of the ANC to negotiations and as such did not reflect the views of all parties; 
in fact, some issues between the government and the ANC also remained unresolved. 
The importance of the document lay in the acceptance by each of the two main parties 
of an attainable second best solution to the conflict, rather than an unattainable victory. 
141 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/record.html 
142 Booysen, S. "Changing relations of political power in South Africa's transition: The politics of 
conquering in conditions of stalemate," Politicon, vol. 19, no. 3, 1992, p. 72. 
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By negotiating inductively, the parties had agreed upon a formula which would guide 
the process through its final phase. Prenegotiation would only be concluded when the 
formula was made as inclusive and as detailed as possible. In this light, the primary 
effect of the Record of Understanding was a sufficient ~xistence of good faith to ensure 
a possible lasting agreement. The remaining issues were to be dealt with in the 
following months. 
4.10.1. Deciding on participants 
A major unintended consequence of the Record of Understanding was the reaction of 
the IFP, specifically Buthelezi, to the summit. Especially the agreements on hostels and 
dangerous weapons were perceived by them as unilateral attempts to weaken their 
bargaining position and ultimately to marginalise them from the negotiation process. 
The reaction was mostly aimed at the government, who in the past attempted to forge 
ties with the IFP on the issue of federalism and, as proved by Inkathagate, even supplied 
them with money for demonstration campaigns. The IFP therefore regarded the 
document as a malicious act by a possible alliance partner and broke off negotiations 
with the government. None of the government negotiators were expecting the IFP's 
reaction to be so heated, and the ensuing rift came as a surprise to them. F.W. de Klerk 
accedes that the government miscalculated on the issue oflnkatha. He states: 
"[With hindsight] I would have been more sensitive to the situation of Inkatha and now 
minister Buthelezi when we resumed. I underestimated the suspicion which there was. 
We felt that the September 1992 ... agreement was a reiteration of what had already been 
agreed, the constitutional part. And it was a reiteration and that therefore, we shouldn't 
have been accused of now making deals just on the bipartisan basis on the constitutional 
issues, because Inkatha supported at Codesa what was reiterated in the September 
record of agreement and I didn't expect the very negative reaction."143 
The issue of the IFP highlighted an obstacle which would remain unresolved throughout 
most of the negotiation process, namely that of participants. As has been noted, one of 
the functions of prenegotiation is to determine who the participants would be once 
substantive bargaining takes place. In the South African case the IFP' s tactics hindered 
143 De Klerk, interview by Waldmeir, 23 November 1994. 
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progress on this issue throughout the negotiation process, so much so that it remained 
unclear until the end whether they would be part of a final solution. The involvement of 
IFP supporters in many incidences of violence also impacted indirectly on the 
relationship between the government and the ANC, where the latter continuously 
accused the government of not adequately preventing incidences of violence. 
Another contentious issue was the announcement by Mandela after the Record of 
Understanding summit that the ANC and the government would in future first reach 
agreement bilaterally before tabling the issue in a multiparty forum. 144 On 6 October 
1992 Buthelezi along with Lucas Mangope ofBophuthatswana, Oupa Gqozo of Ciske~ 
the Afrikaner Freedom Foundation, the AV, CP and IFP formed the Concerned South 
Africans Group (Cosag). The participants called for the replacement of Codesa by a 
more representative forum, a halt to the implementation of the Record of Understanding 
and the disbanding ofMK before they would agree to negotiations. 145 
The heightening rejection of ANC-government bilateral agreements by other parties 
illustrated the irony of the behind-the-scenes trust building meetings between the two 
main parties. In order to establish good faith between them they inadvertently 
disillusioned smaller parties, leading these to claim bad faith. The outcome of the 
Record of Understanding was a period in which both the government and the ANC had 
to lure dissident parties back into the process, with varying degrees of success. This is a 
prime example of the difficulties involved when deciding on participants. As has been 
noted, if some parties are viewed to be obstructing an agreement a decision can be made 
to exclude them from the process. However, it is my view that in lnkatha's case such a 
move would have been detrimental to the process as they had access to quite a large 
constituency, one whose peaceful inclusion into the process was imperative. The issue 
remained unresolved until just before the general election in 1994, in a sense 
questioning the assumption that agreement over participants is of primary importance in 
prenegotiation. Yet, the difficulties their exclusion created for the South African 
negotiation process does prove that the resolution of conflict over participants is crucial, 
even if it takes place at a later stage. It is difficult to assess what the outcome of 
144 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, p. 220. 
145 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 199211993, p. 37. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
elections would have been without the IFP's participation, but the possibility of 
renewed conflict can not be ruled out. According to Joe Slovo the IFP was one of the 
main detractors of a speedy transition. He states: 
"The thing couldn't have been finished in six months, but it went on for four 
years. I think the basic reason it went on for four years is Inkatha. It could 
have been cut by halt: two years, two and a half years. I think they did 
greater damage to the negotiating process than Terreblanche."146 
Despite this view, which highlights the obstructionist role played by the IFP, it is clear 
that the chances for resolving any conflict situation are improved if the process is made 
as inclusive as possible. It could be that the IFP based their tactics on a similar 
assessment, taking the risk that the government and the ANC, in search of an inclusive 
settlement, would make significant concessions towards them if they held out long 
enough. If this was the case their strategy should not be regarded as spoiling, but rather 
as a shrewd pursuit of brinkmanship. I am of the view, however, that this was not the 
case. The IFP's main concern was their marginalisation from the process and their 
(sometimes emotional) reactions to government-ANC agreements belie any notions of 
shrewd manipulative bargaining. If they could, they would have spoilt the process, but 
they realised belatedly that this would put them in a far worse position after elections, 
hence, they decided to join. 
4.10.2. A Government of National Unity 
Although the ANC and the government had agreed in the Record of Understanding to 
an interim government of national unity during the transition, its composition was still 
unclear. The notion of a government of national unity was not a new proposal, as ANC 
negotiators had been advocating the idea since the start of negotiations. According to 
Willie Esterhuyse, Thabo Mbeki had proposed to him as early as 1989 that a coalition 
government, or government of national unity, be set up to ease the transfer of power 
once negotiations had been finalised. 147 Although not as explicit, Mandela also raised 
the issue of white fears to black domination in his 1989 memorandum to P.W. Botha. 
146 Slovo, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
147 Esterhuyse, interview by author, 1996. 
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He argued that any dialogue between the government would involve an attempt to 
reconcile the demands of blacks with the fears of whites. 148 According to Waldmeir, 
Mandela reiterated the sentiment in May 1991 that any new dispensation had to include 
adequate representation of all groups. 149 
Although it was not official ANC policy at the time, the notion again resurfaced during 
the preliminary bargaining events. Around the time of Codesa 2 the ANC negotiating 
commission had a series of bilateral meetings with the government, where the ANC 
made use of the opportunity to probe the government on its positions and strategies. At 
a follow-up meeting to one where the government only responded to questions by the 
ANC, the government delegation argued that they should also be granted the 
opportunity to ask questions on ANC positions. This was a deviation from the agenda, 
hence the ANC had not prepared positions beforehand. It was subsequently decided 
between Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa that the former would lead the discussions. 
Mbek~ after stressing that his arguments were not based on official policy, presented an 
overview ofthe rationale behind a government of national unity. 150 He recalls the event 
as follows: 
"[I] then raised this question about perhaps we might need to look at some 
sharing of power in one way or another for a certain period of time to assist 
in this process of transition and so on. Barend du Plessis said: 'Oh, you 
mean Sunset Clauses.' That is the first time the phrase itself was used ... So 
there was some discussion ... Of course when we came back as the ANC, 
people said Thabo made all these proposals which were indeed personal 
things and so on, but we need to probe these matters because they have now 
become part of this discussions and the brainstorming. So that's were the 
thing started."151 
According to Mohammed Valli Moosa, the ANC's negotiations commission held a 
series of in-depth discussions on the reasons for deadlock after the failure of Codesa 2. 
148 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/64-90/doc890705.html 
149 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 213-214. 
Iso Mbeki, interview by Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. 
!SI/bid 
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The discussions centred around the ANC's perceptions of why the government seemed 
slow-moving in agreeing to a settlement. According to him the commission came to the 
following conclusion: 
"The NP as a party was not going to enter into an agreement which meant 
that there was nothing in it for them, because they were not in the 
negotiations for ahruistic reasons, they were not philanthropists ... So we had 
a lot of discussions and a lot of debate and in out discussions the idea of 
sunset clauses began to gain currency and we had to accept from our side 
that a negotiated settlement entails compromises ... We then accepted all of 
that and the idea of sunset clauses was that there be some provisions which 
expire and initially we didn't know what these provisions could be ... But we 
retained that framework of interim government, constituent assembly and 
then the final constitution as such ... And it is true that both Mac and Thabo, 
in the negotiations commission, we did say just jot down something for 
discussion at the next meeting. And there we had for the first time begun to 
concretise the whole thing."152 
In October 1992 an article entitled ''Negotiation: A Strategic Perspective," written by 
Joe Slovo in his personal capacity, was published in the African Communist. In it Slovo 
argued for the implementation of a temporary period of powersharing in a government 
of national unity, which would ensure a forced ruling coalition until the end of the 
century. The decision to publish the proposals was made by Slovo himself: in order to 
extend the debate surrounding the proposals to the ANC's constituency. He argues: 
" .. .I jumped the gun because there were discussions along those 
lines ... [but] it was just sort of not taken seriously, just wasn't discussed in 
any depth. I then felt we had to break this in a dramatic way even though I 
was risking charges of indiscipline .. .lt was really shock therapy as far as I 
was concerned on this issue, because I felt we couldn't go on being unsure 
about the general direction."153 
152 Mohammed V alii Moosa, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 30 November 1994. 
153 Slovo, interview by Waldmeir, 1994. 
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The proposals immediately triggered heavy criticism among the ANC's constituency 
and leadership. V alii Moosa states that "[t]here was a very very strong reaction in the 
organisation to the paper, our structures were up in arms about it."154 In late November 
1992 the ANC NEC held a three day meeting to debate the proposals. Some members 
were still strongly opposed to the idea of sunset clauses and especially the first day 
produced emotional debates on the issue. A frrst draft to accept the proposals was voted 
down, and only after it had been backed by Mandela and redrawn did the majority of 
NEC members accept the decision. The reasoning behind the ANC's decision to accept 
a government of national unity for a fixed period is described by Thabo Mbeki as 
follows: 
"The notion of a government of national unity, it derives precisely from the 
understanding that we thought the army, the white police, the white 
business, the white civil service would say the National Party was their 
political representative; relatively few in numbers because of the 
demography of the country, but with a hold on very important levers of 
power, the economy, the civil service etc. Let's say we all thought that these 
sections of the population wielding the sort of power would say the National 
Party is our representative and therefore when we came into government, 
we came in with the numbers, they would come in with the power and you 
would need to work together for a certain period instead of saying to those 
power centres: 'You are the opposition. "'155 
The reworked document as accepted by the ANC NEC on 18 November 1992 signified 
another crucial turning point in the negotiation process. In it the ANC acknowledged 
that it did not have the capacity to overthrow the government in 1989 and that 
negotiations were adopted as a strategy because of a mutually hurting stalemate. It 
argued that the government still commanded vast military resources and the ANC did 
not, therefore three options were open to the ANC in their pursuance of a transfer of 
power: 
154 Valli Moosa, interview by Waldmeir, 30 November 1994. 
155 Mbeki, interview by Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. 
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• a resumption of the armed struggle, which the ANC discarded as non-viable 
• a protracted negotiation process, combined with mass action and international 
pressure until the balance of forces would be shifted to such an extent that the ANC 
could secure a negotiated surrender from the government 
• a swift negotiations process combined with mass action and international pressure 
which would take into account ''the need for national unity against counter-
revolutionary forces," and would make use phases to change the balance offorces156 
The NEC argued in the document that the third option would be the most successful in 
establishing the ANC's objectives and stated that ''negotiations therefore represents a 
victory for the democratic movement and a defeat for the forces of apartheid." They 
also stated that negotiations would be conducted both multilaterally and bilaterally, in 
accordance with the issues discussed To structure the process the ANC proposed the 
following phases: 
I. The period prior to the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council. (In 
which the aim would be to secure an agreement on free and fair elections, 
Interim Government and Constituent Assembly; stop unilateral restructuring; 
broaden the space for free political activity; and, address the issue of violence). 
II. The period from the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council leading 
up to the election of the Constituent Assembly and the establishment of an 
Interim Government of National Unity.(In which the aim would be to 
consolidate peace through joint control over all armed forces; ensure free and 
fair elections; and mobilise for a decisive victory in the elections.) 
Ill. The period of the drafting and adoption of the new constitution by the 
Constituent Assembly. (In which the aim would be to establish an Interim 
Government in which the ANC would be a major player; adopt a new 
democratic constitution; and start addressing the socio-economic problems 
facing the country). 
IV. The period of the phasing in of the new constitution, which will include the 
restructuring of the state machinery and the general dismantling of the system of 
apartheid. 
156 http://www .anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/perspect.html 
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V. The period of the consolidation of the process of democratic transformation and 
reconstruction. 157 
4.10.3. A timetable for the transition 
The government accepted the notion of sunset clauses and proceeded to forward their 
proposed timetable for such a transition. This stemmed from a commitment between the 
ANC and the government in the Record of Understanding to establish a timetable for a 
phased transition. The timetable was announced by F. W. de Klerk on 26 November 
1992. In it the government proposed the following deadlines: 
• End of February 1993 
The deadline for the establishment of bilateral discussions across a broad spectrum of 
political parties aimed at the resumption of negotiations, whether in a new forum or in a 
more representative and restructured Codesa 
• End of March 1993 
The deadline for the convening of such a multilateral negotiating forum 
• End of May 1993 
The deadline for multilateral agreements on a Transitional Constitution (including 
constitution-making procedures, constitutional principles and regional governments), a 
Transitional Executive Council and an Election Commission 
• May/June 1993 
The deadline for adoption of legislation for the Transitional Executive Council and 
Election Commission 
• June 1993 
The deadline for the institution of the Transitional Executive Council and Election 
Commission 
IS7 /bid 
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• End of September 1993 
The deadline for the enactment of a Transitional Constitution (also providing for a 
constitution-making body) 
• End of October 1993 
The deadline for the formulation and promulgation of election rules and regulations 
• March/ Apri11994 
The deadline for the levelling of the playing field; measures to ensure free political 
participation; the containment of violence; the inclusion of political parties; the 
organisation of party political campaigns; the finalisation of logistical preparations and 
voter information campaigns; the holding of elections158 
4.11. Finalising prenegotiation 
The agreements and proposals made public at the end of 1992 cemented the newly-
established contract zone between the government and the ANC. Both sides had realised 
that behind-the-scenes bilaterals were conducive to the reaching of agreements, and it 
was decided to continue with this method of bargaining. They conducted crucial 
bosberade in December 1992, from 20 January 1993 and on 10- 12 February 1993, at 
which detailed agreement was reached over the nature of the transition and the 
structures of a government of national unity. The agreements included the following: 
• An interim constitution and bill of rights would be drafted by a multiparty 
conference and enacted by the tricameral parliament 
• The transition would be overseen by a Transitional Executive Council 
• An independent electoral commission would oversee the election 
• A multiparty committee would be appointed to look at possible regions and their 
powers 
• Proportional representation would be the electoral system of choice 
158 http://www .anc.org:m/ancdocs/history/transition/timetable.html 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
• All parties who received more than five percent of the votes in the election would 
receive cabinet positions in accordance with their support 
• A single president would be elected by the constituent assembly 
• The constituent assembly would take decisions on a two thirds majority basis 
• All recommendations on regions arising from the appointed commission were 
binding unless blocked by a three quarter majority in the constituent assembly 
• The government of national unity would operate under a five year sunset clause 
• The next elections would be held within five years of the first one159 
Apart from bilaterals with the ANC, the government also engaged the IFP in secret 
meetings, in order to draw them into the process. It was unsuccessful though, and only 
after reassurances of strong regional powers during an ANC-IFP meeting did the latter 
agree to take part in a multiparty conference. In March 1993 preparatory meetings were 
held for a new multiparty forum and only the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (A WB), 
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and Azapo refused to take part. On the face of it the 
return to prenegotiation was successful, as the new forum boasted twenty three parties, 
increasing its inclusivity. On 1 April1993, after a number of preparatory meetings, the 
Muhi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) convened for its first session. This signified 
the official end of prenegotiation in the South African transition. The contract zone 
established between the government and the ANC would prove strong enough to steer 
the process through its final phase.160 
159 Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, pp. 223 - 224. 
160 For in-depth discussions of the last stage in the transitional negotiations, see Friedman and Atkinson 
( eds. ), South African Review 7; Sisk, Democratization in South Africa; Sparks, Tomo"ow is Another 
Country; and Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle. Its analysis falls outside the scope of this study. 
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CONCLUSION: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN CASE 
5.1. Introduction 
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The relatively peaceful transition of a deeply divided country such as South Africa from 
an autocratic system of government to a democracy, is arguably one of the most unique 
cases of conflict resolution in the world. In general, the epithets that have been used to 
describe the negotiated settlement hint at a convergence of larger-than-life personalities 
in an unexpected quest for a peaceful solution. In this study I argue that, despite 
individual characteristics, the South African negotiations conformed to a framework 
identified on different levels of interaction in various other cases of conflict resolution. 
This suggests that the success of a negotiation process can in part be determined by its 
adherence to preset rules of conduct. The focus of this study falls on the phased 
sequence of events regarded as conducive to settlement and it is argued that an analysis 
of these phases offers a crucial insight into the reasons for South Africa's success. The 
South African case also offers relevant insights for the resolution of conflict in other 
deeply divided societies. It is therefore important to identify the pivotal empirical 
factors in the process between 1985 and 1993, in order to offer them as possible 
recommendations for societies attempting to broker conflict. It is also necessary to 
reflect on prenegotiation theory and re-emphasize known factors which proved to be 
crucial in the South African transition. 
5.2. The mutual recognition of stalemate 
The evidence from the South African transitional negotiations confirms the notion of 
Zartman that a mutually hurting stalemate or impending catastrophe or both serve to 
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accelerate movement towards a mutual recognition of negotiation as a viable strategy. 1 
Zartman also notes that parties arrive at a decision to negotiate differently, separately 
and not concomitantly. The military, political and economic crises which surrounded 
apartheid all played primary roles in persuading agents within the government and the 
ANC to search for a solution along less antagonistic lines. What proved to be 
conclusive, however, was the mutual nature of such an acceptance. The absence of 
negotiation does not mean the absence of unilateral attempts to establish negotiation. In 
the South African case this was illustrated by the number of letters written by Nelson 
Mandela to the government while in prison, in which he argued for the peaceful 
resolution of conflict. Attempts such as these did not signify the start of prenegotiation 
and would remain ineffectual until a similar strategy was adopted by the government. 
The South African case also illustrates that once discussions start it does not necessarily 
imply a vision from parties to settle the causes of conflict. Talks can start with the sole 
purpose of addressing symptoms emanating from adversarial policies. In the case of 
Mandela the preliminary aim of discussions in 1985 was to resolve the issue of his 
continued imprisonment. Some sources have argued that Kobie Coetsee would not have 
continued with talks without the knowledge of P.W. Botha, a valid assumption when 
observing the hierarchical structure of authority during his leadership period. Yet, 
Botha's primary aim was to resolve the issue of Mandela's increasing international 
status. Hence, the main characteristic of a decision to negotiate is the mutual acceptance 
of contact between enemies, as both can still ascribe different purposes to negotiation 
itself. Once bargaining events take place parties attempt to persuade each other of the 
"real" aim of negotiations. This correlates with Zartman's assessment that the shift to a 
multilateral strategy can be one option among others, and parties have only to 
acknowledge the need for multilateral contact for the negotiation process to begin. 
5.3. Secrecy vs. audiences 
A salient characteristic throughout the South African transitional negotiations is the 
secrecy in which most of the bargaining was conducted. Although secrecy is prevalent 
1 See section 2.5 and section 3.4. 
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in most cases ofprenegotiation, it is not an obligatory precondition The reason for the 
frequency of behind-the-scenes talks during prenegotiation is the low-exit costs it 
warrants for a party if it decides to discontinue its pursuit of a multilateral strategy. It 
also creates room for parties to gauge their opponent's strategy without the interference 
of audiences and allows for the development of good faith between opposing sides as 
well as individual bargainers. In the South African context of the 1980s, it was 
imperative for both the ANC and the government to keep the process as secret as 
possible. This was not only to circumvent the almost certain opposition that would 
emanate from supporters of both groups, but also, and probably more importantly, 
because the full leaderships on both sides were not informed. 
5.3.1. Secret vs. confidential bargaining 
To acknowledge that secret bargaining took place from as early as 1985 is still a 
sensitive issue for most negotiators. Especially in the ANC, where a fair amount of 
emphasis is placed on the organisation's democratic tradition, the existence of secret 
meetings with the government during a period when cooperation was regarded akin to 
capitulation, is not readily admitted. A government official who was part of the 
committee that held talks with Mandela in prison, states that the latter emphasised that 
he was partaking in confidential bargaining, not secret bargaining. According to this 
perspective secret bargaining takes place when nobody, except those taking part, are 
aware of its existence, whereas confidential bargaining takes place with the knowledge 
of a constituency, yet the content of discussions are not divulged. 2 
On the face of it, the above distinction seems to be a question of semantics, especially in 
terms of the dictionary meanings ascribed to the two words. Although individuals 
within the ANC leadership received speculative reports that Mandela was talking with 
government officials, the movement at large only became aware of such contact by 
1988/89. The external contact between Mbeki and Esterhuyse's groups was also held in 
conditions of secrecy, in this case partly to prevent outside involvement. I am of opinion 
that the distinction, as offered, is inapplicable to the largest part of the bargaining about 
bargaining phase. The success 9f this phase hinged precisely on the building of trust 
among individuals without the intervention of outside forces. Confidential bargaining 
2 Anonymous, interview by author, 18 Apri11997. 
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implies a broad sanction, which these talks did not have. It is therefore regarded as an 
interpretation formulated to prevent renewed controversy among current supporters. 
Especially on the government side no such distinction can be applied. Events which 
lend themselves more to being described as confidential bargaining, are the meetings in 
the Channel between June 1992 and April 1993. These occurred with the implicit 
endorsement by supporters and the leaderships on both sides, yet they occurred behind 
closed doors. 
The question arises, however, is this a useful distinction to make when analysing 
prenegotiation? Would a process based on confidential bargaining be more successful 
than one based on secret bargaining? The argument put forward here is that secrecy is 
more conducive to the establishment of good faith, whereas confidentiality ensures 
earlier involvement of supporters in a negotiation process, lessening the extent of 
adverse reactions to formal bargaining once it is initiated. However, involvement of 
supporters during the bargaining about bargaining phase negates the idea of low exit 
costs, especially if their support is not a given. Hence, it is proposed that secrecy is 
maintained throughout the bargaining about bargaining phase, with confidential 
bargaining more suited in the preliminary bargaining phase. 
5.3.2. The use of intermediaries 
In an attempt to engage the ANC without becoming directly involved, the NIS task team 
decided to make use of intermediaries such as Willie Esterhuyse. This decision was 
based on an assessment of the conflict between l\11 and NIS and the dangers inherent in 
an uncovering of direct links with the ANC. The question that arises is whether the use 
of intermediaries was an effective strategy. According to a government strategist at the 
time the contact between intermediaries and the ANC was not as decisive to the process 
as the direct meetings with Mandela. This is because the external initiative was more 
tactical and exploratory and the intermediaries did not carry any responsibility in terms 
of the process. They merely served as a conduit for the bi-directional flow of 
information. 3 
3 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 Apri11997. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
194 
From their side the ANC-members were aware ofEsterhuyse's undertaking to Barnard, 
and Barnard's probable link with Botha. They regarded this information channel as an 
indirect avenue for discussions with the broader Afrikaner establishment, and proceeded 
in the belief that through their commwiications with among others, such as the Mells 
Park group, their messages would be conveyed to prominent figures in the civil service, 
police and military. According to Thabo Mbeki, in retrospect, this was based on an 
incorrect assessment of the Afrikaner establishment as one tight-woven hegemonic unit 
who supported the National Party and would be briefed by them. 4 
Although the intermediaries had no official sanction to make proposals on behalf of the 
government, they served the very important function of gaining and offering insights 
into the workings of both groups. The success of any strategy in prenegotiation depends 
on its ability to deepen the process and induce movement towards a next phase. In this 
sense the use of intermediaries functioned as a crucial dress rehearsal for future contacts 
between the ANC and NIS officials in particular. The establishment of good faith 
between Mbeki and Esterhuyse further altered perceptions on both sides regarding the 
intransigence of traditional enemies. A final function of these meetings, which stemmed 
as much from the composition of the two sides as the context in which discourse took 
place, was the discussions it produced on strategic issues. Official delegations might 
have been tempted to engage in trivial bartering, rather than assess the future of any 
mutual strategy. On the other hand, the functioning of the external group correlated to 
what Saunders terms "defming of the problem," in other words identifying causes to the 
conflict, proposing possible solutions and assessing the impact of these solutions.5 
Whereas in the committee meetings with Mandela neither side excluded the possibility 
of extracting concessions, the hypothetical issues discussed at the Mells Park meetings 
ensured a strategic angle to prenegotiation discussions. 
5.3.3. Involving audiences in the process 
Once a negotiation process is moved into the public sphere, parties have to decide 
whether to conduct all bargaining under public scrutiny or to present audiences only 
with finalised agreements. The main detractor of an all-out transparent approach is the 
4 Mbeki, interview by Wa1dmeir, 1995. 
5 See section 2.4.5. 
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pressure on negotiators to perform in the eyes of their supporters, hence decreasing the 
chances of concessions or mutual movement. Behind-the-scenes bargaining, on the 
other hand, offers negotiators respite from critical audiences and is generally conducive 
to reaching an agreement. 
If the latter option is preferred, communication channels between negotiating parties 
and their supporters have to be set up in order to keep the latter up to date and project 
the preferred image of the bargaining process. Good communication between 
negotiators and audiences is beneficial to all negotiating parties. If audiences are not 
informed and convinced of the need for concessions, they can become dissatisfied and 
protest against the need for a multilateral strategy. This can then impact on the 
bargaining process, forcing one party to take a tougher stance against its opponents and 
possibly creating deadlock. Effective channels of communication are especially relevant 
in deeply divided societies where groups still exhibit hostility towards each other. 
The above proposition was illustrated in the South African case by the ANC's 
suspension of negotiations in May 1992 and their subsequent call to mass action, 
forcing deadlock and a renewal of prenegotiation to get the process back on track. The 
event highlighted the increasing dissatisfaction with the negotiation process among 
ANC supporters. Ironically, although the suspension of negotiations impeded progress 
towards a settlement, it strengthened the ANC's bargaining power once formal 
bargaining was resumed. Hence, it is also possible that an effective channel of 
communication can be used as a bargaining mechanism, as a party can utilise its support 
base to demand concessions. 
The mutual dependence on good communication between negotiators and audiences is 
stressed by Thabo Mbeki, who argues that the main problem for the ANC during the 
transition was the rise in activism among supporters disillusioned by the strategy of 
negotiation. According to him this stemmed from a need among supporters to be 
regularly informed of developments, as they only perceived events from the outside. 
Mbeki states that whereas the ANC learned to respond to such demands, the 
government did not. He relates an event· where he had to address members of the 
University of Stellenbosch Business School during the negotiation process, but the 
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venue had to be moved due to the large number of people interested. According to 
Mbeki it turned out that most of those that attended were NP-supporters who were not 
informed on how bargaining was progressing and wanted to hear directly from him. He 
states the following: 
"We complained to them [the government] about this and said: 'but why are 
you not briefing your people, because this thing is going to land all of us in 
a lot of trouble. We come to agreements, your constituency is not there and 
then suddenly you have to retreat because of pressure from your 
constituency. "6 
Mbeki speculates that the reason the government did not brief their supporters was 
because they regarded the concessions they had to make too big, therefore opting for a 
strategy where they would present the audience with a fait accompli, hoping that a 
package deal would seem more balanced than the individual concessions and gains. 
Mbeki's argument corresponds with the events that lead to the 1992 white referendum. 
Although a general slide in government support had been detected since 1990, the 
government did not respond in a way designed to address the issue head on. The call for 
a referendum was triggered when specific events, such as the by-election defeats of the 
NP, reflected an undeniable lack of confidence in the government. After the latter 
received a mandate to continue with negotiation from the referendum result, they did 
not engage their audiences on that level again. 
A last example of the role of audiences is the spoiling effect that disgruntled IFP 
supporters had on the establishment of good faith between the government and the 
ANC. The IFP's involvement in numerous incidences of violence, which stemmed from 
their fear of exclusion, nearly derailed the process on more than one occasion. These 
incidents illustrate the responsibility of negotiating parties to all audiences. Zartman 
lists the summoning of support for multilateral strategies as one of the functions of 
prenegotiation and notes: " ... the construction of domestic support should not merely be 
the affair of each side. Each party has a role to play in the other's politics ... "7 Coupled 
6 Mbeki, interview by Wa1dmeir, 1995. 
7 Zartman, "Prenegotiation," pp. 10 - 11. 
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to the function of choosing participants, the role of audiences proved to be crucial to the 
overall success of the South African transition. 
5.3.4. Secrecy vs. mediation 
Willie Esterhuyse argues that secrecy played a large role in setting up the process in its 
initial stages. Without the interference of audiences or mediators, parties had more room 
to probe ahernatives and gauge opponents' reactions to sensitive proposals. Although 
the Mells Park meetings were chaired by Michael Young the most important 
discussions were held between Mbeki and Esterhuyse, creating a behind-the-scenes of 
the behind-the-scenes situation. This was because one of the first indirect agreements 
between the NIS working group and the ANC members entailed that no mediators or 
facilitators would be involved, a principle which was carried over to preliminary and 
substantive bargaining. 8 
A member of the Mandela-committee states that it was agreed upon at the first meeting 
with Mandela that no third parties would be involved in the discussions. He states that 
this principle was applied throughout the process and was probably the crucial 
determinant of success. Even while public bargaining took place at forums such as 
Codesa, confidential channels were operating to ensure continued movement towards a 
settlement. One important condition for the success of these channels, as identified by 
the source, is the existence of mutual trust between the negotiators involved and the 
party leader(s). He argues that an absence of this trust makes the convincing of 
audiences much more difficult, as negotiators are perceived as traitors when they don't 
have the backing of the leader once concessions are granted.9 
Despite the fact that most of the bargaining about bargaining took place with the 
express agreement among parties that outside facilitation would not be used, some 
recognition has to go to persons and organisations not directly involved with either of 
the two parties in setting up forums for discussion. Esterhuyse stresses the important 
role that the business community played in establishing contact between the ANC and 
high-profile Afrikaners, albeit that they did not play an active mediation role. As was 
8 Esterhuyse, interview by author, 1996. 
9 Anonymous, interview by author, 9 April1997. 
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mentioned, both the government via the NIS and the ANC sought to establish contact 
from the mid-1980's, yet could not risk sending public overtures for talks to their 
opponents. In the case of Mandela it was easy to maintain contact and limit damage in 
the event of an information leak, due to the explicit relationship between jailer and 
prisoner. The continued lobbying by political prisoners for rights and privileges also 
mandated continued contact between them and the government. A third party was, 
however, necessary to establish contact in the case of the ANC in exile. 
Third parties also played an important role in adjusting perceptions of the general public 
towards supposed enemies. This was proved by the series of pilgrimages that white 
South Africans undertook to meet with the ANC. Although the government regarded it 
as a hindrance to their own discussions, it played an undeniable role in setting a 
precedent for more formal contacts. What is disputed, however, is the role these groups 
have declared for themselves in retrospect. At no stage did any of the third party 
delegates receive an official mandate to engage the ANC in issues related to bargaining 
about bargaining. Furthermore, the one-off nature and size of delegations impeded the 
development of any significant 'bargaining' relationships. Although general goodwill 
was expressed between the ANC and visiting delegations, no good faith could be 
established due to the nature of these meetings as fact-finding exercises and not 
bargaining events. For the strategists stearing the government's negotiation program, no 
information was forthcoming from the pilgrimages that they had not already acquired 
through their own channels. This proves the proposition that the meetings with the ANC 
were mainly aimed at preparing audiences for negotiation and not at negotiation itself 
A main reason for the exclusion of third parties is what was perceived as the 
questionable motives of mediators. It became apparent that because of South Africa's 
high profile as a deeply divided society, many international organisations and officials 
offered their services to broker the conflict. Especially the South African government 
did not trust the motives of these actors and they regarded any overtures as attempts to 
gain diplomatic currency or force the government into accepting predetermined 
solutions. The EPG mission highlighted the fact that P.W. Botha usually reacted in 
defiance to external initiatives. For this reason the NIS group, as main strategists of 
talks from government side, regarded third party intervention as a nuisance, as it 
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complicated their approach to Botha. In view of the antagonism between MI and the 
NIS any publicly mediated summit would further have complicated the intense power 
struggle between the two structures. One of the primary reasons for the secrecy of the 
bargaining about bargaining phase was to prevent MI from blocking the process. 
As has been argued, the initial aim of talks for the NIS was not the facilitation of a 
transfer of power. The government and the ANC still held widely disparate viewpoints 
on the outcome of talks, with the government aware that they held a minority 
perspective in terms of the world view of apartheid. Therefore, the selection of a 
mutually acceptable mediator would probably not have been possible. Neither the 
government nor the ANC would have accepted any designate who was perceived to be 
sympathetic towards their opponent. 
Even throughout the preliminary bargaining phase international involvement was 
restricted to issues such as the monitoring of violence. No mediation was ever applied in 
breaking deadlocks between the government and the ANC. Perhaps this reflects why 
one of the outstanding issues of the transition remains the IFP's insistence that a deal 
was brokered to allow for international mediation in determining whether the powers of 
regions had been adequately addressed, a claim discarded by the ANC. 
In conclusion, the principle of secrecy was used to good effect in the South African 
transitional negotiations. According to Roelf Meyer the most important decisions during 
preliminary bargaining were taken in behind-the-scenes bilateral meetings where the 
secret nature of the meetings created the opportunity for parties to establish lasting good 
faith. He argues that a large part of the success of prenegotiation can be ascribed to the 
covert circumstances in which important discussions were held. 10 This view is held by 
most of the negotiators in the South African transition. By excluding external actors and 
audiences to a certain degree, it was ensured that negotiators could focus on bargaining 
itself, which in turn offered room for the above-mentioned establishment of good faith. 
This is an important lesson of the South African transitional negotiations. 
10 Meyer, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
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5.4. The non-linear dynamics of prenegotiation 
One of the problematic aspects of a phaseological approach to negotiation is the 
accurate delineation of phases. Even if phases are well-defmed the identification of 
empirical events that signify a changeover between them can be difficult. In the case of 
South Africa the formal changeovers occurred in tandem with notable events, yet all the 
changeovers did not represent a linear progression along the lines of a predetermined 
sequence. 
This study's analysis of the South African negotiations has shown that although the 
process proceeded through phases one, two and three in sequence, it became necessary 
to revert back to phase two in order to break the deadlock that had ensued. This about-
turn proved to be a decisive factor in the success of the process. By convening the talks 
away from audiences and addressing the causes of conflict between the parties, 
negotiators were able to establish common ground from which they could proceed with 
substantive bargaining. Most of the primary negotiators who were involved in the 
Channel from June 1992 stress the importance of the talks that led to the Record of 
Understanding in demonstrating good faith between them. 
It is argued here that an option to return to prenegotiation at any time 
during a bargaining process should be accepted as a crucial deadlock-
breaking mechanism in deeply divided societies. 
The South African transitional negotiations illustrated that opposing views on the causes 
and outcomes of conflict form the main obstacles to its resolution. Prenegotiation serves 
as the ideal platform to address these issues, necessitating two-way movement in 
bargaining in order to create solutions. 
The strategy of a reverse loop is not explicitly addressed as a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism in prenegotiation theory. Relevant sources usually focus on the phases 
themselves rather than the movement between them, mainly because the boundaries 
between phases are regarded as vague, conceptual constructs. Zartman and Berman do, 
in fact, argue that movement back and forth between the formula and detail phases is 
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not only possible, but indeed desirable, if formulas prove to be controversial or 
ineffective.11 Judging by the South African experience, it is somewhat strange, however, 
that reverse movement between phases have not been addressed in more detail. This 
study aims to contribute to the relevant literature by proposing the following guidelines: 
• Reverse circular movement between phases is not necessarily a one-off process. As 
a strategy it can be utilised whenever deadlock over fundamental issues arises. 
• A return to prenegotiation can be initiated bilaterally without the suspension of 
multilateral substantive bargaining. 
• Deadlock is not a compulsory precondition for reverse circular movement. Parties 
wishing to re-establish good faith or explore potential solutions without being bound 
to them can purposely revert to a prenegotiation forum. 
5.5. The effective prenegotiator 
According to Zartman and Berman, negotiators are made, not born. They argue that it 
can be taught and learned how to steer a negotiation process, yet they accept that 
individuals apply knowledge differently in terms of their personalities. 12 In this sense 
the South African transition provided a crash-course in bargaining for many would-be 
negotiators. Because of its exclusive nature, it can be argued that the success of 
prenegotiation hinged on the ability of individuals to cooperate in the search for a 
mutually agreed settlement. Factors concerning the personal make-up of negotiators will 
be subsequently analysed to determine how important the choice of personalities was to 
the process. 13 In the light of the findings it is relevant to reflect on the influence of 
individuals on the outcome of a negotiation process. Could external pressures have 
forced an eventual solution in the case of South Africa, irrespective of individual 
contributions, or do individuals themselves play the determining role in altering history? 
11 See Section 2.4.4. 
12 Zartman and Berman. The Practical Negotiator, p. 16. 
13 This is relevant only where negotiators were selected. In the initial stages of the process certain 
individuals became part of bargaining on their own volition and because of their personal appraisals of 
the situation. In these cases the emergence of trust was based on the luck of the draw. This emphasises the 
risk involved in prenegotiation, as a lack of personal "chemistry'' between negotiators can smother the 
process at its inception. 
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5.5.1. The recurring issue of trust 
It has been argued that the existence of mutual trust between negotiators is an important 
facet of any negotiation process. When analysing the South African transitional 
negotiations from a phase perspective, it becomes apparent that changeovers between 
phases also coincided with a change of personalities. Whereas certain individuals were 
involved in the process from start to finish, new negotiators were introduced along the 
way. The question that arises is what effect did this have on the building of trust 
between opposing groups as well as between individual negotiators? How important is 
continuity in terms of negotiators for a sequential bargaining process? 
• The Mandela initiative 
The composition of the working committee which steered talks with Nelson Mandela 
was significant in the sense that it did not reflect a purely political front. The exact 
reasons for the decision to exclude cabinet members is unknown. One possible 
explanation is offered by Kobie Coetsee, who argues that the inclusion ofNIS members 
was part of a strategy to enhance their intelligence building capacity. Judging by the 
initial reaction of P.W. Botha to Coetsee's initiative it is also possible that the 
discussions were deliberately kept secret to prevent embarrassment in. the event of an 
information leak. 14 Whichever way, by refraining from including politicians, a climate 
was created for the talks to become more strategically aimed. The inclusion of Mike 
Louw and Niel Barnard, however, initially inhibited the development of mutual trust 
between Mandela and the group, as he remained suspicious as to why the NIS would be 
part of such talks. Their inclusion partly informed his perception that the government 
was attempting to drive a wedge between him and the ANC in exile. This lingering 
suspicion would remain a stumbling block in the establishment of complete mutual trust 
between Mandela and his interlocutors, although the two sides learned to respect the 
positions put forward during discussions. 
14 Some sources argue that Coetsee blocked any attempts from cabinet members to meet with Mandela 
and acted as if the latter was his own personal prisOner. The possibility that contact was initiated as part 
of a personal career move on Coetsee's part can not be ruled out. In the absence of other cabinet members 
Coetsee would remain the senior member in the committee, ensuring that its co-ordination would depend 
on him. 
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• The external initiative 
The decision by the NIS think tank to make use of an intermediary in establishing 
contact with exiled ANC members in 1987 was couched in an analysis of the political 
context at the time. As the primary motive of such contact was to gather information on 
ANC positions without being directly linked to the initiative, the strategy proved to be 
effective. However, despite the ANC members' insistence that they had no official 
mandate to engage in talks, their delegation comprised of leading strategists in the 
organisation. This offered them the opportunity to coordinate any future developments 
with the same core group involved in the meetings.15 In retrospect the government 
strategy did not allow for this, as Esterhuyse had no responsibility towards the 
government, nor was he in a position to affect changes based on his assessment of the 
ANC. His relationship with Mbeki was crucial in establishing trust and a notion of good 
faith on an interpersonal level, but it could not influence the ANC's perception of the 
government in general. Hence, the existence of good faith was subject to the implicit 
recognition that the ANC would have to re-establish it once direct bargaining got 
underway. This was acknowledged by the NIS group at the end of the Mells Park 
meetings, and an offer was made to Esterhuyse to stay part of the process once it 
continued, which he declined. 
Although the prior existence of trust between specific role-players would have 
strengthened the process once it entered the preliminary bargaining phase, the opening 
up of the process in 1990 in any event introduced new participants on both sides who 
had no prior contact with their previous enemies. Hence, the covert nature of the 
bargaining about bargaining phase made it inevitable that establishment of good faith 
would have to be repeated. 
• The leadership dimension 
After an initial period where the established negotiators continued to uphold contact, the 
stage was cleared for the entrance of politicians from government side to enter the 
process. Administrators such as Fanie van der Merwe and Niel Barnard, who had been 
involved in the process for quite some time, were utilised in organisational and advisory 
capacities. This resulted in the process also becoming more political, as intra-party 
15 Interestingly enough, this did not happen. 
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jostling and "playing-to-the-public" became factors in the establishment of a bargaining 
relationship. From the ANC-side decisions had to be made on the positions of internal 
alliance partners in delegations. The inclusion of people such as Beyers Naude, an 
ostracized minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, in official delegations, signified an 
attempt by the ANC to project an image of a broad front acting as opponents to the 
government. Although Nelson Mandela asserted a leadership role on the ANC side, 
there most certainly must have been discussions among ANC-members to decide which 
negotiating wing should lead talks. 
The most visible pairing in the second phase took place between De K.lerk and Mandela. 
After the release of the latter in 1990 they embarked on a public show of trust, mutually 
affirming the integrity of the other. This public display of goodwill played an important 
part in conveying a message of compromise towards their respective supporters. It was, 
however, a risky strategy, as a deterioration in their relationship would also affect public 
perception of the feasibility of a negotiated settlement. A rift eventually occurred in 
December 1991 at Codesa 1, after which their relationship continued to ebb between 
conciliatory and adversarial. Due to both Mandela and De Klerk' s hands-on approach to 
negotiation, their failure to consolidate the interpersonal notion of good faith impacted 
directly on the bargaining process. Each time external events caused the rift to grow 
wider, they responded by taking stronger positions inside the forum of bargaining. In 
effect their inability to establish lasting trust increased the responsibility of negotiators 
to secure compromises. Thus, although the Mandela-De Klerk relationship was very 
important in altering perceptions of those outside the process, it was in many instances 
counter-productive to the general development of good faith between the government 
and theANC. 
In view of the above it is perhaps necessary to reflect on the effectiveness of a strategy 
where leaders become directly involved in bargaining. 
It is argued here that the primary role of leaders should be to extend an 
image of mutual accommodation between opposing groups to their 
respective audiences. 
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This does not imply their exclusion from a bargaining process. It limits their 
involvement to the provision of leadership, i.e. ratifying agreements and breaking 
deadlock, thereby providing room for them to become involved in the external building-
up of support for a multilateral strategy. Constant bickering between leaders negates the 
principles of negotiation they are supposed to maintain. 
According to Douglas an effect associated with the second phase of bargaining is the 
increase in autonomy granted to individual negotiators. This implies increased reliance 
on their ability to make decisions and a decrease in directives from above.16 In the 
South African case the opposite was true. The changeover to preliminary bargaining 
signified an expanding involvement of leaders in day-to-day bargaining. This could 
have been partly due to a power struggle between De Klerk and Mandela, in which each 
aimed to assert the role of primary role-player during the transition. Yet, the 
unconcealed hostility which apparently surfaced between them in one-on-one meetings 
worked against the establishment of good faith and complicated the task of negotiators. 
Having a bargaining contest at the top level of leadership can furthermore be 
detrimental to the party with the weaker leader, as no control mechanism is in place to 
counter unnecessary concessions. 
It is argued here that, since the issue of leaders-as-negotiators is not explicitly addressed 
in prenegotiation literature, the South African experience can offer relevant insights in 
this regard to prenegotiation theorists and similar deeply divided societies. It will, 
however, be mostly relevant to societies hallmarked by conflict on an intergroup level 
within the boundaries of one country. If the leaders of the main negotiating groups in 
these societies ultimately vie for the top position in a new dispensation, as was the case 
in South Africa, the competition that emanates from this can entice them to adopt 
strategies aimed solely at discrediting their opposition. It can also pressure them to try 
and weaken the support base of the opposition through unscrupulous means. The bottom 
line is that an absence of good faith between opposing leaders, who also function as 
primary negotiators, can cause much more damage to a negotiation process than bad 
faith between subordinate negotiators, who can be replaced more easily. 
16 See section 2.4.1. 
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In the face of the deteriorating relationship between Mandela and De Klerk, the setting 
up of a bargaining channel between Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa proved to be the 
decisive step in ensuring success during the post-1990 negotiation period. Based on 
accounts given by the two negotiators, it can be argued that their bargaining relationship 
provided a textbook example of a "successful" relationship. Not only was it based on 
mutual trust and good faith, but it was developed over time, out of the view of 
audiences and kept on a professional basis. 
Although these are all applicable lessons, what cannot be learned from the South 
African case is how to initiate a pairing of two compatible negotiators. The convergence 
of Ramaphosa and Meyer as the chief negotiators were subject to external factors, 
distinct for each side. Ramaphosa was selected for the role on the basis of his successful 
background in industrial bargaining. He was in all likelihood perceived by the ANC to 
be the best choice if they wanted to ensure maximum concessions. Meyer, on the other 
hand, was elevated first to the position of minister of constitutional development after 
the departure of Gerrit Viljoen in 1992. Based on the position of Viljoen as primary 
negotiator, Meyer was awarded the role due to his appointment, but only after an 
internal leadership battle with Tertius Delport, then deputy minister of constitutional 
development, for the ministerial post. Hence his appointment was ultimately based on 
the inherited status of his new position.17 
Although both Meyer and Ramaphosa had previously worked together in the build-up to 
Codesa, it had been in larger working groups, which did not provide the ideal setting for 
an establishment of mutual trust. This could only take place once they were appointed to 
seek a solution to the deadlock in May 1992. Hence, the pairing of the two negotiators 
who's bargaining relationship would become crucial for the success of the process, was 
similar to the situation of Esterhuyse and Mbeki, determined by the luck of the draw. 
17 This position is adopted here because no evidence has been forthcoming that Meyer was deliberately 
appointed to act as direct opposition to Ramaphosa. 
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Although it does not fall within the scope of this study, it can be speculated whether 
different personalities would have produced a similar outcome. 
The difficulty of determining beforehand which negotiators would be mutually 
compatible is further illustrated by the case of two advisors in the Channel, Mac 
Maharaj and Fanie van der Merwe. The two of them also developed a successful 
bargaining relationship, but their circumstances differed from that of Meyer and 
Ramaphosa. In their case they had a background of cooperation which started with their 
involvement in the Secretariat of Codesa. Based on the efficient working relationship 
they established there, they were continuously assigned to the same structures 
afterwards, which provided them with the opportunity to develop their good faith 
bargaining relationship. 
The above examples show one area of prenegotiation which could have been better 
managed had the same persons who established good faith in bargaining about 
bargaining been deployed in preliminary bargaining and substantive bargaining. The 
circumstances determined, however, that new pairings were introduced as late as June 
1992. This was one of the main reasons why it became necessary to revert back to 
prenegotiation between June 1992 and April1993. The establishment of good faith was 
determined to a large degree by the bargaining environment and the personalities 
involved and only after the return to prenegotiation were the negotiators on a footing 
conducive to substantive bargaining. Even though it may be unsettling, it should also 
not be forgotten that luck played a large part in coordinating the process up to the point 
of the MPNP in 1993, especially with regards to the choice of negotiators. 
5.5.2. Learning how to bargain 
Most studies focussing on the dimensions of prenegotiation have done so from either an 
international or an individual level of analysis. In the types of conflict that are to be 
found on these levels, those who attempt to resolve it are usually experienced 
negotiators, be they diplomats, mediators or labour consultants. The implicit assumption 
in such cases is that these negotiators have extensive knowledge of the theories relating 
to their field, as well as of common tactics utilised in bargaining. 
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In the case of South Africa, however, a minority of the participants in negotiation had 
any prior experience of hard bargaining. The decision not to make use of mediation 
made it necessary for negotiators to acquire skills as the process developed and it also 
made them responsible for the steering of the process. 
It is argued here that, because of its informal nature, prenegotiation served 
as an ideal platform for negotiators to gain experience in bargaining 
without being bound to its outcome. 
This dimension of prenegotiation is an important addition to the existing theory. 
Another factor which limited the range of possible negotiators for the bargaining about 
bargaining phase was the conditions of secrecy under which contact was established in 
Europe. The NIS working group could not initiate direct talks with the ANC in fear of 
an information leak, hence they had to make use of intermediaries through already 
established links. The planned meetings between Willie Esterhuyse and the ANC served 
as a timely opportunity for them to set up a communication channel. This implied, 
however, that they had to make use of Esterhuyse and also brief him. The ANC from 
their side recognised the need to engage Afrikaners in talks, but did not yet envision 
contact with the government. Esterhuyse's acceptance to act as a conduit between the 
two parties presented the ANC with an unexpected channel of contact. Yet, they also 
had to accept the intermediary along with the contact. Neither of the parties had the 
luxury to choose their intermediaries. The ANC faced a similar situation in compiling 
their delegation to meet with Esterhuyse's group. Due to the presence of a strong anti-
negotiation sentiment within the ANC they had to choose participants from the few who 
supported talks, again not being able to exercise free choice. Even though the respective 
leaders on both sides knew about the contact they could not become directly involved, 
in case their involvement became public. 
It is therefore evident that, especially in the first phase, parties may have 
limited options in choosing negotiators due to the secrecy of the process. 
A corollary would be that if negotiation is discreetly initiated by a faction within a 
larger group, the negotiators will out of necessity come from the faction itself. This may 
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result in the selection of inexperienced individuals as negotiators, underlying the need 
for prenegotiation to be regarded as a training ground for future bargainers. A dilemma 
can occur when bargaining about bargaining is finalised but no official movement has 
taken place in •he parties' positions outside the bargaining forum, preventing a 
changeover to the next phase. In the South African case the NIS had to force change at 
the end of 1989 by exploiting De Klerk's inexperience in his new position as president 
in order to establish direct contact with the ANC. This was necessitated by the joint 
movement which occurred in both the external meetings with the ANC and the internal 
talks held with Mandela in prison. At that stage the NIS working group had exhausted 
their intelligence gathering exercise and needed to proceed with direct talks. 
5.6. The recommendations: a summary 
In view of the above discussions, a few key lessons on the conduct of prenegotiation 
can be extracted from the South African transitional negotiations. It is my opinion that 
the recommendations based on these lessons are generalisable to a broader set of deeply 
divided societies. While some of them are based on existing assumptions of 
prenegotiation theory, others became apparent in the analysis of the South African 
process. They are: 
• The acceptance of negotiation as a viable response to conflict is dependent on a 
mutual perception of stalemate among parties 
• The principle of secrecy/confidentiality is conducive to the success ofprenegotiation 
• A decision to negotiate under conditions of secrecy does not preclude the 
involvement of audiences. Communication channels can be set up to inform 
audi~nces of agreements after they have been reached. 
• The establishment of good faith and mutual trust between negotiators are the two 
most crucial determinants of the success ofprenegotiation 
• The exclusion of third parties can be conducive to the establishment of good faith 
and mutual trust between negotiators 
• Prenegotiation is not a one-off process. The success of negotiation as a whole is 
determined by parties' ability to revert to prenegotiation in the event of deadlock 
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• Party leaders should not also be chief negotiators 
• The establishment of good faith between negotiators is partly determined by the 
compatibility of their personalities 
• No formula exists that can determine beforehand which negotiators would be the 
most compatible 
• Prenegotiation can serve as a training ground for inexperienced negotiators 
• The successful completion of prenegotiation is imperative for the success of 
negotiation as a whole 
• The use of intermediaries is an effective strategy to set up channels of information 
between opposing parties who do not want to risk direct contact 
5.7. Conclusion 
This study has provided a phaseological analysis of the South African transitional 
negotiations. By identifying three phases on the basis of their functions, namely 
bargaining about bargaining, preliminary bargaining and substantive bargaining, it has 
been argued that the successful completion of the first two phases in terms of their 
objectives is crucial to the success of a negotiation process as a whole. 
In the South African case a number of crucial events had to take place in order to ensure 
the success of prenegotiation. Two of the most important factors proved to be the bi-
directional movement between bargaining phases and the establishment of good faith 
between negotiators. These are also the two most generalisable lessons learnt from the 
South African experience. Although South Africa has much more to offer in terms of 
experience when it comes to the study and pursuit of prenegotiation, any scholar or 
negotiator should be wary to supplant the model as is onto another deeply divided 
society, without a prior understanding of the societies specific attributes. Prenegotiation 
the South African way is not the only way to resolve conflict in a deeply divided 
society. It is merely one successful example of modem-day conflict resolution. 
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Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the 
* Question of South Africa; Harare, Zimbabwe: August 21, 1989. 
I. Preamble 
I. The people of Africa, singly, collectively and acting through the OAU, are engaged in 
serious efforts to establish peace throughout the continent by ending all conflicts 
through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all. 
2. We reaffirm our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial, racial and 
apartheid domination exists, there can neither be peace nor justice. 
3. Accordingly, we reiterate that while the apartheid system in South Africa persists, the 
peoples of our continent as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of 
justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental 
to the stability and development of Africa. 
4. With regard to the region of Southern Africa, the entire continent is vitally interested 
that the processes, in which it is involved, leading to the complete and genuine 
independence ofNamibia, as well as peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed 
in the shortest possible time. Equally, Africa is deeply concerned that the destabilisation 
by South Africa of all the countries of the region, whether through direct aggression, 
sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion and other means, should end 
immediately. 
5. We recognise the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can 
only be achieved when the system of apartheid in South Africa has been liquidated and 
South Africa transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country. We 
therefore reiterate that all the necessary measures should be adopted now, to bring a 
speedy end to the apartheid system, in the interest of all the people of Southern Africa, 
our continent and the world at large. 
6. We believe that, as a result of the liberation struggle and international pressure 
against apartheid, as well as global efforts to liquidate regional conflicts, possibilities 
exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of 
South Africa. For these possibilities to lead to fundamental change in South Africa, the 
Pretoria regime must abandon its abhorrent concepts and practices of racial domination 
and its record of failure to honour agreements all of Which have already resulted in the 
loss of lives and the destruction of much property in the countries of Southern Africa. 
• http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/harare.htm1 
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7. We reaffirm our recognition of the rights of all peoples, including those of South 
Africa, to determine their own destiny, and to work out for themselves the institutions 
and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work 
together to build a harmonious society. The Organisation of African Unity remains 
committed to do everything possible and necessary, to assist the people of South Africa, 
in such ways as the representatives of the oppressed may determine, to achieve this 
objective. We are certain that, arising from this duty to help end the criminal apartheid 
system, the rest of the world community is ready to extend similar assistance to the 
people of South Africa. 
8. We make these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have 
equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed. We 
believe that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own 
government, as equal members of society. No individual or group of individuals has any 
rights to govern others without their consent. The apartheid system violates all these 
fundamental and universal principles. Correctly characterised as a crime against 
humanity, it is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in South Africa, 
resulting in untold loss of life, destruction of property and massive displacement of 
innocent men, women and children. This scourge and affront to humanity must be 
fought and eradicated in its totality. 
9. We have therefore supported and continue to support all those in South Africa who 
pursue this noble objective through political, armed and other forms of struggle. We 
believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interest of all humanity. 
10. While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic 
society in South Africa, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have 
repeatedly expressed our preference tor a solution arrived at by peaceful means. We 
know that the majority of the people of South Africa and their liberation movement, 
who have been compelled to take up arms, have also upheld this position for many 
decades and continue to do so. 
11. The positions contained in this Declaration are consistent with and are a 
continuation of those elaborated in the Lusaka Manifesto, two decades ago. They take 
into account the changes that have taken place in South Africa since that Manifesto was 
adopted by the OAU and the rest of the international community. They constitute a new 
challenge to the Pretoria regime to join in the noble effort to end the apartheid system, 
an objective to which the OAU has been committed from its birth. 
12. Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to help intensify the 
liberation struggle and international pressure against the system of apartheid until this 
system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united democratic and non-racial 
country, with justice and security for all its citizens. 
13. In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding to the wishes of the 
representatives of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publically pledge 
ourselves to the positions contained hereunder. We are convinced that their 
implementation will lead to the speedy end of the apartheid system and therefore the 
opening of a new dawn of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in which racism, colonial 
domination and white minority rule on our continent would be abolished for ever. 
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11. Statement of Principles 
14. We believe that a conjuncture of circumst~nces exists which, if there is a 
demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations 
genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through 
negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing 
preference of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement. 
15. We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their overall 
struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the 
measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We 
support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these 
objectives and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims 
of the negotiations. 
16. We are at one with them that the outcome of such a process should be a new 
constitutional order based on the following principles, among others: 
16.1. South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non- racial state. 
16.2. All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, 
regardless of race, colour, sex or creed. 
16.3. All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and 
administration of the country on the basis of a universal suffrage, exercised through 
one person one vote, under a common voters roll. 
16.4. All people have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, 
provided that this is not in the furtherance of racism. 
16.5. All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil 
liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights. 
16.6. South Africa shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of 
all before the law. 
16.7. South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary. 
16.8. There shall be created an economic order which shall promote and advance the 
well-being of all South Africans. 
16.9. A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights and sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and 
mutually beneficial co-operation with all people. 
17. We believe that the agreement on the principles shall continue the foundation for an 
internationally acceptable solution which shall enable South Africa to take its rightful 
place as an equal partner among the African and world community of nations. 
Ill. Climate for Negotiations 
18. Together with the rest of the world, we believe that it is essential, before any 
negotiations take place, that the necessary climate for negotiations be created. The 
apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond positively to this universally 
acclaimed demand and thus create this climate. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
19. Accordingly, the present regime should, at the very least: 
19.1. Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from 
imposing any restrictions on them. 
19.2. Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and 
people. 
19.3. Remove all troops from the townships. 
19.4. End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including, 
the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity. 
19.5. Cease all political executions. 
20. These measures are necessary to produce the conditions in which free discussion can 
take place - an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the 
process of remaking their country. The measures listed above should therefore precede 
negotiations. 
IV. Guidelines to the process of negotiation 
21. We support the view of the South African liberation movement that upon the 
creation of this climate, the process of negotiations should commence along the 
following lines: 
21.1. Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South 
African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a 
mutually binding cease fire. 
21.2. Negotiations should then proceed to establish the basis for the adoption of a 
new Constitution by agreeing on among, others, the Principles enunciated above. 
21.3. Having agreed on these Principles, the parties should then negotiate the 
necessary mechanism for drawing up the new Constitution. 
21.4. The parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international 
community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order. 
21.5. The parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise 
the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and 
administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order including 
the holding of the elections. 
21.6.After the adoption of the new Constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed 
to have formally terminated. 
21.7. For its part, the international community would lift the sanctions that have been 
imposed against apartheid South Africa. 
22. The new South Africa shall qualify for the membership of the Organisation of 
African Unity. 
V. Programme of Action 
23. In pursuance of the objectives stated in this document, Organisation of African 
Unity hereby commits itself to: 
23.1. Inform governments and inter-governmental organisations throughout the 
world, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations General Assembly, 
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the Security Council, the Commonwealth and others of these perspectives, and solicit 
their support. 
23.2. Mandate the OAU ad-hoc committee on Southern Africa, acting as the 
representative of the OAU, assisted by the Frontline States, to remain seized of the 
issue of a political resolution to the Somh Africa question. 
23.3. Step up all-round support for the South African liberation movement and 
campaign in the rest of the world in pursuance of this objective. 
23.4. Intensify the campaign for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against 
apartheid South Africa; in this regard, immediately mobilise against the re-
scheduling of Pretoria's foreign debts; work for the imposition of a mandatory oil 
embargo and the full observance by all countries of the arms embargo. 
23.5. Ensure that the African continent does not relax existing measures for the total 
isolation of apartheid South Africa. 
23.6.Continue to monitor the situation in Namibia and extend all necessary support 
to SWAPO in its struggle for a genuinely independent Namibia. 
0 
23.7. Extend such assistance as the Governments of Angola and Mozambique may 
request in order to secure peace for their people. 
23.8. Render all possible assistance to the Frontline States to enable them to 
withstand Pretoria's campaign of aggression and destabilisation and enable them to 
continue to give their all-round support to the people of Namibia and South Africa. 
24. We appeal to all people of goodwill throughout the world to support this Programme 
of Action as a necessary measure to secure the earliest liquidation of the apartheid 
system and the transformation of South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial 
country. 
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ADDENDUMB 
THE GROOTE SCHUUR MINUTE 
The Groote Schuur Minute* 
The government and the African National Congress agree on a common commitment 
towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from 
whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of 
negotiations. 
Flowing from this commitment, the following was agreed upon: 
I. The establishment of a working group to make recommendations on a definition of 
political offences in the South African situation; to discuss, in this regard, time scales; 
and to advise on norms and mechanisms for dealing with the release of political 
prisoners and the granting of immunity in respect of political offences to those inside 
and outside South Africa. All persons who may be affected will be considered. The 
working group will bear in mind experiences in Namibia and elsewhere. The working 
group will aim to complete its work before 21st May 1990. It is understood that the 
South African government, in its discretion, may consider other political parties and 
movement and other relevant bodies. The proceedings of the working group will be 
confidential. In the meantime the following offences will receive attention immediately: 
a. The leaving of the country without a valid travel document. 
b. Any offences related merely to organisations which were previously prohibited. 
2. In addition to the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 1, temporary immunity from 
prosecution of political offences committed before today, will be considered on an 
urgent basis for members of the National Executive Committee and selected other 
members of the ANC from outside the country, to enable them to return and help with 
the establishment and management of political activities, to assist in bringing violence 
to an end and to take part in peaceful political negotiations. 
3. The government undertakes to review existing security legislation to bring it into line 
with the new dynamic situation developing in South Africa in order to ensure normal 
and free political activities. 
4. The government reiterates its commitment to work towards the lifting of the state of 
emergency. In this context, the ANC will exert itself to fulfill the objectives contained 
in the preamble. 
5. Efficient channels of communication between the government and the ANC will be 
established in order to curb violence and intimidation from whatever quarter effectively. 
The government and the ANC agree that the objectives contained in this minute should 
be achieved as early as possible. 
Cape Town, 
4th May 1990 
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ADDENDUMC 
THE PRETORIA MINUTE 
Pretoria Minute* 
The government and the ANC have held discussions at the Presidency, Pretoria, today 6 
August 1990. 
1. The Government and the ANC have again committed themselves to the Groote 
Schuur Minute. 
2. The final report of the Working Group on political offences dated 21 May 1990, as 
amended, was accepted by both parties. The guidelines to be formulated in terms of the 
Report will be applied in dealing with members of all organisations, groupings or 
institutions, governmental or otherwise, who committed offences on the assumption that 
a particular cause was being served or opposed. The meeting has instructed the Working 
Group to draw up a plan for the release of ANC-related prisoners and the granting of 
indemnity to people in a phased manner and to report before the end of August. The 
following target dates have in the meantime been agreed upon: 
• The body or bodies referred to in paragraph 8.2 of the Report of the Working Group 
will be constituted by 31 August 1990. 
• The further release of prisoners which can be dealt with administratively will start 
on 1 September 1990. 
• Indemnity which can be dealt with in categories of persons and not on an individual 
basis will be granted as from 1 October 1990. This process will be completed not 
later than the end of 1990. 
• In all cases where the body or bodies to be constituted according to paragraph 8.2 of 
the Report of the Working Group will have to consider cases on an individual basis, 
the process will be expedited as much as possible. It is hoped that this process will 
be completed within six months, but the latest date envisaged for the completion of 
the total task in terms of the Report of the Working Group is not later than 30 
April1991. 
This programme will be implemented on the basis of the Report of the Working Group. 
3. In the interest of moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful 
political settlement and in the context of the agreements reached, the ANC announced 
that it was now suspending all armed actions with immediate effect. As a result of this, 
no further armed actions and related activities by the ANC and its military wing 
Umkhonto we Sizwe will take place. It was agreed that a working group will be 
established to resolve all outstanding questions arising out of this decision to report by 
15 September 1990. both sides once more committed themselves to do everything in 
their power to bring about a peaceful solution as quickly as possible. 
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4. Both delegations expressed serious concern about the general level of violence, 
intimidation and unrest in the country, especially in Natal. They agreed that in the 
context of the common search for peace and stability, it was vital that understanding 
should grow among all sections of the South African population that problems can and 
should be solved through negotiations. Both parties committed themselves to undertake 
steps and measures to promote and expedite the normalisation of the situation in line 
with the spirit of mutual trust obtaining among the leaders involved. 
5. With due cognizance of the interest, role and involvement of other parties the 
delegations consider it necessary that whatever additional mechanisms o 
communication are needed should be developed at local, regional and national levels. 
This should enable public grievances to be addressed peacefully and in good time, 
avoiding conflict. 
6. The Government has undertaken to consider the lifting of the State of Emergency in 
Natal as early as possible in the light of positive consequences that should result from 
this accord. 
7. In view of the new circumstances now emerging there will be an ongoing review of 
security legislation. The Government will give immediate consideration to repealing all 
provisions of the Internal Security Act that-
a. refer to communism or the furthering thereof; 
b. provide for a consolidated list; 
c. provide for a prohibition on the publication of statements or writings of certain 
persons; and 
d. provide for an amount to be deposited before a newspaper may be registered. 
The Government will continue reviewing security legislation and it application in order 
to ensure free political activity and with the view to introducing amending legislation at 
the next session of Parliament. The Minister of justice will issue a statement in this 
regard, inter alia calling for comments and proposals. 
8. We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone on 
the road to true peace and prosperity for our country. In this we do not pretend to be the 
only parties involved in the process of shaping the new South Africa. We know there 
are other parties committed to peaceful progress. All of us can henceforth walk that road 
in consultation and co-operation with each other. We call upon all those who have not 
yet committed themselves to peaceful negotiations to do so now. 
9. Against this background, the way is now open to proceed towards negotiations on a 
new constitution. Exploratory talks in this regard will be held before the next meeting 
which will be held soon. 
PRETORIA 
6 August 1990 
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ADDENDUMD 
THE D.F. MALAN ACCORD 
DF Malan Accord: Report of the Working Froup under Paragraph 
Three of the Pretoria Minute 
I. The Working Group was established under paragraph 3 of the Pretoria Minute, which 
reads as follows: 
"In the interest of moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful political 
settlement and in the context of the agreements reached, the ANC announced that it was 
now suspending all armed actions with immediate effect. As a result of this, nor further 
armed actions and related activities by the ANC and its military wing, Urnkhonto 
weSizwe will take place. It was agreed that a Working Group will be established to 
resolve all outstanding questions arising out of this decision to report by 15 September 
1990. Both sides once more committed themselves to do everything in their power to 
bring about a peaceful solution as quickly as possible." 
2. Having decided that it would not have been possible to submit a final report by the 
15th September 1990, an interim report was brought out on 13 September 1990. 
3. Since then a number of ~eetings have taken place. This report was finalised at a 
meeting on the 12th of February 1991. 
4. With reference to the work "suspending" as used in paragraph 3 of the Pretoria 
minute, the Working Group what was said in paragraph 4 of its Interim Report, namely 
that suspension occurred as a step in the process of finding peaceful solutions, with the 
presumption that the process would lead to the situation where there would be no return 
to armed action. 
5. (a) Under the terms of suspension of "armed action" and "related activities" by the 
ANC, with specific reference also to Urnkhonto weSizwe and its organised military 
groups and armed cadres, it was agreed that the following will not take place: 
1. Attacks by means of armaments, firearms, explosive or incendiary devices. 
n. Infiltration of men and material 
m. Creation of underground structures 
1v. Statements inciting violence 
v. Threats of armed action 
Vl. Training inside South Africa 
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(b) The Working Group: 
1. agreed that the democratic process implies and obliges all political parties and 
movements to participate in this process peacefully and without resort to the use 
of force; 
11. therefore accepted the principle that in a democratic society no political party or 
movement should have a private army; 
m. noted that the ANC had, in good faith and as a contribution to the process of 
arriving at a peaceful settlement announced the suspension all armed actions and 
related activities, with the presumption that the process would lead to the situation 
where there would be no return to armed action; 
1v. noted that by virtue of the fact that Urnkhonto weSizwe is no longer an unlawful 
organisation, membership thereof is not in violation of any of the provisions of 
paragraph 3 of the Pretoria Minute and the letter and spirit of the Pretoria Minute 
as a whole; 
v. noted the historical fact that the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe had placed arms · 
and cadres within the country; 
VI. agreed that in the context of paragraph 5(b) (ii) , (iii) and (iv) above, it was vital 
that control over such cadres and arms be exercised to ensure that no armed 
actions or related activities occur; 
vn. further agreed that in the context of paragraph 59b(ii), (iii) and (iv) above, a 
phased process be initiated in order to enable these cadres of the ANC to resume 
their normal lives and also facilitate and legalise control over the arms and the 
process to ensure such legality will immediately be taken further by the Working 
Group; 
vm. agreed that where applicable, individual weapons shall be licenced in terms of 
existing legislation 
IX. further agreed that the security forces take cognisance of the suspension of armed 
action and related activities and that the parties hereto will remain in close liaison 
with one another according to the procedure prescribed in 6 9a) of this document 
with a view to ensuring prompt and efficient reporting, investigation and 
redressing, where applicable, of all allegations of unlawful activities or activities 
contrary to the spirit of this agreement, by the security forces. 
(c) The Working Group: 
1. agreed that the population at large has a right to express its views through 
peaceful demonstrations; 
11. further agreed that it is urgent and imperative that violence and intimidation from 
whatever quarter accompanying mass action should be eliminated 
m. further agreed that peaceful political activities and stability must be promoted; 
1v. further agreed that it this end joint efforts should be made to implement the 
intentions contained in paragraphs 5 of the Groote Schuur and the Pretoria 
Minutes to ensure that grievances and conflict-creating situations are timeously 
addressed. 
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6. (a) The Working Group agreed that designated members of the ANC would work 
with government representatives in a Liaison Committee to implement this agreement, 
and that the existing nominated SAP and ANC liaison officials appointed in accordance 
with paragraph 5 of the Groote Schuur Minute shall serve as supporting structure of the 
Liaison Committee. 
(b) It is agreed that this agreement will be implemented forthwith and its objectives 
attained as speedily as possible. 
(c) It is further agreed that in view ofthe above the process of attaining the objectives 
contained in paragraph 2 of the Pretoria Minute will be realised according to the 
procedures contained in that minute. 
7. It is understood that nothing in or omitted from the agreement will be construed as 
invalidating or suspending the provisions of any law applicable in South Africa. 
8. It is recommended that this Working Group be continued to supervise the 
implementation of this agreement relating to paragraph 3 and the activities of the 
Liaison Committee and to give attention to further matters that may arise from the 
implementation of this agreement, such as proposed defence units. 
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ADDENDUME 
THE RECORD OF UNDERSTANDING 
Meeting Between the State President of the Republic of South Mrica 
and the President of the African National Congress Held at the World 
• Trade Centre on the 26 September 1992 
I. The attached Record ofUnderstanding was agreed to. 
2. On the way forward -
• The two delegations agreed that this summit has laid a basis for the resumption of 
the negotiation process. 
• To this end the ANC delegation advised the South African Government that it 
would recommend to its National Executive Committee that the process of 
negotiation be resumed, whereafter extensive bilateral discussions will be held. 
• It was agreed that the practicalities with regard to bilateral discussions will be dealt 
with through the existing channel. 
Record of Understanding 
I. Since 2I August I992 a series of meetings was held between Mr Roelf Meyer, 
Minister of Constitutional Development and Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary 
General of the African National Congress. 
These meetings entailed discussions with a view to remove obstacles towards the 
resumption of negotiations and focused on the identification of steps to be taken to 
address issues raised in earlier memoranda. The discussions took note of various 
opposing viewpoints on the relevant issues and obstacles. It was decided that these 
issues should not be dealt with exhaustively in the understanding. This document 
reflects the understanding reached at the conclusion of the discussions regarding these 
obstacles and issues. 
2. The understandings on issues and obstacles included the following, although it was 
observed that there are still other important matters that will receive attention during 
the process of negotiation: 
(a) The Government and the ANC agreed that there is a need for a democratic 
constitution assembly/constitution-making body and that for such a body to be 
democratic it must: 
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• be democratically elected; 
• draft and adopt the new constitution, implying that it should sit as a single 
chamber; 
• be bound only by agreed constitutional principles;have a fixed time frame; 
• have adequate deadlock breaking mechanisms; 
• function democratically i.e. arrive at its decisions democratically 
• with certain agreed to majorities; and 
• be elected within an agreed predetermined time period. 
Within the framework of these principles, detail would have to be worked out in the 
negotiation process. 
(b) The Government and the ANC agreed that during the interim/transitional period 
there shall be constitutional continuity and so constitutional hiatus. In consideration 
of this principle, it was further agreed that: 
• the constitution-making body/constituent assembly shall also act as the interim I 
transitional Parliament; 
• there shall be an interim/transitional government of national unity. 
• the constitution-making body/constituent assembly cum interim/transitional 
Parliament and the interim/transitional government of national unity shall function 
within a constitutional framework/transitional constitution which shall provide for 
national and regional government during the period of transition and shall 
incorporate guaranteed justiciable fundamental rights and freedoms. The 
interim/transitional Parliament may function as a one-or two-chambered body. 
(c) The two parties are agreed that all prisoners whose imprisonment is related to 
political conflict of the past and whose release can make a contribution to 
reconciliation should be released. 
The Government and the ANC agreed that the release of prisoners, namely, those who 
according to the ANC fall within the guidelines defming political offences, but 
according to the Government do not, and who have committed offences with a political 
motive on or before 8 October 1990 shall be carried out in stages (as reflected in a 
separate document: IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME: RELEASE OF 
PRISONERS) and be completed before 15 November 1992. To this end the parties have 
commenced a process of identification. It is the Government's position that all who have 
committed similar offences but who have not been charged and sentenced should be 
dealt with on the same basis. On this question no understanding could be reached as yet 
and it was agreed that the matter will receive further attention. 
As the process of identification proceeds, releases shall be effected in the above-
mentioned staged manner. Should it be found that the current executive powers of the 
State do not enable it to give effect to specific releases arising from the above 
identification the necessary legislation shall be enacted. 
(d) The Goldstone Commission has given further attention to hostels and brought out 
an urgent report on certain matters· and developments on this regard. The 
commission indicated that the problem is one of criminality and that it will have to 
investigate which localities are affected. 
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In the meantime some problematic hostels have been identified and the Government has 
undertaken as a matter of urgency to address and deal with the problem in relation to 
those hostels that have been associated with violence. Further measures will be taken, 
including fencing and policing to prevent criminality by hostel dwellers and to protect 
hostel dwellers against external aggression. A separate document (Implementation 
Programme: Hostels) records the identification of such hostels and the security 
measures to be taken in these instances. 
Progress will be reported to the Goldstone Commission and the National Peace 
Secretariat. United Nations observers may witness the progress in co-operation with the 
Goldstone Commission and the National Peace Secretariat. 
(e) In the present volatile atmosphere of violence the public display and carrying of 
dangerous weapons provokes further tension and should be prohibited. The 
Government has informed the ANC that it will issue a proclamation within weeks to 
prohibit countrywide the carrying and display of dangerous weapons at all public 
occasions subject to exemptions base on guidelines being prepared by the Goldstone 
Commission. The granting of exemptions shall be entrusted to one or more retired 
judges. On this basis, the terms of the proclamation and mechanism for exemption 
shall be prepared with the assistance of the Goldstone Commission. 
(f) The Government acknowledges the right of all parties and organisations to 
participate in peaceful mass action in accordance with the provisions of the National 
Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commissions' recommendations. The ANC for its 
part reaffirms its commitment to the provisions of the Code of Conduct for Political 
Parties arrived at under the National Peace Accord and the agreement reached on 16 
July 1992 under the auspices of the Goldstone Commission as important 
instruments to ensure democratic political activity in a climate of free political 
participation. The two parties also commit themselves to the strengthening of the 
Peace Accord process, to do everything in their power to calm down tensions and to 
fmding ways and means of promoting reconciliation in South Africa. In view ofthe 
progress made in this summit and the progress we are likely to make when 
negotiations are resumed, the ANC expresses its intention to consult its 
constituency on a basis of urgency with a view to examine the current programme 
of mass action. 
3. The two parties agreed to hold further meetings in order to address and finalise the 
following matters which were not completed at the summit: 
• Climate of free political activity. 
• Repressive/security legislation. 
• Covert operations and special forces. 
• Violence. 
Agreed to at Johannesburg on 26 September 1992: 
F W de Klerk N R Mandela 
State President President: ANC 
26 September 1992 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRENEGOTIATION PHASE (1985-1993): A CHRONOLOGY 
co 
co 
Q) 
~ 
THE MANDELA INITIATIVE 
November Kobie Coetsee meets with Nelson Mandela in 
hospital 
February Eminent Persons Group (EPG) meets with Man deJa 
in prison 
May Raids launched by P. W. Botha in Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and Botswana 
June EPG mission cancelled 
December Man deJa granted regular daytrips 
October ANC announces its preconditions for negotiations 
Committee to meet Man deJa is set up and discussions 
take place on its composition 
May First meeting of full committee with Mandela 
December Mandela transferred from Pollsmoorto Victor Verster 
prison near Paarl; meetings arranged for him with 
prominent persons/organisations 
February P.W. Botha steps down as leader of NP 
F.W. De Klerk elected as new leader 
THE EXTERNAL INITIATIVE 
February Arrangements begin for meetin g between ANC and 
intermediari es 
October First meeting between NIS intermediaries and the 
ANC 
February Second meeting between intermediaries and ANC 
August 11tird meeting between intermediaries and ANC 
December Fourth meetin g between intermediaries and ANC 
MEETINGS BETWEEN ANC AND EXTRA-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
September 
November 
Industrialists and journalists, Lusaka 
PFP delegation, Lusaka 
January Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) 
March 
April 
National Union ofS.A Students (NUSAS) 
South African Catholic Bishops Conference 
September Joint delegation from Universities of Cape Town 1 
the Westem Cape 
May 
July 
September 
May 
July 
October 
Intemational business executives 
Idasa trip to Dakar 
Prominent white South Africans, Zimbabwe 
National Democratic Movement (NDM), Frankfut 
University ofStellenbosch academics and student' 
Conference at Leverkusen attended by S.A 
academics 
March Memorandum of Mandela on th_ e_fut'--'-u __ r __ e_:o_:f_:S--.'--A'--. -------- -----.,..,--- ,.---- - - -------- ---------- B-- ------ ---------- -----
Fifth meeting between intermediari es and ANC 1 
July 
August 
September 
Meeting between Man deJa and Botha at Tuynhuys 
ANC issues Harare Decleration 
P. W. Botha resigns as State President 
De Klerk swom in as State President 
April 
June 
September 
Meetin g between Esterhuyse and Mbeki to set up 
direct NIS-ANC contact 
First direct meet ing between NIS and ANC 
Sixth meeting between intermediaries and ANC 
October Release of high profile ANC prisoners 
December Decision taken by cabinet to unban ANC and other 
oganisations 
First meeting between Mandela and De Klerk 
0 
Q) 
Q) 
~ 
March 
May 
June 
August 
February 
July 
September 
December 
Unbanning of the ANC and other organisations 
Release of Nelson Mandela from prison 
Seventh meeting between interm ediaries and 
ANC 
Second and third meetings between NIS and 
ANC to prepare for first official meeting 
between the government and the ANC 
Preparations for Groote Schuur Minute 
The Groote Schuur Minute 
Final meeting between intermediaries and 
ANC 
The Pretoria Minute 
D. F. Malan Accord 
48'" Annual ANC Conference 
lnkathagate 
National Peace Accord 
ANC-Business leader meeting which leads to 
National Economic Forum (NEF) 
l"h e start of Codesa I 
Signs of a rift between De Klerk and Man deJa 
February Working Groups start with substanti ve 
barga ining 
March All-white referen dum and increase in 
government perception of barga inin g power 
May The start ofCodesa 2 
J une Boipatong and the ANC's suspension of 
negotiations 
Start of behind-the-scenes meetings berv .. een 
Meyer and Ramaphosa which would become 
known as the Channel 
July Correspondence between De Klerk and 
Mandela on the questions of deadl ock and a 
return to negotiations 
August Government attempts to draw di ss ident parties 
into the talks 
September ANC march on Bi sho 
Signing of the Record ofUnderstanding 
November The ANC adoption of Sunset Clauses 
T imetable for the transi tion proposed by the 
government 
February Final agreement is reached between the 
government and the ANC on the natu re of the 
transition as a process in two phases 
March A series of preparatory meetings are held for a 
multiparty negotia ting forum 
April I ~te start ofthe Multiparty Negotiating Process 
+ MPNP) '"' tl" rnd of J"OO'g~i•i'" 
July Five Freedoms Forum, Lusaka 
ADDENDUMF 
LEGEND: 
• Bargaining about bargaining 
• Pre! im inary bargaining 
• Substantive bargaining 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2/.6 
BffiLIOGRAPHY 
A. Books and Journals 
Atkinson, G. Negotiating the Best Deal: Techniques that really work Cambridge: 
Director Books, 1990. 
Atkinson, G.G.M. The Effective Negotiator: A practical guide to the strategies and 
tactics of conflict and bargaining (2nd ed. ), London: Quest Research 
Publications. 1977. 
Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Co-operation. New York: Basic Books Inc. PublisherG, 
1984. 
Bacharach, S.B. and Lawler, E.J. Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes, San 
Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981. 
Bercovitch, J. "Problems and Approaches in the Study of Bargaining and 
Negotiation," Political Science, vol. 36, no. 2, December 1984. 
Bercovitch, J. "International Negotiations and Conflict Management: The Importance 
ofPrenegotiation," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 13, 
no. 1, 1991. 
Boraine, A. Dakar Report Back, Cape Town: IDASA Occasional Papers, 1987, p. 3 
Breytenbach, W.J. The ANC: Future Prognosis, University of Stellenbosch: Institute 
for Futures Research, 1989. 
Cooper, C., et al, Race Relations Survey 1988189, Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 1989. 
Cooper, C., et al, Race Relations Survey 1991/92, Johannesburg: South African. 
Institute of Race Relations, 1992. 
Cooper, C., et al, Race Relations Survey 1992/93, Johannesburg: South African 
Institute ofRace Relations, 1993. 
Crocker, C. High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1992, pp. 305 - 306. 
Deng, F.M. & Zartman, I.W. (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1991. 
Douglas, A. Industrial Peacemaking, New York and London: Columbia University 
Press, 1962. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
227 
Druckrnan, D, "Dogmatism, Prenegotiation Experience, and Simulated Group 
Representation as Determinants of Dyadic Behavior in a Bargaining 
Situation", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 6, no. 3, 1967. 
Druckman, D. "Prenegotiation Experience and Dyadic Conflict Resolution in a 
Bargaining Situation", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, no. 4, 
1968. 
Du Toit, P. "Bargaining about Bargaining: Inducing the Self-Negating Prediction in 
Deeply Divided Societies - The Case of South Africa," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 33, no. 2, June 1989. 
Du Toit, P. Power Plays: Bargaining tactics for transforming South Africa, Halfway 
House: Southern Book Publishers, 1991. 
Du Toit, P. "Bargaining Power: Dependence Capabilities and Tactical Options in 
South African Politics" Politikon, vol. 18, no. 2, June 1991. 
Du Toit, P. and Esterhuyse, W. (eds.) The Myth Makers: The elusive bargain for 
South Africa'sfuture, Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers, 1990. 
Esterhuyse, W. and Nel, P. (eds.), Die ANC, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1990. 
Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M. (eds.), State, Resistance and Change in South 
Africa, London: Croom Helm, 1988. 
Friedman, S. (ed.), The Long Journey: South Africa's quest for a negotiated 
settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993. 
Friedman, S. and Atkinson, D. (eds.), South African Review 7: The Small Miracle: 
South Africa's negotiated settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994. 
Giliomee, H. and Schlemmer, L. (eds.), Negotiating South Africa's Future, 
Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1989. 
Hill, B.J. "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem-Solving 
Workshops to Theory", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 26, no. 1, March 
1982. 
Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985. 
Horowitz, D.L. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided 
Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
Levinger, G. and Rubin, J.Z. "Bridges and Barriers to a More General Theory of 
Conflict", Negotiation Journal, vol. 10, no. 3, July 1994. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
228 
Louw, R (ed.), Four Days in Lusaka: Whites in a changing society, Five Freedoms 
Forum - African National Congress Conference, Excom: Five Freedoms 
Forum, 1989, p. 160. 
Mandela, N. Long Walk to Freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela, 
Randburg: Macdonald Purnell, 1994, pp. 497, 512. 
Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1986, p. 19. 
Morley, I. and Stephenson, G. The Social Psychology of Bargaining, London: George 
Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1977. 
Moss, G & Obery, I. South African Review 6: From 'Red Friday' to Codesa. 
Joahnnesburg: Ravan Press, p. 46. 
Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. Research Methods in the Social.Sciences, (4th ed.), 
London: Edward Arnold, 1992. 
Olivier, G. Praat met die ANC, Emmarentia: Taurus, 1985. 
Putnam, L.L. "Challenging the Assumptions of Traditional Approaches to 
Negotiation," Negotiation Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, October 1994. 
Rubin, J.Z. and Brown, B.R The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, 
New York: Academic Press, 1975. 
Saunders, H. "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-
negotiating Phases." Negotiation Journal 1, July 1985. 
Schelling, T.C. The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1960. 
Sisk, T.D. Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Smyth, L.F. "Intractable Conflicts and the Role ofldentity", Negotiation Journal, vol. 
10, no. 4, October 1994. 
Sparks, A. Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's 
Negotiated Revolution, Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 1994, p. 72. 
Stein, J.G. (ed.), Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, 
Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
Talking with the ANC. .. , Pretoria: Bureau for Information, 1986. 
Waldmeir, P. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New 
South Africa, London: Viking, 1997. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
229 
Zartman, LW. and Berman, M.R. The Practical Negotiator, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1982. 
Zartman, LW. (ed.), The 50% Solution: How to Bargain Successfully with Hijackers. 
Strikers, Bosses, Oil Magnates, Arabs, Russians, and Other Worthy 
Opponents in This Modern World, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. 
Zartman, I. W. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Zartman, I.W. & Kremenyuk, V.A. (eds.), Cooperative Security: Reducing Third 
World Wars, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995. 
B. Interviews 
Anonymous, interview by author, 9 Apri11997. 
Anonymous, interview by author, 18 April 1997 
Anonymous, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
Niel Barnard, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 25 November 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
P.W. Botha, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 1 March 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Kobie Coetsee, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 2 March 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Kobie Coetsee, interview by author, 8 October 1996 
Kobie Coetsee, interview by author, 4 April1997. 
F.W. de Klerk, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 23 November 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Pieter de Lange, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 12 October 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Willie Esterhuyse, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 25 November 1994. BC 1070, 
Hermann Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Willie Esterhuyse, interview by author, 19 June 1996 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
230 
Steven Friedman, interview by author, 3 July 1996. 
Jannie Gagiano, interview by author, May 1996. 
Chris Landsberg, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 6 December 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Mike Louw, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 29 May 1995. BC 1070, Hermann Giliomee 
Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Thabo Mbeki, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Mac Maharaj, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 16 November 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Mac Maharaj, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 31 January 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Roelf Meyer, interview by Patti Waldmeir and Michael Holman, 21 June 1994. BC 
1070, Hermann Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Roelf Meyer, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 16 November 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Roelf Meyer, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 10 February 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
RoelfMeyer, interview by author, 8 October 1996. 
RoelfMeyer, interview by author, 5 September 1997. 
Joel Netshitenzhe, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 19 May 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Olusegun Obasanjo, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 8 November 1994. BC 1070, 
Hermann Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Aziz Pahad, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 4 November 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Aziz Pahad, interviewbyPatti Waldmeir, 21 May 1995. BC 1070, Hermann Giliomee 
Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Cyril Ramaphosa, interview by Michael Holman and Patti Waldmeir, 21 June 1994. 
BC 1070, Hermann Giliomee Papers: G.~ Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Cyril Ramaphosa, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 19 January 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
231 
Joe Slovo, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 14 November 1994. BC 1070, Hermann 
Gi/iomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Sampie Terreblanche, interview by author, 18 June 1996. 
Mohammed Valli Moosa, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 27 October 1994. BC 1070, 
Hermann Gi/iomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Mohammed V alii Moosa, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 30 November 1994. BC 1070, 
Hermann Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Jacob Zuma, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 27 January 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Gi/iomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
Jacob Zuma, interview by Patti Waldmeir, 17 March 1995. BC 1070, Hermann 
Giliomee Papers: G: Patti Waldmeir interviews. 
C. Internet Resources 
gopher:/ I gopher. undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/ s77 /16 
gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s85/10 
gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1991/pr0108.01 
gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/11/anc/pr/1991/pr0527.01 
gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1991/pr0719.01 
gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1991/pr0904.01 
gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1992/pr0618.0 1 
gopher:/ I gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/pr/1992/pr0623 .01 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/conf/declare48.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistorylharare.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandelal64-90/doc890705.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandela/64-90/jabulani.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandelalpr910622.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandelalmemo920626.html 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mandela/fwletter.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/minutes.html 
http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/sp91 0700-02.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/sp91 0700-03 .html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/lett2july.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/perspect.html 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/transition/timetable.html 
http://www. udw.ac.za/UDW INP AI About.txt 
http://www.udw.ac.za/UDWINP A 
232 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
